1. Introduction

If U.S. major overseas military bases were to disappear, the United States could no longer project military power abroad, and that would adversely affect America's position as the world's most powerful country.\(^1\) To increase international political power and influence, some states prefer to acquire nuclear weapons than to create a network of bases. However, international interventions and wars are conducted with conventional weapons, and successful operations require overseas bases. As such, worldwide military bases are essential for maintaining America's influence and primacy.\(^2\)

Japan and Germany, as close allies of the United States, are more likely than non-allies to provide stable U.S. military bases. In Germany, domestic pressure against U.S. bases is rare today. In Japan, however, local protest is strong. Why do these allies react differently to U.S. military presence? How does the international security environment constrain domestic reactions to U.S. presence? The answers to those questions have meaning for the prospects of continued U.S. military presence. Recent literature on U.S. bases has focused on domestic politics of host nations in explaining U.S. military presence. Generally, one would expect that powerful domestic opposition could lead to U.S. troop withdrawal. Nonetheless, the international environment continues to force Japan to rely on the United States. In the end, Japan's security dependence and America's desire to remain in Japan play significant roles for continued U.S. presence and alliance. On the other hand, although local Germans and U.S. soldiers maintain good relations and some towns work hard to retain U.S. bases, the United States continues to reduce its military presence there. Taken together, international factors seem to exert more influence on state decisions. In this article, I show the importance of linking base politics, alliance politics, and the concept of alliance dilemma for better understanding base issues.

Keywords: U.S. Japan, Germany, overseas military bases

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1 The article is a significant revision of the paper presented at the conference, Managing the Medusa Project: U.S.-Japan Alliance Relations in Comparison with US-UK and US-Germany Ties, at Hokkaido University, August 29-30, 2006.
3 In some rare cases, such as Cuba, non-allies provide military bases to the United States.
Okinawa, however, local protest is strong. Why do these allies react differently to U.S. military presence? How does the international security environment constrain domestic reactions to U.S. presence? The answers to those questions have meaning for the prospects of continued U.S. military presence. In this article, I delineate domestic and international political factors affecting the United States as the sending nation, and Japan and Germany as the major hosts.4

Despite political differences, neither Japan nor Germany has demanded that the United States close its bases, but they have reacted differently to U.S. force realignment occurring in reaction to a changing international security environment. A comparison of domestic politics shows contrasts between the two countries.

In Germany, local citizens favor U.S. presence, but the decline of the Soviet Union, a once-formidable threat, has weakened the rationale for maintaining bases in Germany. The strong domestic voice for retaining U.S. bases may have somewhat slowed U.S. withdrawal, but the trend continues because of Europe's benign security environment. On the other hand, citizens in Okinawa, where U.S. bases are densely populated, largely oppose U.S. military presence. However, overshadowing Japanese domestic opposition to the bases is East Asia's unstable international security environment causing Japan’s government to maintain the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. bases. Relevant to the case is the concept of alliance dilemma.5

The issue of military bases is closely linked to the study of international relations in general, but few works have examined their relationship. Previous works include detailed accounts of military bases such as the number of U.S. soldiers, tanks, ships, and airplanes stationed at a particular base.6 Others have advanced political agenda calling for total withdrawal of U.S. bases.7 In recent years, however, studies on U.S. military bases have changed noticeably. For example, Kent Calder and Alexander Cooley have used political science approaches to the issue of overseas military presence.8 Andrew Yeo has explored base protests in various countries as

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4 I chose these two countries because both are major allies of the United States as well as main host countries to U.S. forces situated in different security environments.
8 Kent Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); and Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the
social movements. These trends are welcomed in the study of bases although the relative focus is on the domestic side.

The study of alliance is also important because many U.S. overseas bases are located in the territories of close allies such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The literature on alliances, such as Stephen Walt’s *The Origins of Alliances* and Glenn Snyder’s *Alliance Politics*, focus on alliance formation and politics among allies, but they discuss little about overseas military bases. Moreover, regarding studies comparing Japanese and German security issues, Peter Katzenstein and Thomas Berger have made outstanding contributions, but they have not detailed the issue of military bases. My contribution in this article, hence, is to examine both bases and alliances by looking at domestic and international political environments of Japan and Germany.

The rest of the article is organized as follows. First, I discuss the background for force realignment in Japan, focusing on the history of Okinawa’s anti-base movement since 1995. Second, I examine America’s international and domestic environments by touching on transformation and Global Posture Review (GPR). Third, I briefly explain agreements between Japan and the United States in the Force Realignment Plan. Fourth, I explore how Japan’s international and domestic environments affected their reactions to force realignment. Fifth, I examine the German case as a comparative study. Finally, I provide concluding remarks.

