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Growing Religiosity Among Central Asian Migrants in Russia
Why Does Migration 'Theologise'?

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This article analyses why a significant number of Central Asian migrants become more religious in Russia than they were at home. Although debate is emerging on the influence of migration on the religiosity of Central Asians in Russia, it is not yet clear in what circumstances migration 'theologizes'. Here, we use the word 'theologize' to indicate how migration leads a migrant to become more religious.

Insecurity and contexts of reception theories are used in answering this question. I argue that the insecurity theory that was tested in mostly Western countries to explain growing religiosity of immigrants should be looked upon more broadly when applied to other contexts. The very living conditions of a labour migrant, the environment in which he lives, and circumstances he faces every day in Russia incline and push him to seek solace and comfort in religion. It is suggested that the feelings of insecurity—not only economic (mostly in terms of finding a job), but also psychological and existential—are critical factors in such circumstances. Previous research on immigrant religiosity in the West has mostly focused on economic and, to a lesser degree, existential aspects of insecurity while explaining the religious behaviour of immigrants. However, while not ignoring the importance of feelings of economic security, I argue that in the Russian case, psychological and existential (physical) insecurities play a more apparent role in affecting the religious behaviour of many Central Asian labour migrants. Sources of insecurity include but are not limited to bad living conditions far away from close family members, the local population's xenophobia, psychological and financial pressure from officials (police and immigration authorities), contrasts in the cultures of migrants' own and host countries, and secluded lifestyle within their own groups.

In this regard, by examining more deeply the migrants' feelings of insecurity, specific aspects peculiar to the growing religiosity among Central Asian migrants in Russia are explored.

Keywords: Migration, Religion, Central Asia, Russia

Introduction

For the last several years, Russia has been a major destination for international migrants. There were more than 10 million migrants in the country as of November 2016 (RBK, 2016). Around four million people come from Central Asian countries[1]. Currently, there are 1.9 million people from Uzbekistan, 1.06 million people from Tajikistan and 620,000 people from Kyrgyzstan in Russia (RANEPA, 2017). Labour migration from Central Asian countries has been the preferred livelihood strategy due to poverty, lack of jobs and other adverse economic conditions in their home countries.

Most of these migrants travel to Russia for seasonal work; depending on the availability of jobs, many migrants return to their home countries in winter and travel again to Russia in spring. Harsh socio-economic situations and labour force redundancy are major factors in the formation of such a mass labour migration to Russia

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[1] Central Asian migrants in Russia come mainly from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The number of migrants from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in Russia is significantly low.

(Marat, 2009; Urinboev, 2017). Migrants send home a considerable amount of their wages. In 2016, approximately USD 7 billion were sent to home countries by Central Asian migrants in Russia (Migrant Ferghana, 2017).

Most of the migrants from Central Asia in Russia are employed in low-paid, low-skilled, and socially inferior jobs in construction, trade, transport, and housing services. The overwhelming majority of migrants live in appalling conditions (Gorst, 2011). Most of the labour migrants are undocumented[2] which impedes their adaptation to local contexts. They are often subject to police checks and have to bribe law enforcement and other government officials. The health of most Central Asians deteriorates during their stay in Russia as they are routinely exposed to bad living conditions, poor hygiene, as well as lack of or limited access to health care, etc. (Marat, 2013). In order to save as much money as possible, most migrants choose to live in large groups crammed into small apartments and barracks.

On the other hand, a growing number of Russians perceives migrants as potential criminals and carriers of alien socio-cultural and ethno-religious identities (Kolsto & Blakkisrud, 2016). This has led to growing suspicion and dislike by the local population, mostly by ethnic Russians and Orthodox Slavs, towards ever-growing masses of Central Asian migrants that are Muslims in their majority (Buryanov, 2007). The media's negative portrayal of migrants has led the general population, activists, and right-wing groups to urge government agencies to reinforce stricter control of migrant inflows and even the use of force in anti-immigration campaigns (Mukomel, 2014).

As a response, most of the migrants from Central Asia in Russia now observe social distance from the local people for safety and security reasons. They tend to live in their enclosed communities. Migrants remain closed in their ethnic or regional social network, and live a largely isolated lifestyle (IWPR, 2014).

In this regard, Islam, a religion of the overwhelming majority of Central Asian migrants, provides what they seek. What we can observe in this situation is that many Central Asian migrants become more religious when they are in a host country such as Russia. They may not always consider themselves overly Muslim when they are at home (de Cordier, 2015; Roche, 2014; Tucker, 2015).

Apart from scholars, Russian, Western, and Central Asian mass media channels have been reporting for the last several years on stories of many young people who have become more religious while working as migrants in Russia. Several stories especially in the last year concern those 'former migrants' who have found themselves among the fighters of the Islamic State in Syria. Concerns that many migrants were radicalizing during their stay in Russia were expressed by government officials and state-controlled media of Central Asian states as well (Uzbekistan TV 2017). This tendency has spread further since the April 2017 terrorist attack in St. Petersburg (allegedly committed by people of Central Asian origin), following which a Russian security chief alleged that Central Asian labour migrant communities were 'a hotbed of terrorism in Russia.'

This article does not claim that migration 'theologises' all or even the majority of Central Asian migrant workers in Russia. In most cases there is no direct correlation between migration and the migrants' religious devotion; many people do not change their religious practices before, during or after migration (Abashin, 2017). Moreover, thousands of migrants hardly have time to think about religion under the pressure of long and tiring work conditions. Nevertheless, there is a significant number of migrants from Central Asia who become more pious and devout while living and working in Russia and their case should not be ignored. The reasons and roots for this growing religiosity deserve a thorough analysis.

So, why do some Central Asian migrants become more religious in Russia than when at home? There is a growing literature explaining the reason for radicalization of Central Asians as a response to strict government control and oppressive policies towards religious people in home countries in the region. In answering the central question of this paper—why migrants who are not necessarily observant at home become more religious upon migration to Russia—I argue that the insecurity theory used in mostly Western countries to explain the growing religiosity of immigrants should be looked upon more broadly. Migrants' dire living conditions in Russia push them to search for solace and comfort in Islam. It is argued that the feelings of insecurity—not only economic (in terms of finding a job, mostly), but also psychological and existential—are critical factors in such circumstances. Literature on the religiosity of immigrants in the West mostly focus on economic and, to a lesser degree, existential aspects of insecurity to explain the religious behaviour of immigrants. However, the case of Central Asian labour migrants in Russia is different because both Russians and Central Asians for several decades lived in a single state where atheism was advanced by state authorities. The religiosity of Central Asian migrants differs from that of their 'counterparts' in Western countries and most of them do not plan to stay in Russia permanently, i.e., their strategies of assimilating and adapting differ reasonably. Another serious difference is the extremely high level of xenophobia in Russia, mostly by ethnic Russians, towards Central Asians. These differences create distinct sources of feelings of insecurity. This article argues that psychological and existential (physical) insecurities play greater roles in affecting the religious behaviour of many Central Asian migrants while at the same time not ignoring the importance of feelings of economic insecurity.

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[2] Migrants from Central Asia do not need a visa to enter Russia. However, in order to legally stay and work, migrants need work permits (*patent*) and register a place of residence. Unlike in Western countries, a Central Asian migrant can enter Russia legally, but may become illegal or undocumented if he or she overstays the allowed period (90 days) and/or works without proper documents.

Empirical data for this article was gathered in short field trips to Russia and during interviews with migrants from Central Asia in 2013-2015. The interviews took place in Russia and Uzbekistan, and were conducted via Skype. Life stories of several migrants from Central Asia serve as the main data for analysis. At the same time, this article refers to mass-media stories of those 'former' migrants who have left Russia to take part in the Syrian conflict.

In 'measuring' religiosity, several scholars have used the Duke University Religion Index (DUREL) measurement in their quantitative studies. The DUREL assesses three major dimensions of religiosity: a) organizational religious activity (ORA) involving public religious activities such as attending religious services or participating in other group-related religious activity (Friday prayers, religious holidays, etc., in this case); b) non-organizational religious activity (NORA) consisting of religious activities performed in private, such as prayer, reading religious textbooks, watching/listening to religious videos/recordings; and c) intrinsic religiosity (or subjective religiosity) assessing the degree of personal religious commitment or motivation (Koenig & Bussing, 2010). However, in this mostly qualitative paper, using the above-mentioned instrument would not be feasible due to the sample size and the scope and character of this research. Instead, I analyze the migrants' personal perceptions of their religiosity. Clarifying inquiries such as the number of prayers per day or week, frequency of attending Friday mass prayers, as well as personal attitudes towards the Divinity in a migrant's home country and in Russia will serve as complementary questions. This method, though not without shortcomings, should help more or less correctly assess (the change in) one's religiosity.

In the first section, I provide a review of literature to explore different hypotheses and theories used by Western scholars. The second section will discuss the living conditions of a migrant in a host country and how he perceives the host society's attitudes. This will help us establish differences in the living conditions of immigrants and environment they find themselves in the Western countries and in Russia. In other words, peculiarities of the social context in Russia for becoming more religious will be elaborated. The third section reveals real stories of migrants both interviewed and conveyed via mass media who have become more religious while working and living in Russia. In the fourth section, the main argument of the article will be discussed.

1. Theoretical framework and literature review

The religiosity of migrants and immigrants has been an important topic of discussion for the last couple of decades. There is abundant work on how immigration affects the identity of an immigrant:

> In itself, immigrant identity is a particular one since it involves the re-evaluation of oneself and one's identity when being situated in a strange environment and surrounded by different customs, traditions, and language to which the immigrant is expected to adjust (Hashmi, 2003 in Duderija, 2007: 145).

For a long time, scholars paid little attention to or had no interest in exploring the issue of immigrants' religiosity or how immigration influences religious behaviour (Cadge & Ecklund, 2007). Smith (1978) was one of the first to insist that immigration was indeed a 'theologizing experience'. He noted that immigrants turn to religion in trying to respond to the challenges of resettlement, whereas religious organizations served as places of mutual assistance and support.

Only starting from the 1990s did scholars start discussing in earnest the impact of immigration on people's religiosity. The impact of immigration on religious practices of immigrants has been for the last two decades hotly discussed by Western scholars. Most of them have stated that immigrants tend to rediscover new meanings in their own religion in a new country of destination and become more religious (see Alanezi & Sherkat, 2008; Aleksynska & Chiswick, 2013; Cadge & Ecklund, 2007; Duderija, 2007; Ebaugh & Chafez, 2000; Garcia-Munoz & Neuman, 2013; van Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011; Warner & Wittner, 1998; Yang & Ebaugh, 2001). According to Williams (1998), for example, "immigrants are religious━by all counts more religious than they were before they left home ━because religion is one of the important identity markers that help preserve individual self-awareness and cohesion in the group" (p. 29).

Some researchers have claimed that immigration may result in a decline in religious practices of immigrants (e.g., Connor, 2009; Massey & Higgins, 2011; van Tubergen, 2013). However, while there is little consensus on whether migration positively or negatively affects immigrants' religiosity, almost all scholars find a direct relationship between (im)migration and (im)migrants' religiosity.

While most scholars agree that in most cases immigrants are more religious than the local population, the debate is not yet settled as to the reasons and incentives that lie behind this religiosity. In the course of debates and discussions since the late 1990s, various theories and hypotheses were developed to explain this phenomenon. I summarize the major contributions these theories below.

Why do some immigrants start attending religious congregations and praying more often than other immigrants? One of the popular answers to this question has been provided by *secularisation theory*. According to this theory, people's religiosity depends on their country's level of development. In modern and developed

countries, people are less religious than in more traditional and developing countries. Renowned scholars such as Emile Durkheim (1915/2008) and Max Weber (1922/1993) were among those who predicted a diminishing role for religion as countries become more developed. Similarly, the level of religiosity of immigrants who move to more developed countries should diminish under the influence of the host society.

However, this theory has received strong criticism from other scholars (Berger, 1999). The cases of different levels of religiosity in both the modern United States and Western Europe can serve as an objection to this theory. Questions were raised why in the United States, one of the most developed countries in the world, religious attendance is higher than in less developed countries, and why in Europe people are less religious despite the modernization process (Iannaccone, 1998; Stark, 1999 in Ruiter & van Tubergen, 2009).

In responding to critics of the secularization theory, the 'scientific worldview theory' gained more support (e.g., Need & Graaf, 1996). This theory suggests that the more educated the individuals are, the less religious they become and the role of religion will decrease with social development (e.g., Smits, Ruiter & van Tubergen, 2010, van Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011). Massey and Higgins (2011) have found that immigration is a disruptive event that alienates immigrants from religious practice rather than 'theologizes' them.

Another theory—*religious markets* or *rational choice theory*—suggests that there is a constant demand for religion and different levels of religiosity in various countries can be explained by the supply of religious products in religious markets (Stark & Bainbridge, 1987; Stark & Finke, 2000; Stark & Iannaccone, 1998). Competition between religious markets is one of the key factors influencing peoples' religiosity; hence the more diverse and quality products that are offered, the more people—consumers—will consume these religious products. However, Chavez and Gorski (2001) argued that "the claim that religious pluralism and religious participation are generally and positively associated with one another—the core empirical hypothesis of the market approach to the study of religion—is not supported" (p. 274).

Some scholars have concluded that religion offers *social capital* (Hirschman, 2004; Connor, 2011). Hirschman (2004) argues that religion provides migrants with three 'Rs': resources, respect, and refuge for smooth adaptation in a new society; religious organizations provide resources and respect for immigrants in terms of assistance with housing, education, language skills, and employment. The term refuge is important for this research because it "denotes the psychological relief immigrants experience through religious practice with religious organizations" (Connor 2011: 1350).

Scholars have also emphasized the role of *contexts of reception* in immigrant religiosity. Different definitions and typologies of the contexts of reception were developed (Baubock, 1996; Cadge & Ecklund, 2007; Connor, 2010; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). This hypothesis was also explored as social integration theory (Need & de Graaf, 1996; van Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011). Baubock (1996) introduced a typology of contexts of reception as segregation, assimilation, and accommodation. Portes and Rumbaut (2006) see government policies of a host country as a form of context of reception for immigrant adaptation. They offer a typology of three immigrant receptivity contexts: exclusion of immigrants, passive acceptance, and active encouragement. Building on this, Connor (2010) found that "less welcoming contexts create an 'us' versus 'them' scenario triggering a hyper-religious commitment among Muslims" in Europe (p. 281).

Ghaffari and Ciftci (2010) approach immigrant religiosity from a psychological perspective. They claim that there is a significant relationship between 'perceived discrimination' and both religious attitudes and religious behaviour: "perceiving discrimination may encourage Muslims to use their faith in coping with stress from the discriminatory experience" (p. 22).

Another theory developed to explain the relatively higher religiosity of immigrants is *insecurity theory*. Norris and Inglehart (2004) argued that religiosity of individuals is shaped by the level of insecurity they feel. People who feel secure have less need for a religion. On the other hand, those who experience insecurity tend to be more religious. Immerzeel and van Tubergen (2013) argue that "religiosity is higher among people who have an insecure job position, whose parents were unemployed, whose parents had a lower status job, who have experienced a war in their country, who have lost their partner, and who reside in a country with a lower social welfare spending and a higher unemployment rate" (p. 359).

The theory suggests that insecurities can be existential (Norris & Inglehart, 2004), financial (economic) (van Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011), or both (Immerzeel & van Tubergen, 2013). Moreover, the latter have concluded that both economic and existential, past and present, and individual and contextual insecurities are important in explaining different levels of religiosity in different countries.

Several scholars debated the religiosity of immigrants in North America (e.g., Alanezi & Sherkat, 2008; Chen, 2006; Connor, 2008; Connor, 2009; Warner & Wittner, 1998). Discussions on the religious practices of immigrants in Europe have also been held in several Western European countries (Connor, 2010; Hashmi, 2003; Maliepard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Ruiter & van Tubergen, 2009; Smits, Ruiter & van Tubergen, 2010; van Tubergen, 2007; van Tubergen & Sindradottir, 2011). As we can see, the case of immigrant religiosity in Western societies has been widely discussed. The findings of the above-mentioned scholars can be especially relevant to identity issues of Muslims (and others) in North America and several Western European countries. However, this

discussion is applicable mostly to the Muslims in the West, while the case with Central Asian migrants in Russia does not necessarily have the same root causes.

Although studies on Central Asian migration in Russia have grown significantly in number recently, especially among Russian scholars, little research has been done on religious practices of these migrants in the host society.

Olimova and Bosc in 2003 far-sightedly raised the topic of growing religiosity among Central Asian migrants: "While working in Russia, many migrants rediscover Islam. It is not surprising that religious values are beginning to play an increasingly important role" (p. 122). However, this assertion comes as a short note made in passing.

During his fieldwork in the Vakhsh Valley of Tajikistan, De Cordier (2013) observed that migrants who come back from Russia to their home towns and villages had become more religious than they were before traveling to Russia. As an illustration, he quoted a response by one of his interviewees:

> So for me, my brother and my cousin who were with me there at one time, and for many of the mates, this presence of the Islamic religion certainly gave some hold and continuity … So that was encouraging. Probably it inspired others too, because some of the men from our area who came to live with us and who were not observant became so when they were with us. As far as we saw, no one dropped religion altogether there (p. 529).

Though de Cordier grasped the tendency in a Tajik province, his article does not comprehensively answer the posed question: he only discusses how labour migration has affected identity issues of many returning Tajik migrants in a specific area in Tajikistan. The questions of why, how, and in what circumstances migrants become more religious in Russia rather than they were before going to Russia were not answered in full.

Since the launch of the Central Eurasia-Religion in International Affairs (CERIA) initiative, several briefs were prepared that analyze how religious identities and the religious behaviour of some Central Asian migrants change after having lived and worked in Russia (Roche, 2014; Tucker, 2015). In particular, discussing why people with no previous religious practices become more religious and even get radicalized, Tucker (2015) notes that "Central Asians who support or are interested in ISIL appear to mostly be young migrant laborers who have little or no background in Islam as a religion but embrace Islam as an identity that offers solidarity, a sense of belonging and an explanation for economic hardship and discrimination that they experience" (p. 3).

These fragmentary and small-scale studies have not explored in detail the roots and reasons as to why a significant number of Central Asian migrants become more religious while in Russia. The role of Islam as a unifying and consoling factor for many Central Asian Muslim migrants in Russia has yet to be tackled in a thorough analysis.

Contexts of reception and insecurity theories best explain the case of Central Asian labour migrants. Insecurity theory is based on the hypothesis that the more insecure people feel, the more religious they will be. The need for religious belief increases when a person is unable to envisage his/her future, which results in feelings of anxiety. Religious beliefs provide individuals with predictable rules to help them cope with dangers: God promises that in the end everything will be fine, either now or in a possible afterlife. Therefore, when people feel insecure, they are more inclined to follow the rules caused by religious beliefs, which leads to more traditional religious values (Immerzeel & van Tubergen, 2011). In Russia, most Central Asian labour migrants experience insecurity in their everyday lives. Many factors, such as uncertainty of securing a job or getting paid, frequent police abuses, attacks by radical right-wing nationalist groups, risks of being deported and many others contribute to the feeling of insecurity. Looking at the growing religiosity of some migrants through the prism of insecurity theory helps explain the roots and causes for this phenomenon.

According to the context of reception theory, the context the immigrants live in affects how they construct themselves and their sense of belonging. If the local population and social surroundings in a new society present a positive and welcoming context for reception, then immigrants tend to be less religious and more susceptible to the local population's behaviour and cultural values. On the other hand, if the context of reception is negative, or in other words, the environment is hostile, then immigrants are more likely to react by constructing alternative identities (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Stepick & Stepick, 2009). They will resort to their own religious (national, cultural) values in building these identities. As many Central Asian migrants perceive Russia as a negative or unwelcoming context of reception, we have reason to believe that this theory will be helpful to see how perceived discrimination leads some migrants to become more religious.

2. Migrant Living Conditions and its "Theologising" Effect

(1) Central Asian labour migrants in Russia

Most Central Asians in Russia are seasonal labour migrants (Olimova, 2013), although the number of those who seek Russian citizenship has grown recently. They may stay in Russia from several months to several years.

Migrants in their majority are alone or, in some cases, accompanied by their male siblings or sons/fathers (sometimes whole families). Around 85 per cent of migrants from Central Asia are male and almost three out of four are younger than 30 (Argumenty i Fakty, 2013). Laruelle (2007), though, distinguishes two age groups of migrants: young people in their twenties, who have to pay for a wedding or the building of a house; and older men in their forties or fifties, who need more sporadic financing for family celebrations such as children's weddings, circumcision ceremonies, or the expansion of family property.

The older generation is statistically more educated and generally has a good command of Russian. As a result, they find better and more skilled jobs. The younger ones, who constitute the largest portion of migrants, are less skilled, have a poor command of Russian, and consequently get low-paying jobs (Laruelle, 2007). Migrants are employed in construction, cleaning services, trade, heavy industry and agricultural works.

In recent years, the number of female migrants from Central Asia, especially from Kyrgyzstan, has increased. Women may accompany their family members or seek a job on their own with the help of social ties. Another group of Central Asians in Russia is students, who in small numbers compared to labour migrants study in Russia's higher education institutions either under Russian government scholarship quotas or through self-financing. Given that both women and students constitute a small number in comparison to labour migrants, this research's focus will be on the average migrant: a young male from a rural area of Central Asia with a secondary education.

Notwithstanding the fact that Russia is one of the largest immigration destinations with more than 11 million foreigners, the country's relevant agencies still have shortcomings and deficiencies in regulating and legalizing the flux of migrants. Starting from January 2015, authorities introduced a new *patent*[3] system for foreign workers from those countries with which Russia has a visa-free regime (including Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). At the same time, punishment for breaching the country's immigration laws was toughened (e.g., deportations, fines, temporary imprisonment, bans from re-entering the country for five to ten years). Though an important step in regulating the migration sphere, the new rules also have failed to regularise large numbers of illegal migrant workers.

As a result of large flows of migrants and their failure to meet the criteria to obtain *patent*, hundreds of thousands of migrants from Central Asia even today remain undocumented. Working in Russia illegally without work permits and permanent residence status is widespread (Ilkhamov, 2006; Urinboyev 2017).

Migrant workers' undocumented or illegal—a term widely used by Russian officials, media and migrants themselves—status makes them very vulnerable to frequent police abuses. Most migrants have to secure a certain amount of their budget to bribe corrupt police officers and other authorities. Migrants save as much money as possible so they can send more remittances to impoverished families in home countries. In order to save money, many migrants choose to live in large groups in small ill-furnished apartments, barracks or even in spontaneously built construction sites.

In many cases, even having all proper documents protects a migrant from abuses. According to a Russian migration expert, currently neither (proper) document, nor *patent*, nor registration provides reliable legal protection for a migrant. He can easily be detained, subjected to administrative punishment, and even deported (Sputnik, 2017).

One migrant estimated that he spent 15 per cent of his earnings bribing police officers (Eurasia.net, 2013). But often even having a legal work permit does not provide refuge from maltreatment by officials. Human rights activists and mass media report instances of cruelty and exploitation at workplaces as well as ill-treatment of migrants in detention and deportation facilities (HRW, 2013; HRW, 2017).

In many cases employers also take advantage of a migrant's vulnerable situation: they offer much less wages to migrants than to ordinary Russians, knowing that the former has little, if any, choice. At the same time, employers may postpone or even refuse the payment of wages. As more than half of employment contracts among migrants in Russia are brokered without any written documents, between 35 to 50 per cent of migrants in cities like Moscow and Saint Petersburg are not paid for their work (Marat, 2013). "Migrants increasingly face deteriorating conditions of employment in addition to rising administrative barriers and hostile attitudes from local populations, including abuse and harassment" (Olimova, 2013: 72). Russian authorities use bans on employment and restrictions on mobility as effective mechanisms for extracting fines and bribes while also perpetuating the perception of the migrant as a threat (Matusevich, 2017).

(2) Real Xenophobia or "Perceived Discrimination"?

Most local people in Russia perceive labour migrants from Central Asia as a distinct and alien group that may pose a threat to Russian and Orthodox culture and values. In Russian media and government reports, irregular and illegal migration, especially from Central Asia, has been associated with growing organized crime, mounting shadow economy, unhygienic working and housing conditions, as well as an extra burden on social services. If in the 1990s Chechens were portrayed as the main enemy, later in the 2000s the media started the active cultivation of a negative image of migrants from Central Asia (Shnirelman, 2007).

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[3] In Russia, a work permit for migrant workers is called *patent*.

At the same time, in some cases, the behaviour, lifestyle and activities of migrants provoke the hostility of the local population. However, it remains a fact that migrants often encounter hostility and xenophobia in different levels and in different places, including public transport, public places, social service and administrative offices.

> The widespread belief among local populations that migrants 'take away' jobs forces the governments of destination countries to toughen their migratory policies. Since these beliefs are broadcast by the mass media, they promote discrimination and xenophobia, and increase tensions between countries of destination and origin. As a result, labor migrants face increasing political and administrative risks in their countries of destination (Olimova, 2013: 68-69).

Public discourse about migrants as unwanted guests in Russia is widespread. It is very often that Russian officials, media agencies, and TV shows openly assign the migrants the role of the "other," of cultural aliens, who have low levels of culture and who must be sent back to their home countries. "A migrant is not just—as the academic definition requires—any 'relocating' person but an 'other' who, it is implied, poses some sort of 'threat' and 'danger' to the 'receiving society.' In the cultural classification, the word 'migrant' has turned in essence into a legal euphemism for the expression of nationalist and racial prejudices" (Abashin, 2013: 13). It is not a coincidence that Russia ranked 123 among 136 countries with a 2.6 index score out of a possible 9.0, according to the Gallup's Migrant Acceptance Index (Gallup, 2017).

All these factors have brought about a situation where suspicion towards Muslims among local Russians is growing. Racial (or ethno-religious) tension is so volatile that ordinary quarrels often grow into inter-ethnic clashes. These include, but are not limited to, the Kondopoga events (2006), the Manezhnaia riots (2010), the Moscow mayoral election (2013), the Biryulevo riots (2015), and the death of baby Umarali Nazarov (2015). Although in recent years, experts have noted a slight decrease in xenophobic sentiments in Russian society due to the changing focus of the media to events in the Ukraine and Russia's deteriorating relations with the West, a blast in the St. Petersburg metro (underground) in April 2017, allegedly perpetrated by Akbarjon Jalilov, an ethnic Uzbek from Kyrgyzstan with Russian citizenship, and its aftermath have again raised anti-migrant attitudes in Russia.

Reports of the SOVA Center, a Moscow-based think tank, on xenophobia and racism in Russia are worth noting. In the first half of 2017, six people were killed and 16 were injured (or beaten) on racist bases (SOVA Center, 2017). Attacks usually target those perceived as "ethnic outsiders."

The practice of "white cars," when ultra-right radicals walk through train cars beating up passengers of "non-Slavic appearance," still exist. Many migrants are also afraid of raids by ultra-rightist groups in search of "illegal migrants." These raids do not always proceed peacefully despite the fact that the police (and sometimes media) are often present. Activists of unofficial organizations such as *Shchit Moskvy* (The Shield of Moscow) usually raid the residences of migrant workers demanding to see the residents' documents. Those who cannot provide proper documents are usually thrown out into the street or even attacked in some cases. Raids against sellers of fruits and vegetables on streets also happen often and end with throwing goods on the ground.