2. Background for Force Realignment in Japan: Protest Movement in Okinawa and SACO

U.S.-Japan alliance and base issues cannot be understood without analyzing Okinawa, which constitutes about 0.6 percent of Japanese land but is host to about 74 percent of U.S. bases in Japan. On May 15, 1972, the United States returned Okinawa to Japan, but Okinawa residents
continue to endure noise pollution and to fear that U.S. forces will cause accidents.

When three U.S. service men stationed in Okinawa raped a Japanese schoolgirl on September 4, 1995, Okinawans’ accumulated anger erupted. On October 21, dissatisfaction over the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that favorably treats suspects also provoked a massive protest. According to the organizer, 85,000 protestors demonstrated in Naha, Okinawa’s capital.16 Ten days later, on October 31, the United States and Japan formed the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO), a consultative group on base issues, which first met on November 20 to discuss how to deal with the growing anti-base movement. Five months later, on April 12, 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale announced that the Futenma Air Base, located in a crowded residential area in Okinawa, would be returned to Japan within the next five to seven years. This agreement was included in the interim SACO report that came out three days later.17

On April 17, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton met in Santa Monica, California, to announce a joint security declaration, emphasizing the importance of the alliance between the two countries.18 However, on September 8, Okinawans showed their objections by holding Japan’s first prefectural referendum (59.53 percent voting rate) in which 89 percent voted to downsize U.S. bases in Okinawa and to revise SOFA.19 The final SACO report, completed on December 2, 1996,20 confirmed that Futenma Air Base would be returned within five to seven years along with ten other facilities, amounting to about 21 percent (or 5,000 hectares) of the total U.S. bases in Okinawa.

At that time, Japan and the United States were revamping their drifting alliance ties, and were challenged to respond to the deteriorating East Asian security environment, including the North Korean nuclear crises (1993–94) and the Taiwan Strait crisis (1996). The strong local opposition to U.S. presence in Okinawa could have damaged the alliance, and both countries sensed that they could not take that risk. However, despite the SACO agreement in 1996, almost no progress occurred. Futenma Air Base was never moved to the proposed relocation site, the shore of Henoko by Camp Schwab in Okinawa, because local activists stiffly resisted it and even

rejected the government’s environmental assessment, a prerequisite for the relocation. In 2003, environmental activists filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), further delaying the plan. They argued that constructing the airbase would produce infill that would endanger the dugong, a sea cow. They demanded that DOD comply with the U.S. National Historic Preservation Act.\(^{21}\)

When DOD was negotiating the SACO deal, the United States began the transformation process, to adjust U.S. forces in response to a new security environment. As part of transformation, the Global Posture Review called for realigning U.S. bases overseas. Ultimately the GPR involving Japan was quite similar to the SACO plan created about a decade earlier.


Transformation calls for running the U.S. military more effectively and efficiently in the post-Cold War era and for emphasizing unpredictable threats such as terrorism, although traditional state threats will continue to be important. Moreover, to adjust to a new security environment, the Global Posture Review (GPR) seeks the realignment of U.S. military bases worldwide, emphasizing overseas military bases.

Transformation began in 1996 by the DOD’s initiative to reexamine the post-Cold War strategy and tactics of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines to explore how to run them more efficiently. DOD’s Transformation Planning Guidance, defines transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organizations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.”\(^{22}\)

The 2001 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review states that the U.S. national security goal is to transform the military from a threat-based model dealing with Cold War threats to a capabilities-based model dealing with twenty-first century threats. The “capabilities-based model focuses more on how an adversary might fight.”\(^{23}\) Instead of focusing on “who the adversary might be or where a war might occur,”\(^{24}\) the capabilities-based model focuses on preparing for troubles that cannot be predicted. This approach seeks to improve flexibility and mobility to send U.S. forces to future unknown trouble spots swiftly.

Speaking to Congress on September 20, 2001, President George W. Bush said “[t]o contend with uncertainty and to meet the many security challenges we face, the United States will require bases and stations within and beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, as well as

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\(^{24}\) Ibid.
temporary access arrangements for the long-distance deployment of U.S. forces.”

In August 2003, the United States announced the GPR calling for realigning U.S. forces abroad to more effectively and efficiently confront new threats such as terrorism. On November 25, President Bush announced that the United States would review its relationships with its allies around the globe: “Beginning today, the United States will intensify our consultations with the Congress and our friends, allies, and partners overseas on our ongoing review of our overseas force posture. We will ensure that we place the right capabilities in the most appropriate locations to best address the new security environment.” On August 16, 2004, Bush said “Over the next ten years, the president’s plan will close hundreds of U.S. facilities overseas and bring home about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees.”

Moreover, the 2006 DOD Quadrennial Defense Review suggests that the United States has been “adjusting the U.S. global military force posture, making long overdue adjustments to U.S. basing by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons, and placing emphasis on the ability to surge quickly to trouble spots across the globe.” Such force realignment is now underway in allies that provide U.S. bases.

In sum, with the end of the Cold War and especially after 9/11, the United States has emphasized dealing with unpredictable threats such as terrorism relative to threats emanating from traditional states. To meet new security challenges, the United States has reemphasized the significance of overseas bases and the need to realign overseas base structure accordingly.

4. The Force Realignment Plan and Japan

The force realignment plan unavoidably affected Japan, a provider of major U.S. bases. Japan and the United States took three steps to reach a final agreement and to establish the Roadmap for Force Realignment Implementation.

4.1. Three Steps

In the first stage, Japan and the United States agreed on common strategic objectives. In the second stage, they delineated the roles, missions, and capabilities of Japan's Self Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. Armed Forces. In the final stage, they devised a roadmap for realignment implementation.

This speech was also included in The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 29.


First, on February 19, 2005, the Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee set common strategic goals at a regional level. The goals included peaceful unification of the two Koreas, peaceful resolution regarding North Korean nuclear programs, and resolution of the Taiwan Strait issue. The four defense and state ministers of both countries, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Minister for Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura, and Minister of State for Defense Yoshinori Ohno, also sought transparency for China's military. At a global level, both countries agreed to tackle terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

Second, on October 29, 2005, once again the ministers met to discuss the “U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” outlining the roles, missions, and capabilities of SDF and of the U.S. forces, as well as force posture realignment. Both countries recomfirmed that “[t]he U.S. will maintain forward-deployed forces, and augment them as needed, for the defense of Japan as well as to deter and respond to situations in areas surrounding Japan.” Regarding nuclear deterrence: “U.S. strike capabilities and the nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. remain an essential complement to Japan’s defense capabilities in ensuring the defense of Japan and contribute to peace and security in the region.” Moreover, the document discussed transforming the SDF, enabling it to act jointly with the American military by strengthening joint operational coordination. Their recommendations for realigning U.S. forces stationed in Japan became the foundation of the next document.

Third, “The Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” (May 1, 2006) included the finalized content. Following the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee (SCC) meeting, the four ministers (Rice and Rumsfeld were involved, but Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso and Minister of State for Defense Fukushiro Nukaga replaced Machimura and Ohno) released a joint statement in which both nations agreed to continue the alliance to deal with future threats, and to adjust the alliance to meet demands from the changing security environment. Touching on the issue of realigning U.S. forces, the document stressed that “these realignment initiatives are

29 “Joint Statement U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee,” February 19, 2005, file://G:\www_bk\j\news\youjin\2005\02\0219_2plus2\04.htm (accessed January 24, 2006).
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
essential to strengthen the foundation of alliance transformation.” The term **alliance transformation** was new. On the day the meeting was held, Defense Minister Fukushiro Nukaga said that the alliance seemed to be reaching a new height.\(^{35}\) Obviously both countries desired not only further cooperation but also changes in the alliance: the United States would no longer protect Japan in return for Japan providing the bases; instead, Japan would cooperate on military missions. The roadmap was considered important because it affects where U.S. forces will be deployed and strengthens U.S.-Japanese security ties, especially when some SDFs and U.S. headquarters will be co-located at the same base in Japan.

### 4.2. The Roadmap for Force Realignment Implementation

The roadmap deals with six issues: (1) realignment in Okinawa, (2) improvement of U.S. Army command and control capability, (3) Yokota Air Base and Air Space, (4) relocation of Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, (5) missile defense, and (6) training relocation. The first two are especially important.

The first core component in the agreement is base realignment in Okinawa, specifically, where to relocate Futenma. The Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF), to be completed by 2014, is configured basically as landfill and includes “two runways aligned in a ‘V’-shape, each runway having a length of 1,600 meters plus two 100-meter overruns. The length of each runway portion of the facility is 1,800 meters, exclusive of seawalls.”\(^{36}\) Unless FRF is completely operational, the United States does not plan to relocate forces there nor will it operate fighter aircraft from there. Hence, before MCAS Futenma is returned to Japan, the United States will examine bases used by the Air Self Defense Forces at Nyutabaru City (Miyazaki Prefecture) and Tsuiki City (Fukuoka Prefecture). If needed, facilities may be improved, but the roadmap does not clarify which country will bear the costs.

The relocation plan, scheduled for completion by 2014, calls for relocating from Okinawa Prefecture to Guam about 8,000 Marine personnel (III Marine Expeditionary Force, or IIIMEF) and about 9,000 dependents. Units not directly engaged in combat will be relocated: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Command Element, Third Marine Division headquarters, Third Marine Logistics Groups-formerly Force Service Support Group headquarters, First Marine Air Wing headquarters, and Twelfth Marine Regiment headquarters. U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) air-ground task force elements, including “command, ground, aviation, and combat service support” and “a base support capability” will remain to ensure deterrence. This relocation plan affects units mainly from Camp Courtney, Camp Hansen, MCAS Futenma, Camp Zukeran, and Makiminato Service Area. Relocation costs are estimated at $10.27 billion. Japan has agreed to cover 59 percent ($6.89 billion with $2.8 billion in direct cash), and the United States, 31 percent ($3.18 billion).