All these factors put hundreds of thousands of migrants from Central Asia into a difficult situation, forcing them to stay away from public spaces and remain within their enclosed enclaves as much as possible. Migrants try to find housing within the close proximity of their work places so as to avoid or minimize using public transport. "Racism has now become an integral part of the everyday life of Central Asian migrants. They face discrimination in the housing market, unfair treatment when attempting to access social services, and repeated insults" (Laruelle, 2007:112).

3. "Religion Gave Me Hope": Stories of "Theologized" Migrants

In such unfavourable conditions, it is perhaps natural that the migrants turn to religion. This section is conditionally divided into two parts. First, selected stories of migrants who have become more religious, become radicalized and even found themselves in the battleground in Syria conveyed through mass media will be addressed. Second, the author's interviews with migrants who have either become more religious or whose interest in Islam has grown during their stay in Russia are discussed.

As an illustration of migrants turning to Islam, the BBC Russian Service tells a story of Umed Sobirov from Tajikistan, who became more interested in religion after having worked in Russia. His sister is quoted saying, "We don't go to the mosque and we are not religious people. Such was my brother before going to Moscow, and he returned very pious, praying five times a day and trying to live by the laws of Islam." Umed himself explains his behaviour simply: "Religion gave me what I was looking for: calmness and hope for justice. When there is so much negativity and humiliation, and you do not see light at the end of the tunnel, it is important to believe in something not to get crazy" (BBC, 2013).

The government-controlled Uzbek TV channel *O'zbekiston* broadcast a story of 27-year-old Nodir Javliev from Uzbekistan who became radicalized in Russia. He and his brother, who had never practised Islam at home,

started praying and became more involved in religion. Nodir went further—he went to Syria to fight for the Islamic State. The programme ends with a claim that many migrants abroad might fall prey to 'terrorists' (Ozodlik, 2014).

Noah Tucker (2015) analysed Facebook with regards to how twenty-year-old Shohruh (pseudonym) from Samarkand, Uzbekistan became radicalized while working as a migrant in Russia. "After moving to Russia and living separated from his family and community in 2014 he gave up on dating services and meeting other Uzbek women. His friend network rapidly expanded, filled with popular Uzbek language Islamic devotional sites (none of which he added in the first year he was on Facebook while living in Uzbekistan) and their administrators and popular Uzbek imams, expanding from only 22 total friends in 2013 to a total of 250 in October 2014" (Tucker, 2015: 2). In that month, he began frequently posting Islamic State memes and iconography and changed several times his profile pictures dressed in jihadi military gear and holding an automatic rifle. "A twenty-year-old in Samarqand hoping to use Facebook to meet women and get a job in the United States grew into a twenty-two-year-old migrant worker in Russia for whom fighting for an Islamic State in Iraq or Syria seemed more achievable than finding a girlfriend and living the American dream… Like Shohruh, most who become interested or involved in the conflict [in Iraq and Syria] have little or no theological background and often become abruptly more interested in religion after taking up residence as in a foreigner in a non-Muslim society" (Tucker, 2015: 2-3).

There are many stories reported in mass media about former labour migrants from Central Asia who have left Russia to take part in the fighting in Syria. However, there is no single opinion on the number of Central Asians (mostly former migrant workers) who have left for Syria and Iraq. The International Crisis Group (ICG, 2015), for example, claimed that between 2,000 and 4,000 Central Asians were believed to be in the Islamic State-held territory. However, Lemon and Heathershaw (2017) believe these numbers are overestimated. Regardless of the actual number of Central Asians who left for *jihad*, one thing is true: a significant number of migrants in Russia become more involved in religion than they were before coming to the country. Needless to say, becoming more religious and radicalization should not be equated. There are many migrants who would not consciously choose the radical way of expressing their religiosity and join the *jihadists*. Those who believe they have embarked on the right path continue working to earn and feed their families back in their home countries.

Personal interviews show that in order for a migrant to become more religious, certain circumstances must be present. In other words, 'theologisation' happens in specific social contexts of migrant life.

Ortiq, a 28-year-old married man from a rural area in Uzbekistan and one of the main interviewees[4], offers a clear example of a change in migrant's religious behaviour. He explained that his interest in religion grew when he was staying in an overcrowded tenement in the first year of his stay in Moscow. "There were ten to twelve people (tenants were not stable, one might leave, another might move in) living in a small apartment: taxi drivers, street-sweepers, sales assistants, and waiters"[5].

Ortiq, who for the last two years has worked as a porter in a market, plasterer at a construction site, and guard in a private house, describes himself as a person who grew up in a mostly non-religious environment: his parents were not practicing believers and his friends were 'ordinary' people. However, living together with people of different backgrounds gradually changed his views on various life issues:

> Depending on his work schedule, Rustam-aka, one of the tenants and a respected man with deep knowledge of religion, endeavoured to pray five times a day. He went to Friday prayers and would urge others to practice Islam more actively. A lot of what Rustam-aka said about Allah, the prophet, a good Muslim's obligations and other religious affairs were new and interesting to me. Though I was sceptical in the beginning, I gradually became interested. Once when I had a day off from my job, I joined Rustam-aka to go to a Friday prayer to the Mosque Yardyam and saw many people of different ethnicities. Though at the time I didn't pray properly, I felt relieved when I came home. Since then I started to go to Friday prayers whenever I had an opportunity. I learnt several prayers to repeat before bed and at times of difficulty. I witnessed many cases of harassment by nationalists and was longing for my wife and little son living back in Uzbekistan. I had a feeling that the more I believed in God, the easier was for me to overcome these difficulties. Now my wife has joined me and we live in a separate apartment outside Moscow. We are working hard to be able to bring our three-year-old son here (he is now staying with my mother-in-law). Though I attend Friday prayers from time to time (I pray at home very rarely), I strongly believe that when you have faith, it is much easier to overcome difficulties. In a way, religion gave me hope."[6]

The story of another migrant worker, Alisher (23), from southern Uzbekistan, is similar to that of Ortiq. Alisher has lived in several places in and around Moscow, including a barrack at a construction site. The time he spent in an overcrowded communal house with shared facilities was one of his longest stays:

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[4] Names of all interviewed migrants have been changed.
[5] Interviews with Ortiq via Skype in Moscow, April 2015.
[6] Interviews with Ortiq via Skype in Moscow, April 2015.

Too many people, including couples lived at this place (there were even overnight stayers). Using the toilets and bathrooms was very time consuming. To kill time while waiting in the queue, the tired and bored people would play cards, listen to radio, 'hang out' on *Odnoklassniki* (a social network popular in post-Soviet space) or discuss their daily lives in circles. I liked to listen to discussions because people were talking about their problems, while others were offering different, often contradicting, solutions. There were some religious men who prayed at least twice a day and often discussed religious issues. They discouraged those who occasionally drank alcohol 'to heal wounds' or 'to celebrate payday'. Several months later a man from Margilan (in the Ferghana Valley) moved in. Abdurahim-aka was very knowledgeable in Islam and could tell interesting religious stories. Through the influence of several other religious people, Islam became one of the often and hotly discussed topics of evening talks. I respected Abdurahim-aka for his ability to give explanation to various issues from religious point of view in a convincing way. Though I had thought of myself as a believer, I came to realize that I was far from being a proper Muslim.[7]

Alisher, like almost everyone in the communal house, was afraid of serious problems and difficulties: hard working conditions, health problems, withholding of wages, fear of police raids, avoiding encounters with Russian nationalists, missing family relatives, and so on. For him, religion gradually became a source of consolation:

"When I learnt more about Allah and started praying, living through the problems I had seemed easier. I learnt a lot about what being a good Muslim meant. Of course, there were different people and many still would object to religious and sententious speeches, and outside the communal house there were some who disapproved my interest in religion, but for me, religion started to matter as something different. What is so bad about being a nice and devout person?" Alisher said.

Though these two interviewees had different levels of religiosity (in their own understanding) before and after coming to Russia, one thing is true for them and many other migrants: their living conditions in a big city with problems and difficulties inherent to migrants has made them more susceptible to religious sentiments.

There are two more points that can be inferred from interviews with these and other migrants. First, migrants enjoy relative freedom of religious practice and access to (religious) information in Russia. Second, a fear of repression by their respective authorities in Central Asia is minimised. "Unlike in my country, you can easily go to a mosque here [in Russia] and no one will question you" said one of the migrants. This relative freedom (of practicing religion) in Russia was repeated several times in interviews with other migrants as well.

4. Analysis and Discussion

The majority of Central Asian migrants see their living circumstances as a hostile environment. What is a hostile environment for a migrant? First and foremost, it is the mostly negative attitude of nationalist individuals or groups and media. Most migrants feel the pressures associated with being an unwelcome guest. Secondly, poor living and working conditions, frequent abuse by police and other government agencies as well as by employers, occasional attacks by aggressive nationalist youngsters in combination with other factors mentioned, mean that many Central Asian migrants feel disenfranchised in their everyday lives. As Van der Bracht et al. (2013), noted, perceived discrimination has a positive effect on the religiosity of a significant number of migrants.

As mentioned above, immigrant religiosity in Western countries has been widely explored. The findings of scholars on sources and causes of immigrants' insecurity are mostly be relevant to identity issues of Muslims (and other immigrants) in North America and several Western European countries. Then questions may rise: in what way is Russia's case different? How are Muslim migrants different from those in Western countries?

The case of Central Asian migrants in Russia, as Muslims in a mostly non-Muslim society, is different from the case of Muslims in the West for several reasons. First, populations of both Russia and Central Asian countries have an experience of living in a single state under a single political regime for several generations. While many Muslims of, say, Britain or France see the British and the French as former colonizers, ill feeling among Central Asians towards the Russians is less pronounced thanks to the USSR's *affirmative action* policy (Martin, 2001).

Second, almost three generations of Central Asians lived in a state where atheism was a state policy and religious practices were largely restricted (Ro'i, 2000). Therefore, though Muslims constitute the majority in Central Asian countries, the level of religiosity and the ways in which people perceive their Muslim identity in these societies are quite different, mostly because of having lived in an officially atheist country, compared to that of Muslims from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia (Khalid, 2007; Louw, 2007).

Third, labour migration of Central Asians to Russia is a relatively new phenomenon which has reached its peak only in recent years. Last, but not least, the majority of Central Asian migrants go to Russia for seasonal work (the share of those who choose to stay for a long term is very small), while the majority of Muslims from other parts

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[7] Interview with Alisher via Skype in Moscow, March 2015.

of the world move to Western countries with the long-term aim to settle down, obtain legal status, bring their families with them and raise their children there. That is why I am using the term 'labour migrant' deliberately in this article.

Accordingly, Central Asian migrants in Russia and Muslim immigrants in the West have different approaches to and strategies for adaptation and assimilation in their host countries. All these factors make the situation in Russia different from the Western countries and require a separate inquiry into the case.

Though both Central Asians and Russians had lived in a single country for about three generations, cultural differences among them still prevail: Russians differ very much culturally from Central Asians. They often find themselves struggling to adapt to norms of social behaviour which are different from those accepted in their home societies. This factor also contributes to the alienation of migrants.

No less important is the factor of living separately from families, as it sharpens the sense of homesickness among migrants. In these isolated circumstances in Russia, a hostile environment, Central Asian labour migrants seek something that could comfort and console them. As argued by Alexei Malashenko, "it was only to be expected that a community living largely isolated from the host society would seek solace in a shared culture or belief" (IWPR 2014).

Relatively easy access to religious materials such as video clips and audio recordings (on social media) play their role as well, thanks to the fast development of and increase in the number of users of social media platforms. Many migrants find themselves exposed to an abundance of online religious materials, and this may affect their religious feelings and worldview. The case provided by Tucker (2015) is an illustration of how a young migrant became more religious and eventually fell victim to Islamic State recruiters through social media. "It is no surprise that these arguments appear to be more compelling to disenfranchised Central Asians already experiencing everyday discrimination as migrant labourers in a rapidly nationalizing Russia" (Tucker, 2014: 5).

Islamic organisations such as mosques, be they officially registered big mosques or the ones that operate unofficially in privately rented offices, as well as gatherings of believers, are other important factors in the possible changes in the religious practices of migrants. Observers believe that such communities in large cities of Russia play a significant role in providing consolation and 'moral guidance' for migrants who find life in Russia difficult.

> It is no wonder that people look for an opportunity to join a group in which he can get ready meanings. Islamic meanings in this regard, firstly, are consistent internally, and secondly, provide guidance on the interaction with alternative meanings and their carriers; as a result, they are resistant to both individual woes and the collective "propaganda attack." One of the modes of conversation of the mosque attenders can be called a "practical theology" in which ordinary community members talk about God and Islam, tell each other *hadiths* of the Sunnah, as well as try to interpret their own life conflicts through the prism of Islam and to understand what is correct according to Islamic standards (Varshaver & Rocheva, 2014: para. 67).

Olimova (2015) also pays attention to the importance of trust that Islamic institutions provide among migrants. The significance of the role of religious institutions and networks among Central Asian labour migrants can be explained by the fact that they are based on trust and credibility. To the extent that a crisis of trust among migrant networks occurred, religious institutions began to occupy a more major role in the life of migrants. "Currently mosques and *jamoats* (religious communities) provide basic services to migrants such as assistance with employment, registration, search for housing, and protection. I would also add that religion saves migrants from the (moral) spoilage in major metropolitan areas, where a lot of temptations are present" (Olimova, 2015).