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35 “Nihon no se ni omoi yakuokusu [Japan shoulders a heavy promise],” *Asahi Shimbun*, May 2, 2006, 5.
36 “United States-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation.”
The second important agreement is about Army command and control structure. By U.S. fiscal year 2008, the United States would transform the structure of Camp Zama’s Army command and control, integrating command functions for U.S. Army’s First Corps at Fort Lewis in Washington State with Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. Furthermore, by Japan fiscal year 2012, Ground SDF Central Readiness Force headquarters is to be co-located at Zama, and SDF helicopters could use Camp Zama’s Kastner heliport. Using U.S. funds, the United States would construct a battle command training center and various support facilities inside the Sagami General Depot (SGT).

Thus the United States and Japan took three steps between 2005 and 2006 before they agreed to the base realignment plan. With this background for force realignment, Japan faces dilemmas in dealing with the plan. Overall, the Japanese people are most pleased that citizens living close to U.S. bases in Okinawa will have their burden lifted. The Japanese government also wants to alleviate those burdens, but it is more concerned about maintaining deterrence.

5. Japan’s Reactions to the U.S. Force Realignment Plan

Local opposition has been generally strong against U.S. bases, but not strong enough for the Japanese government to consider requesting the withdrawal of U.S. soldiers because U.S. military presence is essential for countering potential threats in East Asia. Moreover, providing the United States with military bases in Japan is a key component of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As such, Japan is reluctant to jeopardize the alliance. The alliance dilemma affected Japan’s reactions to force realignment.

5.1. Domestic Reactions to the U.S. Force Realignment Plan

Continuing to maintain Futenma Base in a densely populated area is problematic. If another serious incident occurs, it will arouse stronger anti-base and anti-U.S. protests across Okinawa, which would not only threaten U.S. military presence in Okinawa but also the U.S.-Japan alliance itself. Removing Futenma from the center of the city to a less densely populated area would reduce the chances of accidents, but strong resistance at candidate sites has made relocation difficult.

In 2004, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi announced that local governments in mainland Japan would share Okinawa’s burden. Camp Fuji (Gotemba City, Shizuoka Prefecture) was a candidate, but in July the mayor rejected requests by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Henoko in Nago City in Okinawa Prefecture has been another proposed relocation site since the mid-1990s, but again strong protests interfere.

37 For negotiations regarding Futenma relocation, see Takemasa Moriya, “Futenma” koushou hiroku [The secret negation of Futenma] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2010).
38 “Shushou hondo iten wo meigen [Prime minister clearly states that relocation would take place in the mainland],” Asahi Shimbun, October 2, 2004, 1.
Similarly, in the relocation plan involving other bases in mainland Japan, 90 percent of citizens in Iwakuni City, Yamaguchi Prefecture, have opposed the relocation of fighter jets from Atsugi City, Kanagawa Prefecture.\footnote{“Beigun ukeire hantai 9 wari [90 percent oppose accepting U.S. soldiers],” \textit{Asahi Shimbun}, March 13, 2006, 1.}

Under the new and first Democratic government, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (September 2009–June 2010) heightened Okinawans’ hopes during the election campaign by discussing moving Futenma Base. After he became Prime Minister, he negotiated with the island of Tokunoshima, Kagoshima Prefecture, to no avail. He claimed to have another plan but never revealed it. Moreover, his attempt to reconsider a previously arranged plan raised U.S. concerns and damaged the bilateral relationship. In the end, he could not find a relocation site. Taking responsibility for the debacle, he resigned.

The new Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, an ardent supporter of the U.S.-Japan alliance, began a new administration in December 2012, and tried to hasten the relocation plan by increasing the Okinawa Promotion Funds\footnote{“Okinawa shinko 3001 okuen, 3 nenrenzoku rainendo seifu yosanan [Okinawa promotion fund to be 300.1 billion yen],” \textit{Nippon Keizai Shimbun}, January 30, 2013, http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNZ051136280ZZ0C13A11LX000/ (accessed April 1, 2013).} linked with the return of five U.S. bases located in southern Okinawa Prefecture.\footnote{“Okinawa beigunkichi Kadena inan henkan ‘Futenma kirihanashi’ o tekkai [Okinawa U.S. bases south of Kadena to be returned],” March 31, 2013, \textit{Mainichi Shimbun}, http://mainichi.jp/select/news/20130331k0000m010076000c.html (accessed April 5, 2013).} The previous Democratic government delinked the Futenma relocation and the return of the five bases to soften criticisms against the Democrats, but Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party re-sent the message to Okinawa Prefecture that Futenma must be relocated or the other bases would not be returned, thereby pressuring Okinawa Prefecture to act on the Futenma relocation plan. Abe has been more forceful in implementing the agreement, but the prospect for successful relocation is uncertain. All in all, strong protests both within and outside Okinawa have failed to close U.S. bases in Okinawa. The international environment, particularly the issue of alliance, affects the case.

\subsection*{5.2. International Environment Affecting the Alliance and Base Issues in Japan}

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan alliance drifted apart for a short time after the Cold War, but uncertainties in the security environment in East Asia brought them back together. The alliance dilemma incentivized Japan to maintain its alliance with the United States as well as U.S. bases in its territory. While some Japanese officials feared that the United States would drag them into U.S.-initiated wars in areas outside East Asia, concerns about North Korean nuclear weapons and the rise of China persuade Japanese policymakers to remain close with the United States. Alliance dilemma and the likelihood of U.S. abandonment affect Japan’s calculation regarding base issues and alliances in general.
Glenn Snyder devised the *alliance dilemma* concept: when a state decides to cooperate with its allies, it increases its risks of being entrapped in unwanted conflicts. If the state decides not to cooperate, it increases its risks of being abandoned. In a multipolar system of many great powers, alignment patterns are more fluid; thus fears of abandonment and entrapment both heighten the dilemma. During much of the bipolar Cold War, a U.S. alliance was considered Japan's best option. At the same time, relying on the United States under bipolarity security meant a dominant fear of entrapment. The fear of abandonment, however, was still present. With the détente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s, Japan saw the possibility of abandonment.

Has the balance between the two risks changed with the end of the Cold War? Stephen Walt's balance of threat theory suggests that an alliance without a common threat loses rationale for its existence. The end of a bipolar system, therefore, should relax U.S.-Japan ties. The U.S.-Japan Alliance, according to Yoichi Funabashi, was “drifting apart” in the immediate years after the Cold War. Such a situation should generate fears of both entrapment and abandonment. But the Japanese feared abandonment relatively more strongly because that fear had been relatively weak for about 40 years.

The time for drifting apart was short, however. The alliance began to tighten after the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crises and the 1996 Taiwan Straits crisis, which showed that East Asian states are relatively freer to act now that the superpowers imposed weaker structural constraints on them after the Cold War. With the security environment directly threatening Japan, it is drawn to cooperate closely with the United States. In the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton agreed that the two countries would start revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation of 1978.

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43 Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics.”

44 On alliance dilemma and U.S.-Japan alliance, see Jitsuo Tuchiyama, “Araiansu jirenma to nihon no doumei gaikou: nichibei doumei no owari [Alliance dilemma and Japanese alliance politics],” *Leviathan*, no. 13 (1993): 50–75. Michael Green also writes about alliance dilemma and the U.S.-Japan alliance, but from a different view, focusing on defense production. He writes, “The role of defense production has been a particularly important way for Japan to define its autonomy within the U.S.-Japan alliance, first because it embeds Japanese security within the goal of economic growth, and second because other hedge against entrapment and autonomy…have all been politically or constitutionally problematic — if not impossible — for Japan.” See his *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 3.

45 Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*.


47 Masahiro Akiyama, *Nichibei no senryaku taiwaga hajimatta: Anpo saiteigi no butaiura* [The Japan-U.S. strategic dialogue has begun] (Tokyo: Aki Shobo, 2002), pp. 241–243. Many presume it was not just the 1993 North Korean crisis but also the Taiwan Strait Crisis of March 1996 that gave Japan and the United States an incentive to work closely. While he does not deny that, Akiyama argues that after 1993 North Korean crisis, Japan has already been working on how to cooperate more smoothly and
Japan hopes to see bilateral cooperation mainly in East Asia, while the United States expects it on a global level. America’s preference seems to have won over that of Japan’s. For example, one force realignment plan included moving army command from Washington State to Camp Zama. The Washington command oversees operations from Singapore to the Indian Ocean. Article 6 of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, however, stipulates that the United States can use bases/facilities in Japan to contribute to Japan’s security as well as to peace and security of the Far East. Japan is concerned that it would be supporting wars in areas beyond the Far East if integrations between U.S. forces and Japanese SDF proceed further, as stated in the October 2005 2 Plus 2 (or Security Consultative Committee) document.