As noted, reasons for becoming more religious in Russia have many different roots and causes. But in very short terms, they all can be attributed to many migrants' feelings of insecurity and their perception of Russia as an unwelcoming context. Of course, many factors and theories in previous works (mostly related to Western Europe and North America) are relevant to the Russian case as well. They may play different roles, some to a bigger extent and some to a lesser, in affecting the religious worldview of many migrants. However, we believe that the feeling of insecurity contributes significantly to changes in the religious behaviour of Central Asian migrants. At the same time, it should be noted that insecurity feelings theory is not only about economic insecurities as it was explored in the West (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Immerzeel & van Tubergen (2013) have extended the theory to existential insecurities, but the existential insecurity should go beyond personal experience of a war and death of a friend (as the mentioned authors have argued) and should include *inter alia* the explicit expression of xenophobia in public discourse often accompanied by physical and psychological violence in migrants' living conditions. Hard living and working conditions add to the feelings of psychological insecurity. The situation is dramatized by how migrants feel themselves to be unwanted guests.

5. Conclusion

This article demonstrated that the precarious living conditions of migrants contains situations which may serve as fertile soil for some of them to become more religious. It argued that insecurity theory should be looked upon more broadly to explain growing religiosity among immigrants. The very living conditions of a migrant, the environment he lives in and circumstances he faces every day in Russia, incline and push him to seek solace and comfort in religion. It is suggested that the feelings of insecurity━not only economic (in terms of finding a job, mostly), but also psychological and existential━are critical factors in such circumstances. Previous research on immigrant religiosity in the West has mostly focused on economic and, to a lesser degree, existential, aspects of insecurity while explaining the religious behaviour of immigrants. However, in Russia's case, psychological and existential (physical) insecurities play a more apparent role in affecting the religious behaviour of many Central Asian migrants while not ignoring the importance of feelings of economic insecurity.

In Central Asian countries, Islam is under strict control of government bodies. When most migrants come to Russia, they feel relieved of omnipresent government control (of their religious lives) and enjoy relative freedom in their religious practices. On the other hand, migrants, Muslims in their absolute majority, encounter dislike and disapproval by local populations in Russia who perceive them as dangerous and unwanted. These two factors also contribute to the growing religiosity of Central Asian labour migrants.

This article does not claim that all migrants become more religious. On the contrary, hundreds of thousands of migrants do not change their religious practices at any level in Russia. However, given the fact that today many in Russia see a terrorist threat in large Central Asian migrant communities (especially after the April 2017 terrorist attack), this phenomenon should be taken seriously and studied thoroughly. This article claims to be a small and introductory piece to explore the topic of current interest.

This study hopes to open opportunities for further research. In particular, the growing role of mosques in the adaptation and integration processes of migrants in Russia should be explored more deeply. Fragmented and scattered information from interviews with migrants and media reports suggest that mosques have been playing a significant role in the changes in religious behaviour of many migrants. Another topic for discussion could relate to a possible change of religious authorities for migrants. We know that, as it has been since the Soviet period, village elders who have also served as *imams* have been and still are authorities in religious matters for the absolute majority of Central Asians. But this changes in urban areas of Russia when migrants encounter with relatively young and educated *imams*. This is for another research topic: how the Islam that the migrants find in Russia is different from that in their home countries.

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論文

日中比較からみる日本古代朝政の特色
Features of Politics of the Court of Ancient Japan from the Viewpoint of Japan-China Comparison

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　　「朝政」という言葉は、一般的に「朝廷の政治」という意味で古代の政治を表す用語である。従来、日本古代の朝政は、漠然として「朝堂政」や「あさまつりごと」と捉えられてきたことが多い。本論文では、日中比較の観点から朝政の語源に注意しながら、日中の史料に見られる朝政の用例を分析し、日本古代の朝政を「みかどのまつりごと」を定義した上で、朝政成立史上の推古朝の画期性を指摘した。
　　Chōsei is generally a term expressing ancient politics in the sense of "politics of the court". Traditionally, it has been vaguely captured as *chōdōsei* or *asamatsurigoto*. In this paper, from the viewpoint of Japan-China comparison, I analyze examples of *chōsei* found in Japanese-Chinese historical records, while paying attention to the origin of *chōsei*, trying to define *chōsei* as "political affairs of the court," and point out the innovation of the period of Emperor Suiko in the history of *chōsei*.

キーワード：朝政　朝廷　まつりごと　政事
Keywords: Politics of the Court, The Court, Politics, Political Affairs

はじめに

　　「朝政」という言葉は、一般的に「朝廷の政治」[1]という意味で古代の政治を表す用語である。従来、日本古代の朝政は、漠然として「朝堂政」や「あさまつりごと」[2]と捉えられてきたことが多い。ただし、近年、儀式研究や都城発掘の進展により、その意味をめぐって再定義が迫られている[3]。現在、「朝政」に関する理解はなお多様である。「あさのまつりごと」「みかどのまつりごと」「朝堂の政治」「朝廷の政治」などのように、「朝」の語義についてさまざまな定義があり、混乱が見られる。

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[1] 新村出編『広辞苑』（第六版、岩波書店、2008 年）1831 頁、尾崎雄二郎等編『角川大字源』（角川書店、1992 年）849 頁、鎌田正等編『大漢語林』（大修館書店、1992 年）692 頁、松村明・三省堂編集所編『大辞林』（三省堂、1995 年）1659 頁、藤木邦彦執筆の「朝政」条（角田文衛監修『平安時代史事典　本編下』角川書店、1994 年）1645 頁。
[2] 新村注 1 前掲書、白川静『字通』（平凡社、1996 年）1110 頁、永原慶二監修『岩波日本史辞典』（岩波書店、1999 年）766 頁、角田注 1 前掲書。
[3] 「朝政」に関する先行研究については、最近では岸俊男『日本の古代宮都』（岩波書店、1993 年）、橋本義則『平安宮成立史の研究』（塙書房、1995 年）、井上亘『日本古代朝政の研究』（吉川弘文館、1998 年）、西本昌弘『日本古代の王宮と儀礼』（塙書房、2008 年）、古瀬奈津子『日本古代王権と儀式』（吉川弘文館、2013 年）、志村佳名子『日本古代の王宮構造と政務・儀礼』（塙書房、2015 年）などを参照。

　そもそも古代、とりわけ飛鳥時代から奈良時代の文献史料の中には、分析に足るだけの「朝政」の用例が見出せないという史料的限界があると言わざるを得ない。平安前期に編纂された『儀式』には、「朝堂儀」という条があり、また、平安中期に成立された『延喜式』にも、「朝政」や「朝堂政」などの条文が見られる。『儀式』と『延喜式』により、平安時代の「朝堂政」の詳細はほぼ復元できるが、それまでの「朝政」については、直接の記載がないために学者の間でも未だ共通理解に至っていない。一方、「朝政」については、「あさまつりごと」と訓読した例が『源氏物語』などの平安時代中後期の文献に見られ、「朝政」を「天皇が毎日早朝政務を親裁する儀」とする説もある[4]。問題なのは、平安時代の史料に見られる「朝堂政」という儀が、果たして飛鳥奈良時代まで遡及できるかということである。通説としては、『儀式』『延喜式』の中の規定は、奈良時代以来の原則とされ、それはさらに七世紀初期の推古朝まで遡ることができ、律令制度の整備とともに発展してきたものとされている。

　確かに、「朝堂政」が行われていた場所の「朝堂」は、七世紀に成立していたと考えられている。現在、発掘された最古の朝堂遺跡は、孝徳朝の難波長柄豊崎宮と思われる前期難波宮の朝堂院である[5]。また、『日本書紀』の推古紀や孝徳紀などにも、後世の朝堂の前身とされる「庁」に関する記載が散見している。ただし、その「庁」は後世の朝堂とどのような関係があったのかについては、まだ議論の余地がある。一方、朝堂遺構の有無から朝政の存在を推定するのは難しい。現在においても天武・持統朝の飛鳥浄御原宮の朝堂遺跡は発見されていないことから、七世紀の朝堂は必ずしも直線的に発展したものではないことが窺われる。平安時代の「朝堂政」も、七世紀の朝政の系譜とつながるとは限らない。

　また、「朝堂」は中国の古代にもあったが、日本のいわゆる「十二朝堂」の配置は、中国で見られない独特の形式である。それを考えれば、日本の朝堂は単に中国から伝来したものとは言えなくなる。その起源は、七世紀ないしそれ以前にまで遡ることができると考えられている。それゆえ、平安時代までの「朝政」を検討するにあたっては、直接的に平安時代の史料を用いてもよいのかという問題、あるいは平安時代の制度を奈良時代に遡らせて同一の土俵のうえで検討してよいのかという問題も出てくる。

　飛鳥奈良時代の文献史料の中には「朝政」の詳細を直接的に記録した記事が少ないため、現在この分野の研究は、文献史料よりも朝堂の遺構や木簡などの考古学的な材料のほうが重視されている傾向がある。その分析の手がかりの一つとして、政務が行なわれている場所である「朝政の場」の構造を重視すべきだと考える。その変貌は、政治形態の変遷を具体的に示すものと言ってよい。近年、宮都研究の進展により、その実態の解明が飛躍的に進んでいる。「宮都」という言葉は、岸俊男による造語で、宮室・宮殿と都城を併称する略語である。その語源は「宮室・都城」、あるいは「宮殿・都城」とされている[6]。岸の指摘のように、「宮」は、和訓で「ミヤ」と訓み、「ヤ」に尊敬を表す接頭語の「ミ」が加えられ、貴人あるいは天子のすまいを意味する。これに対して「都」は、和訓で「ミヤコ」と訓み、「ミヤ」に場所を表す「コ」が加えられ、天子のすまいのある集落と解されている。同じ「ミヤコ」と訓む漢字には「京」がある。たとえば、「平安京」といえば、それは条坊制の街区を構成する広大な地域をさす。これに対して、「平安宮」は、「平安京」の中央北に位置する大垣で囲まれた一郭をさしており、「平安京」と区別されている。すなわち、前者が「都」「京」であり、後者が「宮」なのである。

　それでは、宮都は、日本古代国家において、どのような性格をもっていたのであろうか。前述のように、「宮」は天子のすまいを意味し、「都・京」は、「宮」を中心とする一定の地域のひろがりをさす。また、宮都は王権の所在地であり、王権の支配力を誇示するために人為的につくられた象徴的な景観である。その構造の変化には、日本古代国家の政治形態や王権の存在形態があらわれる[7]。たとえば、「朝堂院」の成立には、「朝政」の成立と不可分の関係がある。また、大極殿の出現は、「大王」から「天皇」への転換と関係がある。そのような意味で、日本古代国家の形成、あるいは律令国家の成立の問題を取り上げる際に、宮都を、その分析の手がかりの一つとして、重視すべきなのである。

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[4] 角田注 1 前掲書。

[5] 前期難波宮について、中尾芳治「難波宮発掘」（直木孝次郎編『古代を考える難波』吉川弘文館、1992年、120-149 頁）と積山洋『古代の都城と東アジア―大極殿と難波京―』（清文堂出版、2013 年）などを参照。

[6] 岸注 3 前掲書、2-5 頁。

[7] 林部均「古代宮都と考古学」（『古代宮都形成過程の研究』青木書店、2001 年）16-27 頁。

　考古学の立場からみると、古代宮都の形成過程には、（1）大極殿・朝堂の成立、（2）宮への官衙の統合、（3）律令官人の居住地としての条坊制の導入、という三つの大きな画期がある[8]。これらのことは、急激に進められたわけではなく、政治機構の整備とともに、飛鳥時代から奈良時代にかけて、少しずつ導入されたものである。したがって、日本古代国家の形成過程は、古代宮都の成立過程そのものであるといっても過言ではない[9]。なかんずく大極殿・朝堂院を中心とする宮都の中枢部の成立は、天皇の私的な空間である内裏から、公的な性格をもつ空間が独立したことを意味する。そこは、律令制度の一環として朝政が発展するとともに、創出された政務と儀式が行われる公的な空間である。そのような意味で、大極殿・朝堂院の構造の変遷は、朝政の変化に対応している。しかし、前述のように、現在確認されている最古の朝堂遺構は、七世紀中期のものであり、推古・舒明・皇極朝の皇居は発見されているが、朝堂は確認されていない。また、七世紀後期の皇居遺構から見れば、天智朝の近江大津宮に朝堂の存在が確認されたが、斉明・天武・持統朝の皇居では現在のところ朝堂の存在が確認されていない[10]。したがって、「朝政＝朝堂政」という図式は本当に成立できるのかという疑問が出てくる。また、「朝政」の「朝」を漠然と「あさ」として理解することも、説得力に欠けるところがあると言わざるを得ない。

　以上のように、朝政をめぐって学者の間には未だに共通理解に至っていないのが現状である。本論文では、まず、「朝」「廷（庭）」「政」の語源に注意しながら、中国古代の文献史料から、中国古代の朝政のあり方を検討したい。次に、日中比較の観点から『日本書紀』などの文献史料に見られる「朝政」の用例を分析し、日本古代の朝政の特色と意味を明らかにしたい。最後に、日中古代の文献史料と考古学の発掘成果を通じ、朝政の場から日本古代朝政の成立と変容を見ていきたい[11]。

１．中国古代朝政の語源と語義

（1）「朝」「廷（庭）」「政」の語源

　「朝政」は、中国から日本に伝来した言葉であるため、本節では、「朝」「廷（庭）」「政」の語源に注意しながら、中国古代の文献史料から、中国古代の朝政のあり方を検討したい。まず、辞書的語義を概観してみると、名詞としての朝政の語義は以下のようである。

　　（1）朝廷の政治、あさまつりごと（『広辞苑』）
　　（2）政治、あさのまつりごと（『字通』・『字統』）
　　（3）朝廷のまつりごと、朝事（『角川大字源』）
　　（4）朝廷の政治（『大漢語林』）
　　（5）朝廷の行う政治（『大辞林』）
　　（6）朝廷の政令、朝廷政事（『漢語大辞典』）