In August 2004, with approval of Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiroyuki Hosoda, Minister of Defense Shigeru Ishiba, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) secretly drafted a letter to the United States objecting to co-location of the U.S. Army Corps I in Camp Zama because it would stretch SDF activities to the Middle East, and thus violate the “Far East” clause. Moreover, on August 27, 2004, Shin Ebihara, MOFA Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau and Kazuki Iihara, JDA Director-General of the Defense Policy Bureau, met with Richard Armitage, then Deputy Secretary of State at the State Department, and reiterated the difficulties of accepting a new command to Zama. MOFA’s Treaties Bureau (currently the International Legal Affairs Bureau) has particularly advocated adhering strictly to the article.

Japan’s SDF, however, has already supported U.S. wars afar. Japan quickly passed two laws specifically to back U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although Japan was not engaged in combat missions, by sending troops to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, they may already have been entrapped into U.S. wars. It also means that the SDF have expanded their geographical responsibilities outside the Far East. Practically, SDF has already violated both the letters and spirit of Article 6.

Such developments are because Japan’s fear of abandonment outweighs the fear of entrapment. The East Asian security environment is fluid, and Japan needs U.S. bases as well as continued U.S. alliance to counter future contingencies. As such, Japan cannot reject U.S. demands to bring the command from Washington, although it entails future activities beyond the Far East. Moreover, Japan agreed to shoulder 60 percent of costs to relocate U.S. Marines in Okinawa to Guam, but this too seems to be from the fear of abandonment.

In sum, at the top level, Japan does not consider it rational to demand U.S. troop withdrawal,
as strategic calculations shape force deployment plans. Although former Prime Minister Hatoyama took a unique stance on Okinawan bases, even he did not call for withdrawal of major American bases in Okinawa or for ending the alliance. He said, “Deterrence including nuclear deterrence as well as Japan-U.S. Security Treaty are needed in the Asia-Pacific region.”

In fact, no serious politicians, Democrats or Liberal Democrats, have opposed the U.S.-Japan alliance or questioned the significance of Okinawan bases. Japan’s fear of abandonment by the United States in case of contingencies led Japan to concede to U.S. demands such as partial integration of command. The fear also contained local protests in Okinawa.

6. Germany Compared

In stark contrast with Japan where many Okinawans longed for U.S. troop withdrawal, and where potential sites resisted base relocations, Germans were reluctant to lose U.S. forces. Why did the Japanese and Germans react to force realignment so differently? Moreover, although German local governments tried strongly, why did they fail to stall U.S. force reduction?

6.1. The Force Realignment Plan and Germany

On March 25, 2004, the Washington Post reported that the DOD had drafted plans to withdraw U.S. forces from countries such as Germany by as much as 50 percent of the 71,000 stationed there. Commenting on the Army, one official said the United States would withdraw “more than 60 percent of its 56,000 (Army) troops in Germany.”

Although officials declined to comment, top U.S. officials met on May 20, 2004 to discuss the Pentagon plan. According to U.S. Army Chief of Staff Peter Schoomaker, the United States was planning to withdraw two heavy divisions from Germany: First Armored Division and First Infantry Division, located in Bavaria, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate, constituting more than half of those stationed in Germany, many of whom served in Iraq. Once the divisions return to the United States, they may be replaced by the Stryker division, which is much smaller but more lightly armored and mobile than traditional divisions. If the plans are implemented, about 40,000 troops will remain in Germany.

President Bush spoke about the GPR on August 16, 2004. Regarding the expected changes in Europe, he emphasized that infrastructures built during the Cold War were no longer relevant and should be eliminated. Heavy forces used for land warfare would no longer be needed and

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would return to the United States. He reiterated that heavy divisions in Germany would be replaced with rapidly deployable forces.\textsuperscript{55} In late July 2005, the DOD announced that 11 bases would be returned to Germany in fiscal 2007: “scheduled as part of plans for the 1st Infantry Division headquarters’ return to the United States with its divisional flag in the summer of 2006. Additionally, the 1st Infantry Division’s subordinate units, as well as selected V Corps and U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) units will return to the United States, inactivate entirely, convert, or be reassigned in Europe to support Army transformation in fiscal 2006.”\textsuperscript{56}

6.2. Germany’s Domestic Reactions to U.S. Force Withdrawal

In February 2003, to persuade the United Nations to pass a resolution that would increase the legitimacy for the United States to invade Iraq, Secretary of State Collin Powell insisted that Iraq was clandestinely developing WMDs and refusing to cooperate with inspectors. However, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder opposed the resolution mainly for domestic political reasons. German, French, and Russian opposition killed the resolution, souring U.S. relations particularly with France and Germany. The United States threatened to withdraw U.S. troops from Germany and cancel commercial contracts, but for economic and social reasons, officials and citizens in German local governments where U.S. bases are located tried to halt U.S. force withdrawals.

U.S. officials, especially at the DOD, were furious at the Germans and wanted to damage economic relations by terminating military and industrial cooperation. Department hawks tried to make Germany an example to show what would happen to a country for defying the United States. According to one Pentagon source, “The aim is to hit German trade and commerce. It is not just about taking out the troops and equipment; it is also about cancelling commercial contract and defense-related arrangements.”\textsuperscript{57} Industries in Germany support the U.S. Army in Europe by providing missiles and equipment. Defense companies such as Diehl, a missile maker; EADS Deutschland, aerospace and defense giant; Rheinmetall, armaments maker; and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann, a vehicle maker, earn billions of euros every year, and they are most likely to lose from U.S. withdrawal.\textsuperscript{58}

Small towns in Germany where U.S. forces are stationed also feared that U.S. withdrawal would damage the local economy.\textsuperscript{59} The U.S. Army’s First Infantry Division’s home is in the


\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{59} This starkly contrasts with the Japanese case where most local governments do not want U.S. forces.
southern city of Wuerzburg. A spokesman there worries about base closure, because thousands of local jobs depend on U.S. forces.\textsuperscript{60} The Kaiserlautern Military Community (KMC) will also likely be affected because it has more than 20,000 Army and Air Force troops, civilians, and retirees, and the same number of U.S. dependents. According to the annual report of the 435\textsuperscript{th} Comptroller Squadron at Ramstein Air Base, in 2003 KMC brought about $1.29 billion to the local economy.\textsuperscript{61} About 20 percent of Birkenfeld district’s GDP depends on the Baumholder military base, where parts of the First Infantry Division are currently stationed. Werner Knauth, press spokesman for the district, is greatly concerned about repercussions from base closings.

German officials have tried to convince the Americans to remain in Germany. Eric Schaefer, press spokesman for the Interior Ministry of Rhineland-Palatinate, said, “We’re now in negotiations with the Americans, trying to make it appealing for them to stay at their current sites.”\textsuperscript{62} Mayors in German towns where U.S. troops are stationed have also tried to halt further withdrawal with a strategy I call \textit{bond appealing}. Thirteen mayors from Germany visited Washington: “They met with several members of Congress, including House Speaker Dennis Hastert, R-Ill., and a team from the Pentagon, including Air Force Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Secretary of the Air Force James Roche and acting Secretary of the Army Les Brownlee.” The mayors “praised U.S. service members and their families for being wonderful guests,” and argued that Germany already has the necessary infrastructure, and that they can “guarantee a good future for troops.”\textsuperscript{63}

Differences between Japan and Germany can also be found in the good relationships between U.S. soldiers and German locals. Consider an article excerpt:

American GIs walk the streets, eat at local restaurants, and marry Baumholder’s daughters. Female soldiers and the wives of GIs have their hair done at the local beauty parlor, and their children play on local soccer teams. Sigrid Zimmer, proprietor of the Berghof Hotel, has often taken an active role supporting US troops in Baumholder. When the soldiers from the base shipped off to Iraq last year, she organized a drive to send care packages. “When they left for Iraq it was just terrible,” she says. “Those are our boys, too. It just won’t be the same without them.” Zimmer pulls out a handful of thank-you letters

that soldiers wrote from Iraq. She is particularly fond of a letter from Pfc. Roy Scranton, who wrote: “It is the thought of such kind and openhearted people back home that makes our hard work here worthwhile and carries us through our daily struggle.” “When he referred to Baumholder as home, I just cried my heart out,” she says.  

An excerpt from another article stands in stark contrast with the Okinawan situation:

No one is afraid of the Americans, who, with 13,000 people, make up the town’s majority—the base has the largest concentration of combat arms soldiers outside the mainland United States. Instead, most of Baumholder’s 5,000 German residents are willing to show some leniency toward the young troops. Friendships have developed over the years and the Germans worried along with American families about the spouses, parents and friends in Iraq. Before that, it was Kuwait. Before that, Vietnam.  

Furthermore, in Schweinfurt, Bavaria, more than 10 percent of the 300 marriages were between Germans and Americans in 2003. The relationships between the base and town were “at times, even a love affair.” However, strong appeal from local governments and citizens could not stop U.S. force withdrawal from Germany.

6.3. International Environment Affecting U.S. Force Withdrawal from Germany

Compared with East Asia, Europe’s security environment is quite stable. Even if the United States had not “punished” Germany by threatening to reduce U.S. forces, the United States nonetheless continued to reduce troops simply because no serious threat looms. Neither the fear of entrapment nor abandonment is in force. Thus, no matter how Germans long for continued U.S. military presence for economic and other reasons, American soldiers will likely continue leaving Germany.