　このように「朝廷の政治（政事）」という理解は共通しているが、「あさまつりごと」という理解もある。『字通』では、「朝政」の「朝」が時間の「あさ」と場所の「朝廷」との二つの意義を兼ねるという。また、『角川大字源』『大漢語林』では、「朝廷」の項目に「昔は、朝日を迎えて政治を行った」と説明し、

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[8] 岸俊男「古代宮都概観」（『日本古代政治史研究』塙書房、1966 年）448-466 頁、今泉隆雄「律令制都城の成立と展開」（『古代宮都の研究』吉川弘文館、1993 年）260-284 頁。

[9] 林部注 7 前掲書、27-29 頁。

[10] 最近の都城発掘成果の整理については、相原嘉之「宮中枢部の成立過程―内裏・大極殿・朝堂院の成立――」（『古代飛鳥の都市構造』吉川弘文館、2017 年、129-177 頁）を参照。

[11] 本論文では、『周礼』『礼記』『爾雅』『春秋左氏伝』『呂氏春秋』『後漢書』『三国志』『隋書』など中国側の史料については、『景印文淵閣四庫全書』（台湾商務印書館刊行）をテキストとした。『三国志』魏書東夷伝の倭人条（通称『魏志倭人伝』）と『後漢書』東夷列伝の倭条（通称『後漢書倭伝』）と『隋書』東夷列伝の倭国条（通称『隋書倭国伝』）の訓読は、和田清・石原道博編訳『魏志倭人伝・後漢書倭伝・宋書倭国伝・隋書倭国伝』（岩波書店、1978 年）による。『日本書紀』の引用と訓読は、小学館刊行の小島憲之等校注・訳による新編日本古典文学全集による。『続日本紀』のテキストとしては、岩波書店刊行の青木和夫等校注による新日本古典文学大系を用いた。

「朝廷」という言葉が「あさ」に由来することに言及している。『大漢語林』は、「朝政」の項目に「朝廷の政治」としか挙げておらず、「朝政」の「朝」が時間としての「あさ」の意を認めていない。

　そもそも漢字の「朝」は、「艸（草）＋日＋月」という字形で、艸間に日があらわれ、なお月影が残っているさまを示す。「艸＋日＋川（水）」という字形で、草の間から太陽がのぼり、潮が満ちてくる時を示していると解釈する説[12]もあるが、この字は「草間に太陽があらわれる時間」を本義とする点が両説に共通している。字形から見れば、「朝」という字は、アサあるいはユウベの太陽が草の間にあらわれている時を意味し、アサだけではなく「夕」の意も持っていたと考えられる。したがって、時間の「あさ」が「朝」の本義である可能性は高い。アサに君主にまみえることが朝政の原初的形態のではなかったかと考えられる。

　しかし、朝見の定例化は朝見の場所（朝政の場）の限定をもたらしたと考えられる。さらに、政治内容の拡大と朝政の場の限定にしたがって、朝政の時間は必ずしも「朝夕」に限定されなくなった。その結果、「朝政」の「朝」には時間の「あさ」の意味から場所の「朝廷」の意味が派生したと考えられる。「庭」は「廷」に通じ、中国古代において両字が混用されていた。字形から見れば、「廷」の金文は、会意字で三部分からなる。すなわち、意符の下部（ニワの隅の場所）と、土（または、彡。土が盛ってあって、その場所に立つ身分の人の官位を示す印）と、上部（人の直立した形）とから成る。「テイ」の音は、人がまっすぐに立つ意（＝壬）と関係がある。これを考えれば、「廷」は、天子がニワで臣下を朝見するとき、官吏がそれぞれ所定の位置に直立していること、ひいてはその場所を意味する字となる[13]。

　古代の庭は、祭祀の場として「斎庭」の性格を帯びていた一方で、政事を行う場としての役割も担った。それは「祭政一致」という古代政治のありかたをそのまま示すものと言ってよい[14]。庭を祭祀や政事の場とした以上、庭に一定の人数が必要となる。また、祭祀や政務を行うためには、庭の中での人の位置や役割などを事前に規定しておく必要もあった。そうした「庭に人を集める方法」や「庭での規則」から、権力の存在がうかがえるのである。佐竹昭は「朝廷」が熟語として一般的に使われた時期を戦国時代以降と推定した[15]。朝政の朝が場所の朝廷をさして用いられるようになったのはその以前のではなかろうか。したがって、時間の「あさ」の意味から場所の「朝廷」の意味が派生した時期は、春秋時代に入った以降のであろう。

　言い換えれば、春秋戦国時代に入ると、朝政の朝の本源的な意味である「アサ」が捨象されて用いられなくなっていた代わりに、「朝政の場」という意味である「朝廷」が朝政の朝に定着していく過程があると考えられる。一方、字形からみれば、「政」は、「正＋攴」という形声字（一説では会意兼形声）である。音符の「正」は征服することで、その支配のために、「うつ・強制する」の意のある「攴」を加えて「政」となった。元来、「政」は力による支配を意味する字であった[16]。

　要するに、時間のアサが「朝」の本源的な意味であり、アサに君主にまみえることが朝政の原初的形態ではなかったかと考えられる。しかし、朝見の定例化は朝見の場所（朝政の場）の限定をもたらした上で、政治内容の拡大と朝政の場の限定にしたがって、朝政の時間は必ずしも「朝夕」に限定されなくなった。その結果、朝政の朝の本源的な意味である「アサ」が捨象されて用いられなくなっていた代わりに、「朝政の場」という意味である「朝廷」が朝政の朝に定着していく。それゆえ、「朝政」という語は、基本的に朝廷の政事を意味すると考えられる。

　一方、古代の庭（廷）は祭祀の場として「斎庭」の性格を帯びていた一方で政事を行う場としての役割も担ったため、「朝廷」という語もそれに由来したのであろうか。後述のように、「朝」はほかに動詞として「王が廷で臣下と会して政事を処理する」という意味を持つ（それも本源的な意味である「アサ」から派生した）ので、朝廷の朝は動詞の朝見や朝政を意味すると考えられる。「朝廷」とは、基本

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[12] 白川注 2 前掲書、同『字統』（平凡社、1985 年）603 頁、鎌田注 1 前掲書、尾崎注 1 前掲書、藤堂明保等編『漢字源』（学習研究社、1994 年）579 頁。

[13] 尾崎注 1 前掲書、575 頁と同書、583 頁。鎌田注 1 前掲書、469 頁と同書、476 頁。白川注 2 前掲書、1134 頁と同書、1141 頁。藤堂注 12 前掲書、395 頁と同書、389 頁。

[14] 井上注 3 前掲書、315 頁。

[15] 佐竹昭「朝廷の語義について」『古代文化』巻 46 号 9、1994 年。

[16] 白川注 2 前掲書（901 頁）と同注 12 前掲書（495 頁）を参照。

的に朝政するための庭または朝見用の庭を意味する語ではなかろうか。

（２）中国古代経典に見える朝政の用例

　『周礼』夏官道僕に「朝夕」という言葉が見られる[17]。「朝夕」について清の孫詒譲は、王がアサとユウベに「聴事」を行ない、アサの「聴事」が「朝」、ユウベの「聴事」が「夕」という[18]。しかし、「朝」と「夕」との性格は少し異なっている。「朝」は「王聴事見群臣（王事を聴き群臣を見る）」を、「夕」は「臣見君（臣君に見ゆ）」を前提とするように、両者とも王と臣との「見」であるが、「見」の主動者は違う。また、常に行われる「朝」と比べれば、「夕」は事の有無によって行われていたようである。『爾雅』釈言に「陪、朝也（陪は朝なり）」[19]とあるように、時代が下ると「臣見君」である儀式そのものも「朝」と呼ばれるようになった。また、「朝」「夕」とも同じ場所の「内外朝」で行われていたため、のちに「夕」も「朝」に通じるようになった。『呂氏春秋』貴直論には「不聴朝（朝を聴かず）」[20]とあり、また「朝」について、後漢の高誘は「朝、正也（朝は正なり）」と注した。高誘の注について陳奇猷は「正、即政字（正は即ち政の字なり）」と解釈した[21]。「正」・「征」・「政」は一系の字と考えられている。「正」には征服、「征」には賦税という意味があるので、「政」は政治的で経済的な支配を意味し、ときに軍事・軍政の意味も帯びる[22]。

　一方、『春秋左氏伝』成公十三年に「国之大事、在祀與戎（国の大事は祀と戎とに在り）」とあるように、中国古代では少なくとも春秋戦国時代まで、祭祀は最も重要な統治の手段として、軍事とともに国の大事とされた。その後、政事内容の拡大により、祭祀・軍事・経済にこだわらずに、「政」は政治全般を意味するようになった。その結果、朝見の定例化と朝見場所の限定をもたらした。さらに、政治内容の拡大と会見場所の限定にしたがって、朝政の時間は必ずしも「朝夕」に限定されなくなった。「朝夕」について「朝夕同在内外朝, 故亦通謂之朝（朝夕は同じく内外朝に在り、故に亦た通じて之を朝と謂う）」[23]と孫詒譲は指摘したが、「内外朝」はどのようなものであったろうか。結論を先に述べると、これは中国古代の理想的な都城構造である「三朝五門」を指すものと考えられる。

　「五門」とは、南から北まで天子の都城に開く皐・庫・雉・応・路の五つの門であり[24]、「三朝」とは、都城のうち、五門で隔てられる外朝・治朝・燕朝の三区画である[25]。一般的には、庫門の外が外朝、路門の外が治朝、路門の内が燕朝とされている。また、『周礼』秋官の鄭注[26]に「周天子諸侯皆有三朝、外朝一、内朝二（周天子諸侯皆三朝有り。外朝は一、内朝は二）」とあるように、外朝に対して治・燕両朝とも内朝とされている。しかし、内・外朝の概念は一定ではなく、燕朝を内朝とし、それに対して治朝を外朝とする場合もある[27]。天子は、それぞれ外朝で万民の大事を、治朝で群臣の事を、燕朝で家事を処

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[17] 「道僕掌馭象路以朝夕」とある。
[18] 「左伝朝夕、以臣見君為文、此朝夕以王聴事見群臣為文、其義通也。凡常朝皆在旦、有事則有夕、朝夕同在内外朝、故亦通謂之朝」（孫詒譲『周礼正義』中華書局、1987 年）2598 頁。
[19] 宋の刑昺の疏に「臣見君曰朝」とある。
[20] 「(荊文王) 得丹之姫、淫、碁年不聴朝」とある。
[21] 陳奇猷『呂氏春秋校釈』（学林出版社、1984 年）1549 頁。
[22] 白川注 2 前掲書（901 頁）と同注 12 前掲書（495 頁）を参照。尾崎注 1 前掲書（769 頁）と鎌田注 1 前掲書（618 頁）のように、白川説と全く同じと考える説もあり、藤堂注 12 前掲書（528 頁）のように、「政はもと、まっすぐに整えること。のち、社会を整えるすべての仕事のこと」と考える説もある。各説は支配の程度や方式などについては異なる理解を示しているが、「ただす」と解している点では一致している。
[23] 注 18 を参照。
[24] 『礼記』明堂位に「大廟、天子明堂、庫門、天子皐門、雉門、天子応門」とあり、鄭玄注に「天子五門、皐、庫、雉、応、路」とある。
[25] 「古者、天子三朝、外朝、内朝、燕朝。外朝在王宮庫門外、有非常之事、以詢万民於宮中。内朝在路門外。燕朝在路門内。蓋内朝以見群臣、或謂之路朝。燕朝以聴政、猶今之奏事、或謂之燕寝」（葉夢得『石林燕語』中華書局、1984 年）19 頁。また、「周之時有三朝。庫門之外為外朝、詢大事在焉。路門之外為治朝、日視朝在焉。路門之内曰内朝、亦曰燕朝」（劉献廷『広陽雑記』中華書局、1985 年）19 頁。
[26] 『周礼』秋官朝士に「朝士掌建邦外朝之灋」とあり、鄭玄注に「周天子諸侯皆有三朝、外朝一、内朝二、内朝之在路門内者、或謂之燕朝」とある。
[27] 『礼記』文王世子に「其在外朝、則以官、司士為之」とあり、鄭玄注に「外朝、路寝門之外庭」とある。

理したようである。「内朝」や「家事」などから見ると、外朝に対して内朝は私的な色彩が濃い。特に、燕朝は天子の私的な領域であり、天子の「燕寝」となっており、内朝のなかの内朝と言ってもよい。また、治朝は内・外両朝ともに属しており、公と私との要素を兼ね、群臣が施政するところである。最後の外朝は、天子と万民との接触の場所で、もっぱら公的なところである[28]。

　『周礼』夏官と『礼記』文王世子の鄭注に「燕朝、朝於路寝之庭（燕朝は路寝の庭に於いて朝す）」「外朝、路寝門之外庭（外朝は路寝の門の外庭）」とあるように、治・燕朝は「庭」に行われていた。つまり、「朝」とは「王が『廷』で臣下と会して政事を処理する」ことを指す。また前に述べたように、そもそも「王が臣下と会して政事を処理する」ことそれ自体が「朝」というものであった。そして、その「朝」の場である「廷」はどこかに限定されるものであるから、「廷」は自然に「朝廷」と呼ばれるようになったと考えられる。一方、「朝、正也（朝は正なり）」とあるように、「朝」は「正（政）」に通じ、「朝政」は実は「朝」と同義であると考えられる。以上のことから、筆者は経典に見える「朝政」を「君主が朝廷で臣下と会して政事を行うこと」（朝廷の政事）と定義したい。

　前述のように、時間の「あさ」は「朝」の本義である可能性が高いものの、早い時期には時間の「あさ」の意味から場所の「朝廷」の意味が派生したと考えられる。また、『周礼』や『礼記』などの中国古代の経典に見える「朝」の用例は、動詞の「まみえる」と朝政の場として用いられるのが多いのに対し、時間の「あさ」をさして使われる用法がほとんど用いられなくなっていた。