As explained before, after Germany opposed the Iraq War, the United States announced plans to withdraw troops from Germany. Fearing more opposition from allies, the United States was apparently signaling consequences they might suffer if they defied U.S. leadership: “Last month [February 2003], German Defense Minister Peter Stuck said he was told the United States had no plans to reduce its troops in Germany, but White House spokesman Ari Fleischer hinted several days later that the United States was mulling over plans to restructure its overseas troops.” Moreover, “the German military attaché here, Col. Carsten Jacobson, expressed surprise when told the force reduction could end up in the range of 50 percent. ‘It’s definitely higher than what we’ve heard so far,’ he said, adding that his understanding was the proposed

cuts were in the rage of 20 to 30 percent.”

On February 11, 2003, Duncan Hunter, Republican Chairman of the House Armed Service Committee, announced hearings concerning U.S forces in Europe, primarily focused on Germany. He emphasized that the planned hearings were not intended to punish Germany for opposing America’s plans to attack Iraq, but “Germany’s and France’s opposition of the use of military force to oust Saddam Hussein has ‘brought the issue to the forefront.’” He also mentioned that withdrawing troops was not just about bringing troops and families back home, but also about “creating bases in ‘more cost-friendly environments’ in some of the Eastern European nations that have recently joined or been invited to join NATO.”

With the end of the Cold War, the United States has been adjusting its force structure overseas to reflect the needs of the changing security environment. As such, Germany’s opposition to the Iraq War per se was probably not the primary reason for withdrawing U.S. troops. Douglas J. Feith, Pentagon undersecretary for policy, said “the changes in troop levels were in no way connected to Germany’s opposition to the U.S.-led war in Iraq.” While he may have been speaking diplomatically, the remarks have some truth. When the Cold War ended, more than 300,000 U.S. troops were in Europe; in the late 1990s, 244,200 were in Germany. By 2004, U.S. forces in Europe were cut by one third to 114,000. In December 2012, according to DOD, the number was down to 45,596. This suggests that domestic demand for continued U.S. presence, no matter how strong, did not stall further reduction of U.S. soldiers in Germany. Rather, changes in the international security environment seem to account for the trend.

7. Conclusion

In this article, I have shown first that international structural change after the Cold War induced the United States to reconsider its strategy from focusing on Soviet Union containment to focusing on terrorism and the rise of China. With this change, the United States has begun

68 Graham, “U.S. May Halve Forces in Germany.”
70 “U.S. Troop Pullout Would Hit Germany Hard.”
73 U.S. Department of Defense, Statistical Information Analysis Division (SIAD), Personnel and Procurement Statistics, December 31, 2012 (DMDC data), http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm (accessed April 3, 2013). SIAD provides the data, “Active Duty Military Personnel by Service by Region/Country,” which has been updated quarterly since 1950 (except for 1951–52), but no longer does so after March 31, 2012. Defense Manpower Data Center’s (DMDC) data beginning June 30, 2013 is included in the website as it provides similar data. DMDC serves under the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The name of the DMDC data is “Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength Total Military Personnel and Dependent End Strength.”
Aligning U.S. forces stationed overseas. I examined domestic reactions to U.S. force realignment in two host countries, Japan and Germany, as well as the international security environment and alliance relations.

Strong anti-base movements occur particularly in Okinawa, but the security environment forces Japan to need U.S. bases and to continue the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Japanese government’s stance on force realignment is to reduce the burden in Okinawa, but not to sacrifice the level of deterrence. Despite local opposition to U.S. bases, top Japanese politicians recognize that U.S. military presence is still crucial for Japan’s security and for maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance. As such, the fear of being abandoned by the United States in case of contingencies constrains the domestic voice.

Germany’s opposition to the Iraq War in 2003 alarmed Washington policymakers, and some called for punishing Germany by cutting defense-related business opportunities and reducing U.S. troops more than initially planned. In response, mayors of some German cities even travelled to Washington to lobby for continued U.S. presence. German reactions to U.S. “punishment” showed how much those municipalities want to keep U.S. soldiers. However, Europe lacks immediate threat, and America’s strategic shift from Europe to Asia seems to be more fundamental in limiting domestic demands.

Recent literature on U.S. bases has focused on domestic politics of host nations in explaining the prospects for U.S. presence. Generally, one would expect that powerful domestic opposition could lead to U.S. troop withdrawal. Nonetheless, as discussed, the international environment continues to force Japan to rely on the United States. In the end, Japan’s security dependence and America’s desire to remain in Japan play significant roles for continued U.S. presence and alliance. Although local Germans and U.S. soldiers maintain good relations and some towns work hard to retain U.S. bases, the United States continues to reduce its military presence there. Taken together, international factors seem to exert more influence on state decisions. In this article, I showed the importance of linking base politics, alliance politics, and the concept of alliance dilemma for better understanding base issues.

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74 Masaaki Gabe is skeptical on this point, however. He questions whether maintaining the level of deterrence is possible when U.S. Marines are to leave Okinawa. See his _Sengo nichibei kankei to anzen hosho_ [The post-war Japan-U.S. relations and security] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 2007), 12.