（３）中国古代の朝廷と朝政の変容

　中国語の辞書を引いてみると、『漢語大詞典』[29]には、「朝廷」の語義について、（a）君王が朝見を受けて政務を処理する場所、（b）君王を首とする中央政府、（c）帝王の代称との項を立てている[30]。また、『漢書』張湯伝のように朝廷が外朝をさす[31]用法が見られるため、朝廷が君主を含まない中央政府として用いられた場合もある。佐竹昭の研究[32]によると、朝廷という語は、漢代とその以前の時代で朝政の場と中央政府として用いられる用例が多いのに対し、隋唐時代になると中央政府と皇帝の代称として用いられる用例が多く、朝政の場の用法がほとんど用いられなくなっていた。朝廷の語義の変容は、漢代から隋唐時代にかけての中国古代の朝政の場の変容に対応する。隋唐時代では朝政の場の用法がほとんど用いられなくなっていたのは、隋唐時代の朝堂の重要性が低くなっていたことを反映している。

　古代中国では、皇帝が直接臨御して政治的な決裁や指令を行う太極殿などの正殿と、臣下達が集会して上奏案文を作成する朝堂という二つの朝政の場があった。古代中国における最高意志決定の政治構造は、皇帝の正殿と臣下の朝堂との相互関係を通じて現れた。無論、その具体的な形態と存立基盤は、中国の各王朝を通じて一律ではない。おおまかに区分すれば、漢から魏晋南北朝の「外・内朝」制と、隋唐の「外・中・内」の三朝制という二つの時期に分けることができる[33]。『周礼』『礼記』に見える「外朝・治朝・燕朝」という三朝制は、一種の政治理想として七世紀の隋唐に至ってようやく「外朝・中朝・内朝」という形で実現された。これは、隋・唐における中国古代官僚機構の成熟さを反映している。一般的に中国では、古代に通じて官僚機構が統治手段として利用されていたとされるが、この統治手段は、秦・漢から隋・唐に至るまで、千年以上をかけて、次第に完備されてきたものである。

　政治構造から見れば、唐と『周礼』『礼記』の三朝制は、同じ「三朝」の形であるが、内実は別のものである。前述の通り、筆者は、『周礼』『礼記』にみえる「朝政」を「君主は朝廷で臣下と会して政事を行う」とまとめた。とすれば、この『周礼』『礼記』の三朝制という政治理念は、王が臣下と直接に接触することを通して政治が展開されるということであり、この際の交渉の手段は君主と臣下の間で直接交わされた言葉（口頭行政）であっただろう。この点は後世、科挙や文書制度を代表とする隋唐時期の制

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[28] 注 25 と注 27 を参照。
[29] 漢語大詞典編輯委員会・漢語大詞典編纂処編纂『漢語大詞典』（第六巻、漢語大詞典出版社、2001 年、1315 頁）の「朝廷」条を参照。
[30] 「(a) 君王接受朝見和処理政務的地方、(b) 亦指以君王為首的中央政府、(c) 借指帝王」とある。
[31] 「聞有詔令、乃驚、使吏之丞相府問焉、自朝廷大臣莫知其與議也」とある。
[32] 佐竹注 15 前掲論文を参照。
[33] 中国古代朝政の内容について、渡辺信一郎『天空の玉座—中国古代帝国の朝政と儀礼—』（柏書房、1996 年、18-50 頁）を参照。

度（文書行政）と比べれば、大きな差異がある。

　漢から隋唐までの都城構造もこの政治構造を具体的に反映している。換言すれば、両漢から魏晋南北朝にかけての中国における最高意志決定は、皇帝個人の恣意によるものではなく、国家中枢部における会議の重層構造のなかで形成されたのである。すなわち、皇帝の裁可と各層会議による官僚の集団意志との二つの力は、相対的に独立しており、その相互関係を通じて国家の最高意志が形成されていたと言える。これに対して、隋唐は朝堂を外朝化することにより、朝政の実質的な役割を中・内朝へ移行させた。その結果、朝政における皇帝と官僚とによる並立する二つの勢力という図式は消滅し、代わりに皇帝一人による一元的な朝政の構造が出現したのである。朝政の場から皇帝の代称への朝廷の語義の変容は、漢代から隋唐時代への政治構造の変更を反映している。

２. 日本古代朝政の語源と語義

（１）日本古代朝政の特色と語義

　本節では、日中比較の観点から『日本書紀』などの文献史料に見られる「朝政」の用例を分析し、日本古代の朝政の特色と意味を明らかにしたい。七世紀までの日本は、秦漢までの中国と類似点があった。「日本」という国家意識はまだ形成途上にあり、王権も超越的な地位を持たなかった。当時の政治状態はむしろ諸豪族の連合政権であったといえる。大王家と諸豪族との間で微妙な均衡が保たれ、大化前期の「国家」は、邪馬台国以来の神威政権の色彩が濃厚であった。

　中国を再統一する隋唐帝国の出現は、東アジアの各地域に大きな影響を与えた。典型的な事例として、隋唐帝国と朝鮮半島諸国との戦争が挙げられる。東アジア諸国の対応といえば、高句麗・百済・新羅の朝鮮三国は大体同じ時期に政治改革を行った。日本にも乙巳の変と大化の改新が行われた。石母田正氏は、以上のことを「国家成立史における国際的契機」[34]とまとめた。しかし、滅国の危機を感じた朝鮮三国と比べれば、島国である日本にとって外来の圧力はそれほど強くなかったと考えられている。近年、大化の改新や天智朝に関する研究の深化により、壬申の乱までの政治改革をめぐる評価は修正されつつある。律令国家の出発は、以前は推古朝や孝徳朝であるとされてきたが、現在は七世紀後期の天智・天武・持統朝まで下げて論ずる研究が多くなっている[35]。

　一方、近年、律令制度研究の深化により、奈良・平安時代の律令制度についての認識にも大きな変化が見られる。従来の律令制度崩壊論によれば、大宝律令の頒布は律令制度が確立した指標であり、その原則は平安前期までに維持されたが、奈良後期から「崩壊」がはじまったという。しかしながら、制度の形式から見れば、奈良時代よりも、むしろ平安前中期の制度の方が唐制に接近している。唐風化のピークも、大宝・養老律令が頒布された奈良前期というより、奈良後期から平安前期にかけての時期であったと推定するのが妥当であろう。現在、八世紀は律令制度整備の第一段階にすぎないという説が有力である[36]。それを受け入れるならば、日本古代の律令制は八・九世紀に至って形式的には「崩壊」であるが、実質的にはより整備されていくという、論理的に二律背反的な側面を表していると言えよう[37]。

　つまり、七・八世紀の日本には、漢帝国が国土の拡大によって感じていた内外の圧力と類似するものがあったと考えられている。しかし、日本列島は大陸との地理的距離があるので、外来の圧力を過大評価することができない。日本古代の律令制度は、むしろ大化前期の伝統が唐制と妥協して生まれたもの

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[34] 石母田正「国家成立史における国際的契機」（『日本の古代国家』岩波書店、1989 年）11-66 頁。

[35] 「日本」という国号は七世紀後期に成立し、その前の国号は「倭国」であると考えられているが、本論は便宜のため、八世紀前の倭国をも日本と表記する。一方、天皇号の成立について、天武朝成立説の立場に立ち、天武天皇以前の天皇を大王や倭王、天武天皇以後の天皇を天皇と表記する。なお、天武天皇以前の大王を天皇と表記する場合もある。また、推古や孝徳など天皇の漢風諡号は、奈良時代後期に成立したものであるが、本論は慣習により天皇の漢風諡号をそのまま使用する。日本国号と天皇号の研究については、吉田孝「『日本』の国号の成立」（『日本の誕生』岩波書店、1997 年、115-138 頁）を参照。

[36] 吉田孝「律令国家の諸段階」（『律令国家と古代の社会』岩波書店、2005 年）411-441 頁、坂上康俊『律令国家の転換と「日本」』（講談社、2001 年）1-5 頁、大津透「『日本古代国家』と国家の成立」（『日本古代史を学ぶ』岩波書店、2009 年）7-15 頁。

[37] 大津注 36 前掲書、13 頁。

である。したがって、奈良時代の日本は、建前上、天皇から公民までの一元的な統治体制を標榜したが、実際には朝廷―国司と、郡司―公民という二元的な統治体制を実施していた[38]。官僚機構が熟成されていない段階では、単に制度のみで国家を運営することはできないので、政権維持のためには伝統的な神威が依然として重視されていた。また、天皇の個人的能力が期待され、王権安定のために幼帝は憚れ、奈良時代には成年天皇でなければ即位できないと考えられていた。国家制度の成熟は、平安時代を待たなければならなかったのである。

　以上のように、七・八世紀の日本の官僚制度は未熟であったゆえに、隋唐の律令制度を導入したとはいえ、当時の日本にとってはそれを全面的に実施するのはまだ時期尚早であった。というより、日本古代の律令制度は、日本の政治的伝統と隋唐の律令制度とが織り交じって妥協して生まれたものと言えよう。それゆえ、「朝政」はそもそも中国から伝来した言葉であるが、日本的な「朝政」の特色が見いだされることに注意しなければならない。

　日本の史料において「朝政」という言葉の初出は、『日本書紀』天武十二年二月己未朔条の「大津皇子、始聴朝政（大津皇子は始めて朝政を聴く）」である。また、『日本書紀』においては、「臨朝秉政（朝に臨み政を秉る）」（顕宗即位前紀）、「君無二政、臣無二朝（君に二政無く、臣に二朝無し）」（孝徳即位前紀）などの記載が見られる。一方、『続日本紀』に見られる「朝政」の用例は、合わせて大宝二年五月丁亥条、養老元年十月丁亥条、養老三年六月丁卯条、養老六年二月条、天平五年八月辛亥条の四例がある。また、聖武天皇紀の天平五年八月辛亥条に「天皇臨朝、始聴庶政（天皇朝に臨み、始めて庶政を聴く）」との記載が見られる。

　まず、朝政の主体は、「君無二政、臣無二朝（君に二政無く、臣に二朝無し）」（孝徳即位前紀）とあるように、大きく「君」と「臣」との両者に分類することができる。「君」は「飯豊青皇女・孝徳天皇・皇極皇祖母尊・聖武天皇」、「臣」は「中大兄皇子・群臣・大津皇子・大伴安麻呂・粟田真人・高向麻呂・下毛野古麻呂・小野毛野・藤原房前・首皇子・安部広庭」があげられる。また、朝政において各主体の役割は、大きく「聴朝政」と「参議朝政」の二種類に分類することができる。「君」はすべて「聴朝政」であることに対して、「臣」の場合、皇太子・摂政は「聴朝政」、ほかの群臣は「参議朝政」である。以上の用例から見れば、日本古代において「朝政」とは、君と臣がともに政治的活動を行う行為であると定義することができる。この点は中国のそれと変わりはない。

　しかし一方で、古代中国の「朝政」の場合、「朝、正也（朝は正なり）」とあるように、「朝」は「正（政）」に通じ、「朝政」は「朝」と同義である。先述したように、筆者は中国古代の「朝政」を「君主が朝廷で臣下と会して政事を行うこと」であると定義した。しかしながら、日本古代の場合、「臨朝秉政（朝に臨み政を秉る）」（顕宗即位前紀）・「天皇臨朝、始聴庶政（天皇朝に臨み、始めて庶政を聴く）」（聖武紀天平五年八月辛亥条）とあるように、日本古代の「朝政」という語は、「朝―政」の二つの形態素を「修飾語―被修飾語」の関係で配置して表現した合成語である。語彙の構成から見ると、「朝の政」という修飾構造に属し、中国古代の「朝政」と同じものではない。

　形態素である「朝」と「政」を別々に見ると、後述のように「朝」は「みかど」と訓読され[39]、「朝政」の行われていた場所を指す。また、「政」は君臣に通じるまつりごとであり[40]、「朝政」の内容を意味する。筆者は、日本古代の「朝政」を「みかどで行われる君臣に通じるまつりごと」（略称「みかどのまつりごと」）と定義する。以上のことから、日本古代の「みかどのまつりごと」は、中国古代の「朝政」と同じものではないのが分かる。日本の「朝政」は、中国語の借用語ではあるが、中国とは異なる日本的な特色を持った用語なのである。

（２）みかどの語源と語義

　中国古代の「朝政の場」である「朝廷」という語は、日本古代で「みかど」にあたる。「みかど」は、多様な語義を持っている語である。朝政の場として、「みかど」の形成は朝政の形成と不可分な関係が

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[38] 須原祥二「八世紀の郡司制度と在地―その運用実態をめぐって―」（『古代地方制度形成過程の研究』吉川弘文館、2011 年）2-42 頁、山口英男「地域社会と国郡制」（『律令国家の展開』東京大学出版会、2004 年）93-120 頁。

[39] 同じ「みかど」と訓読される同義語は、「朝廷」または「朝庭」があげられる。

[40] 成沢光『政治のことば―意味の歴史をめぐって―』（講談社学術文庫、2012 年）39-53 頁。

あるため、その変容から朝政形態の変化がうかがえる。その用法には歴史的な推移があるため、歴史叙述には安易に用いることができない。平安時代以前の文献には、「みかど」を「朝」「朝廷」「朝庭」と表記することが普通である。しかし、史料に即して語義を検討してみると、同じ「朝廷」と書かれるが、日本と中国では語義に微妙な差異がある。その違いは、「朝廷」の語をめぐって、日中両国の歴史的背景の相違を示唆していると考えられる。

　和語としての「みかど」の検討は、すでに戦中の武田祐吉氏の研究がある[41]。武田氏は、『古事記』『万葉集』に見える万葉仮名で書かれたみかどの用例を集めて検討した。武田氏の研究によると、「みかど」は、本来宮城の御門という語であるが、やがてその語義は分化を遂げて宮殿・朝廷の意で用いられるようになった。天皇の意で用いられるのは、七世紀後半以降のことと論じられた。試みに、辞書を引いてみると、『日本国語大辞典』には、「みかど」の意味として、（a）門をいう尊敬語、ごもん、（b）家、屋敷をいう尊敬語、後殿、御所、（c）特に、天子・天皇の居処、朝廷、政府、政所、（d）天子、天皇の位、帝位、皇位、（e）天子、天皇の尊称、（f）天子、天皇の治める国、帝国、皇国、（g）「みかどのつかさ」の略の七つが挙げられている[42]。また、『角川国語大辞典』には、「みかど」の語義について、一、御門①「かど」の尊称、「門」「入口」の意、ご門。②特に皇居の門。二、朝（門に全体を代表させ）①宮殿、御殿、皇居。②朝廷。③行政官庁、朝廷の出先官庁。三、帝（皇居や御殿に住む人の意）①天皇。②上皇・皇子など。③天皇の一族、皇室。四、朝①天皇が治める国土、国家。五、天皇が治める治世との項を立てている[43]。

　一方で、「みかど」の語義の歴史的推移について、白川静は、「みかど」は「門」である「かど」に尊敬を表す接頭語の「み」が加わったものであり、そもそも「皇居の門」を意味したが、のちに、天子あるいは天子の家を指すようになったと指摘した[44]。また、日本古典文学全集『古事記　上代歌謡』[45]の頭注には、みかどの本義は宮殿の門であるが、それから宮殿・天皇・国家の順で転義するとされている。『万葉集神事語辞典』に、木村康平氏がみかどの意味について①御門・宮門、②宮殿・皇居、③朝廷、④国の版図、国家、⑤天皇の順で成立したという見解を指摘した[46]。新日本古典文学大系『続日本紀』の補註[47]によると、「朝庭（みかど）」は、宮殿の構造に由来する語で、単に「朝（みかど）」「庭（おほば）」ともいい、本来は、臣下等が天皇の面前に集う広場を意味したが、転じて天皇の治世ないし天皇（みかど）そのものを意味する語となり、のちには「朝廷」と書かれるようになった。和訓のみかどは、推古朝の小墾田宮や孝徳朝の難波小郡宮などの王宮の「大門」または「紫門」に由来するものであると考えられている。

　以上のことを整理しなおすと次のようになろう。第一に、みかどの語義については、A御門、B宮殿・皇居、C朝廷・政庁、D天皇・皇室、E国家、F天皇の治世の六つがまとめられる。第二に、みかどの本義は門であるがゆえに、その門を代表として、宮殿・皇居を意味するように分化を遂げた。のち、朝廷・政庁・天皇・国家・治世を意味するようになった。

　平安時代以前の文献には、「みかど」を「朝」・「朝廷」・「朝庭」などと表記することが普通である。しかし、その場合は、中国語の語義をそのままに借りる可能性が高いため、必ず当時における「みかど」の意味を反映するとは限らない。それゆえ、ここでは、相対的に漢文の影響が低い『古事記』歌謡・『万葉集』・『続日本紀』宣命から、主に万葉仮名で書かれた「みかど」の用例を集めて検討し、その用法と語義の歴史的推移を考えてみる。

　『古事記』においてみかどという語が初めて使われたのは開化天皇記の「朝庭別王」である。人名として用いられるので、具体的な語義が不明であるが、「朝庭」という表記に注意しておきたい。また、

[41] 武田祐吉「御門考」『文学』第 10 巻 3 号、1942 年。
[42] 小学館国語辞典編集部編『精選版　日本国語大辞典　第三巻』の「みかど」条（小学館、2006 年、783頁）を参照。
[43] 時枝誠記等編『角川国語大辞典』の「みかど」条（角川書店、1983 年、2001 頁）を参照。
[44] 白川静『字訓』の「みかど」条（平凡社、1992 年、715 頁）を参照。
[45] 日本古典文学全集『古事記　上代歌謡』の頭注 19（小学館、1975 年、328 頁）を参照。
[46] 国学院大学研究開発推進機構日本文化研究所編『万葉集神事語辞典』の「みかど」条（国学院大学、2008年、233 頁）を参照。
[47] 新日本古典文学大系『続日本紀一』の補註 1-20（岩波書店、1989 年、247 頁）を参照。

清寧天皇記の用例から見れば、「朝庭」は、「旦参赴於朝庭、昼集於志毘門」のように、「志毘門」と対応して用いられていることが見られる。「志毘門」は、「志毘臣之家」であるので、「かど」である「門」は「家」という意味で用いられる。したがって、「みかど」の語源と言えば、「かど」の前に尊敬を表す接頭語の「み」を加えて「みかど」となり、この記事に「朝庭」で表記され、天皇の宮殿を意味する。ただし、「神朝庭」（景行天皇記）のように、「みかど」は、伊勢の大御神の宮殿、すなわち伊勢神宮を意味する例もある。『古事記』の時代では、建物を指す「みかど」が天皇の専用ではなく、貴人の家を意味するようである。

　一方で、「凡朝庭人等者」（清寧天皇記）とあるように、「朝庭人等」は「朝廷の人々」の意で、「朝庭」は、中央政府をさす抽象的な意味も出現した。ここで注意しておきたいのは、この記事での「中央政府」は、志毘臣をはじめとする中央の諸豪族を意味し、天皇を含まないことである。律令時代では、「朝庭」は専ら天皇の中央政府あるいは天皇本人を指すが、天皇を含まない大臣たちを指す用法の例が極めて少ない。また、『万葉集』の場合、宮門もしくは貴人の宮殿を指す用例が全般的に見られる。

　『続日本紀』宣命に見える「みかど」は用法によって二種類に分けられる。一つは、文武天皇の第一詔[48]のように、天皇朝庭は政治などを行うあるいは賜うといった表現と、百官人等が明浄直誠の心を以って天皇朝庭を助けあるいは仕えといった表現があげられる。もう一つは、孝謙太上天皇の第二十八詔[49]のように、誰かが逆心を以って朝庭を動かし傾けんとする表現が挙げられる。光仁天皇の第五十二詔では、「大臣之曽祖父藤原朝臣内大臣明浄心以天皇朝助奉侍奉」と「祖父太政大臣又明浄心以天皇朝助奉侍奉」との後に、「今大臣者鈍朕扶奉侍奉」という表現が続いているように、「天皇朝」と「鈍朕」とが対応している。また、朝庭を傾けるという表現は、すなわち「謀反」を意味する。養老名例律によると、「謀反」は「謀危国家」である[50]。ここでの国家については、「臣下将図逆節、而有無君之心、不敢指斥尊号、故托云国家」とあるように、実は天皇を意味する。要するに、『続日本紀』宣命に見える「みかど」は、天皇本人もしくは天皇の語に加えられた尊称を意味すると考えられる。

　以上のことから、和語としての「みかど」の語義には、「宮門」や「貴人の家」など具体的な場所を指す語義から、「天皇の治める国」もしくは「天皇本人」という抽象的な語義になるという変化が確かめられる。天皇の意で用いられるのは、武田氏のいう奈良時代後半以降ではない。個人的には、七世紀後期から八世紀初期のあたり以降、「みかど」が天皇や国家などを指す例が増えるようになったのではないかと推測している。ただし、「宮門」や「貴人の家」など具体的な場所を指す用法は、「みかど」の本義として、奈良時代においても続いて用いられていた。

（３）『日本書紀』に見える朝と朝庭（廷）の語義

　続いて「みかど」の漢字表記について検討し、朝政の場としての「みかど」の成立事情に迫りたい。九世紀以前、朝政の場としての「みかど」を「朝」「朝廷」「朝庭」と表記するのは一般である。それにより、本節では、『日本書紀』に見える「朝」「朝廷」「朝庭」の用例を集めて分析し、その用法と語義の歴史的推移をあきらかにしたい。論述の都合のために、『日本書紀』に現れる「朝」「朝廷」「朝庭」の用例について、各巻・紀に何回またはどのような意味で出現したかを統計してみた。表 1 の通りである。

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[48] 「天皇が朝庭の敷き賜ひ行ひ賜へる百官人等、四方の食国を治め奉れと任け賜へる国々の宰等に至るまでに、国の法を過ち犯す事なく、明き浄き直き誠の心を以て、御称々りて緩び怠る事なく、務め結束て任へ奉れと詔りたまふ」とある。

[49] 「逆に穢き奴仲末呂い詐り奸める心を以て兵を発し朝庭を傾け動かさむと」とある。

[50] 謀反については、『養老名例律』に「一曰、謀反。謂、謀危国家。謂、臣下将図逆節、而有無君之心。不敢指斥尊号、故托云国家」とある。

巻紀	天皇・中央政府		宮・庭などの場所		天皇の治世	国家・国土	朝堂
	朝	朝庭（廷）	朝	朝庭（廷）			
5 崇神	1	1		1			
6 垂仁	1						
7 景行	2	1					
9 神功	3						
10 応神	4	1	2				
11 仁徳	1		1				
14 雄略	4			1			
15 清寧・顕宗	1		1				1
16 武烈	1		1				
17 継体	2			2			
18 安閑		1					
19 欽明	3	1			1		
20 敏達	4	5					
21 用明		1	1				
21 崇峻		5					
22 推古		1	3	1			
23 舒明			3		1	1	
24 皇極	2		2				1
25 孝徳	3	1	5	3			
26 斉明	5		2			1	1
27 天智				1			
28 天武	3	2					
29 天武	6	4		6	2		
30 持統	6		1			2	2

表1　『日本書紀』における朝・朝庭（廷）の語義

　用例の語義の区別については、文章理解の個人差もあるが、まぎらわしい例がある。特に、天皇を指すか中央政府を指すか中央を指すかの区別は、難しい場合が多いため、ここではすべて「天皇・中央政府」の用法と見なす。大きく「天皇・中央政府」、「宮・庭などの場所」、「天皇の治世」、「国家・国土」との四つに分ける。比較するため、「朝堂」の例も加えて整理してみた。

　また、朝廷と朝庭の異同について、『日本書紀』の諸本を考慮すると、古代はほとんどすべて朝庭と記していた可能性がある[51]。ただし、中国史料でも廷と庭はほぼ同義で混用されているので、ここでは「朝庭（廷）」として、「朝」とに分けて表示することにする。「天皇の治世」と「国家・国土」との意味で用いられた用例は、本論の直接的な対象ではないから、「朝」と「朝庭（廷）」に分けて表示することをしないことにする。また、対照の事項として、「朝堂」の用例も加えている。

　表１のように、『日本書紀』では朝と朝庭（廷）はほぼ同義に用いられる。また、「天皇・中央政府」という用法は、崇神紀から持統紀までの『日本書紀』の全般に見られる。同時代の隋唐では、「朝廷」は皇帝もしくは中央政府を意味することから、『日本書紀』に見える朝と朝庭（廷）の語義は当時の隋唐の影響を受けていたと考えられている。問題なのは、推古紀以降とそれ以前との用例の違いである。たとえば、推古紀以降、特に「宮・庭などの場所」を指す用例が急に増加する。「宮・庭などの場所」の用例は、推古紀以前にわずか九例が見られるが、推古紀以降、二十七例まで増加する。隋唐において、「朝」

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[51] 佐竹昭「古代宮室における『朝庭』の系譜」の注５（『日本歴史』547 号、1993 年）を参考。

「朝廷」を「宮・庭などの場所」として用いられる用法はあまり見られないので注目に値する[52]。

　「天皇・中央政府」という用例も、推古紀を画期として変化が見える。推古紀以前では、「聞神宝献于朝廷」（崇神六十年七月己酉条）や「朝庭遣大伴糠手子連」（敏達十二年是歳条）などのように中央政府を指す用例が一般であるが、推古紀以降、天皇を指す例が多くなる。特に、「客等拝朝庭」（推古十八年十月丁酉条）や「百寮諸人拝朝庭」（天武十年正月癸酉条）などのように「拝朝」に関する記事が急に増加する。また、「天皇の治世」や「国家・国土」を指す例は『日本書紀』では意外と少ないが、それらほとんどの例は推古紀から持統紀に集中して見られる。「朝堂」に関する記事も『日本書紀』でわずか五例のみ見られる。ただし、推古紀以前では清寧紀の一例しか見られないが、推古紀に入ると四例に増加する。

　前述のように、文献史料によって、朝と朝庭（廷）の語義は推古朝を画期として変化していたことがあきらかにされている。中国古代で「朝廷（庭）」は A 皇帝が朝見を受け政事を処理する場所、B 中央政府の代称、C 皇帝の代称として使用されているが、隋唐には B や C の意がほとんどで、「朝庭」が宮城内の具体的な場所を指す語として使用されることはなかった[53]。しかし、「朝庭」が宮城内の具体的な場所を指す用例が、推古紀以前にはわずか九例のみであったが、推古紀以降、二十七例にまで増加するという現象には注目すべきである。

　養老令と唐令との対照により、『日本書紀』『続日本紀』における「朝・朝庭（廷）」が具体的な場所を指す用法は、唐の影響ではなく、当時の日本の事情によるものと言ってよいだろう。そう考えると、同じ名称であるが、日本の王宮における「朝庭」と唐におけるそれとは異なる意義を持ち、機能にも独自性がうかがえる。また、同じ「朝庭」が「天皇・中央政府」を指す用例でも、推古紀以前は、中央政府を指すのが一般的であるが、推古紀以降、天皇を指す用例が多くなる。特に、「拝朝」に関する記事が急に増加する。ここからも推古朝がひとつの画期となったことが認められる。

３．日本古代朝政の成立と変容

（１）日本古代における朝政の場の成立

　本節では、日中古代の文献史料と考古学の発掘成果を通じ、朝政の場から日本古代朝政の成立と変容を見ていきたい。岸氏は、本来朝政の場であった朝堂は、推古朝の小墾田宮から存在しており、そこでの朝参・朝政が平安宮まで存続し、また、その構造は律令制政治機構の整備と密接な関係があるらしいと指摘している[54]。岸氏は小墾田宮における庁のある朝庭を後世の朝堂院の祖型とする。小墾田宮における「庁」が藤原宮以降の朝堂を指す「庁」と同じものであるかどうかは不明である。ただし、小墾田宮の朝庭は、伝統的な政務・儀礼の場である「庭」が中国都城における朝堂の概念の影響を受け、のちに朝堂・朝庭という広い「ニハ」へと展開していったものと考えられる[55]。

　『万葉集』に「庭中の　阿須波の神に　小柴さし　我は斎はむ　帰り来までに」[56]という和歌がある。岡田精司氏は、この歌に詠まれた「ニハ」において木の枝を地上に刺したてることを「庭中祭祀」と考え、また、それはヤシロが出現した以前の古代祭祀の一般的なありかただと指摘している。日本古代の「庭」は、本来、神事に関する空間と捉えられている。一方で、古代の「庭」は元来神意を聴く「斎庭」であり、総意を結集する「意思形成」の場であった[57]。加えて、「庭」が服属儀礼の場としても重要な役

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[52] 『続日本紀』に入ると、宮・庭などの場所を指す用例が減少し、全般的に「天皇・中央政府」を指す用例が見られる。また、『日本書紀』の性格について、天皇家の日本列島支配を正当化するため、七世紀後期から八世紀前期の律令官人らによって作られた政治的ものである。特に六世紀以前の『日本書紀』の記事には信憑性の問題があることは、つとに津田左右吉をはじめとする諸先学が指摘した。それゆえ、『日本書紀』の全般に見られる「天皇・中央政府」の用法は、当時の隋唐の影響のほか、七世紀後期から八世紀前期の事情を反映する可能性もあると言わざるを得ない。

[53] 注 15 と注 51 の佐竹前掲論文を参照。

[54] 岸俊男「朝堂の初歩的考察」（『日本古代宮都の研究』岩波書店、1988 年）239-242 頁。

[55] 志村注 3 前掲書、63-66 頁。

[56] 『万葉集』巻二十、4350 番。

[57] 井上注 3 前掲書、315-317 頁。

割を担った[58]。

　欽明天皇の和風諡号である「天国排開広庭」は、「宮庭」の概念が成立していたことを反映しているのだと考えられる[59]。また、『日本書紀』推古十六（608）年八月壬子条に「召唐客於朝庭、令奏使旨。時阿倍鳥臣、物部依網連抱、二人為客之導者也。於是、大唐之国信物置於庭中」とあるように、「朝庭」が外交儀礼の場として認識されていたことが示されている。儀礼の場としての役割は、後世の王宮に受け継がれている。皇極二（643）年十月己酉条に「饗賜群臣伴造於朝堂庭。而議授位之事。遂詔国司、如前所勅、更無改換、宜之厥任、慎爾所治」とあり、朝堂を含める朝庭が饗宴と議事の場として機能していたことがうかがえる。

　また、大化三年（647）是歳条には「壊小郡而営宮。天皇処小郡宮而定礼法。其制曰、凡有位者、要於寅時、南門之外、左右羅列、候日初出、就庭再拝、乃侍于庁。若晩参者、不得入侍。臨到午時、聴鍾而罷。其撃鍾吏者、垂赤巾於前。其鍾台者、起於中庭」とあり、孝徳朝になると有位者は朝庭の庁に定時に参上することが規定される。朝庭は天皇への拝礼や官人の政務処理の場所へと発展した。さらに、難波長柄豊崎宮の完成により、十四棟以上の朝堂をもつ広大な「朝庭」が出現した。また、養老儀制令の文武官条に「凡文武官初位以上、毎朔日朝。各注当司前月公文。五位以上、送着朝庭案上。即大納言進奏」とあるように、朝庭の儀礼は奈良時代においても機能しつづけていることがうかがえる。

　要するに、六世紀中後期の欽明朝頃から七世紀初頭の推古朝の時期には、「朝庭」が成立していたのだと言えよう。推古朝の小墾田遷宮を契機として、朝庭の外交儀礼や政務処理という政治的な性格が強化され、庁（＝朝堂）の出現をとともに、複数の朝堂を包含する広大な「ニハ」へと発展した。言い換えれば、七世紀前後に成立した朝庭は、後世の朝堂院の祖型と位置付けられるだろう。

（２）まつりごとの起源と分化

　日本語の「まつりごと」という言葉は、文字通り、政治と祭祀の両者を包括する意味を持つもので、「政」と表記されることが多い。また、『日本書紀』には、「政治」「政事」「事」という表記もある。「まつりごと」とは、「祭り事」の意で、一般的に「政」と表記される[60]。古代の政治は政事と祭事が一体不可分のもとで行われるので、従来祭政一致論で説明されることが多い。前述のように「正」は征服することで、その支配のために「うつ・強制する」の意がある「攴」を加えることを「政」という。本来、「政」は力による支配を意味する字である[61]。

　また、「治」はそもそも農耕のための治水を意味する字であると考えられる[62]。すなわち「政治」という言葉には、本来力による支配と合わせて、治水による生産を保護するという意味があるのである。「事」は、会意兼形声で、意符の下部（手）と、意符と音符を兼ねる上部（小旗をつけてしるしとした柱の意）とから成る文字である。古代に役所や職業の目印として、枝のある立ち木を切って立て、これにその取り扱う仕事を表す小旗をつけたことから、本来、目印の旗が示す仕事を意味し、転じて一般的に仕事・事柄の意として用いられる[63]。

　「任那之政（任那の政）」（欽明五年二月条）、「莫懶懈於任那之事（任那の事に懶懈ること莫かれ）」（敏達四年二月乙丑条）、「天皇所以治天下政（天皇天下の政を治むる所以）」（敏達十二年十月是歳条）、「天皇所治政事、有三失矣（天皇政事を治むる所に三失有り）」（斉明四年十一月壬午条）とあるように、『日本書紀』では「政」「事」「政事」が混用され、ともに「まつりごと」と訓読された。「まつりごと」

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[58] 志村注3前掲書、106-108頁。
[59] 水野正好「古代庭園の成立とその道程」（金子裕之編『古代庭園の思想－神仙世界への憧憬』角川書店、2002年）173-175頁。
[60] 佐藤謙三・山田俊雄編『角川最新古語辞典』の「まつりごと」条（角川書店、2004年、534頁）を参照。
[61] 白川注2前掲書（901頁）と同注12前掲書（495頁）を参照。
[62] 白川注2前掲書（1072頁）、鎌田注1前掲書（806頁）、尾崎注1前掲書（1003頁）、藤堂注12前掲書（674頁）を参考。
[63] 「事」の字形と字源については、諸説があるが、「事」を「しごと」「つかえる」と理解することが同じである。一方、白川説と鎌田説のように、「事」はそもそも「祭祀」と関係がある説もある。ここは、尾崎説にしたがう。また、尾崎説に近いのは、藤堂説がある。白川注2前掲書（682頁）、鎌田注1前掲書（43頁）、尾崎注1前掲書（54頁）、藤堂注12前掲書（32頁）を参考。

という言葉は、本来、力による支配と合わせて治水による生産の保護を意味した一方、「まつり」である宗教的な権威と儀礼とによって政治を持続的に安定的行うことをも意味すると考えられている[64]。

　前述したように、中国古代では少なくとも春秋戦国時代までは、祭祀は最も重要な統治の手段として、軍事とともに国政の中心であると認識されていた。そうした祭祀に基づいて政治を運営する形態は中国に限られず、歴史上、世界各国で見られる現象でもある。日本古代でいえば、文献上、最古は『魏志倭人伝』に記載された倭女王卑弥呼の統治下の邪馬台国まで遡ることができる。『魏志倭人伝』には女王卑弥呼が「鬼道」「惑衆」によって邪馬台国を統治するという記載である[65]。「骨を灼いて以って卜し、用って吉凶を決す」[66]（『後漢書倭伝』）、「其の俗挙事行来に、云為する所有れば、輒ち骨を灼きて卜し、以って吉凶を占い、先ず卜する所を告ぐ。其の辞は令亀の法の如く、火坼を視て兆を占う」[67]（『魏志倭人伝』）などのように、日本列島では神意に基づいて政治を行うことは古来の風俗といえる。

　続いて、『隋書倭国伝』には 600 年前後の倭王の朝政のあり方が記されている[68]。当時の倭王は、天を兄、日を弟とする太陽の崇拝に基づき、日の出る前に聴政を行う。中国の殷代にも、「朝日の礼」というこれに近いものをおこなうことがあったが[69]、秦漢時代より千年を経て隋唐時代になると、完備な統治・支配システム（皇帝制度・官僚制・律令制・文書主義など）が形成されていた。この支配システムの素晴らしさは、たとえ皇帝本人が国家を統治しない場合があっても、国家の各部門が自律的に機能することができるという点である。その結果、中国古代の国政は、神意ではなく制度（礼・法）によって行われるようになった。祭事も政事と分離され、一種の支配手段として存続したが、その重要性は大幅に低下した。中国の「朝政」には神的な、いわゆる宗教的な色彩が薄く、現実主義な傾向が多い。それゆえに、隋の文帝にとっては、倭王の未開的な聴政の在り方は中国の政治と違うものであり、「此大無義理（此れ大いに義理無し）」と思って、訓令でこれを改めさせようとしたわけである。

　従来、「まつりごと」が政治と祭祀とに分化したのは、推古朝からのことであるとされている[70]。「恐朝無善政、取咎於神祇耶（恐るらくは、朝に善政無くして、咎を神祇に取れるにか）」（崇神七年二月辛卯条）、「春夏秋冬、祭拝為事（春夏秋冬、祭拝りたまふことを事と為す）」（欽明十三年十月条）とあるように、六世紀のヤマト朝廷には、倭王の任務が祭祀であるという観念が根強く残っていた。しかしながら、七世紀に入ると、状況は次第に変化してきた。大化元年七月庚辰条に「先以祭鎮神祇、然後応議政事（先づ以て神祇を祭ひ鎮め、然る後に政事を議るべし）」とあり、これに孝徳天皇は「祭鎮神祇」と「議政事」を二つの「事」として分化させたことがわかる。七世紀におけるヤマト朝廷の「政事」の具体的な内容は、次の通りである。

　　（１）官制（天智三年二月丁亥条、天智十年正月甲辰条）
　　（２）法制（天智十年正月甲辰条、天武十年二月甲子条）
　　（３）儀式（天智十年正月庚子条、天武五年十一月乙丑朔条）
　　（４）経済（大化二年正月甲子朔条、斉明四年十一月壬午条）
　　（５）軍事（舒明九年是歳条、天智即位前紀、天武元年七月壬子条、天武十三年四月丙戌条）
　　（６）外交（舒明九年是歳条、皇極四年六月戊申条、天武五年十一月丁卯条、天武十四年十一月己巳条、持統元年九月甲申条、持統九年三月己酉条）

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[64]　白川注 44 前掲書、703 頁。
[65]「其国本亦以男子為王、住七八十年、倭国乱、相攻伐歴年、乃共立一女子為王、名曰卑弥呼、事鬼道、能惑衆、年已長大、無夫婿、有男弟佐治国。自為王以来、少有見者。以婢千人自侍、唯有男子一人給飲食、伝辞出入。居処宮室楼観、城柵厳設、常有人持兵守衛」とある。
[66]「灼骨以卜、用決吉凶」とある。
[67]「其俗挙事行来、有所云為、輒灼骨而卜、以占吉凶、先告所卜、其辞如令亀法、視火坼占兆」とある。
[68]「開皇二十年、倭王姓阿毎、字多利思北孤、号阿輩雞弥、遣使詣闕、上令所司訪其風俗、使者言倭王以天為兄、以日為弟、天未明時出聴政、跏趺坐、日出便停理務、云委我弟、高祖曰、此大無義理、於是訓令改之」とある。
[69]　白川注 2 前掲書（1110 頁）と同注 12 前掲書（603 頁）を参照。
[70]　橋本注 3 前掲書、153 頁。

　このように、七世紀になると、日本の朝政のありかたは古典的な「祀與戎」[71]の段階を抜け出て、隋唐時期の中国的な朝政に近いものになったのではないかと考えられる。その中、七世紀初頭の推古朝は一つの画期をなすものと考えられている。推古朝の変革は、『隋書倭国伝』の記載どおり本当に隋の文帝の訓令によったものかどうかは判断できない。しかしながら、推古天皇のもとで聖徳太子と蘇我馬子が一連の政治改革を実施したのは事実であろう[72]。対隋の交渉のなかで推古朝の執政者は、国力の上で、自分たちと隋との差が巨大であることをこのころようやく認識した。中国や朝鮮諸国など外部からの刺激は、日本の古代社会が次第に成熟してきたことの一因となる[73]。そうした刺激がなかったならば、日本が律令体制を受け入れて実施することもなかったろう。

（3）日本古代朝政の成立と変容

　朝政の場である朝庭機能の転換を考慮しながら、当時の朝政のありかたを見ていくことにする。推古八年（600）、すなわち隋の開皇二十年、倭国の遣隋使は、隋の文帝に朝見した。『隋書』倭国伝には、当時の様子が記載される。『隋書』によると、当時の倭王は、「以天為兄、以日為弟、天未明時出聴政、跏趺坐、日出便停理務、云委我弟」という実情で、まつりごとを行っていたらしい。この聴政は、天を兄、日を弟とする太陽の崇拝に基づき、日の出る前に行なわれている呪術的な祭事に近いものと考えられる。隋の文帝にとっては、倭王の未開的な聴政のありかたが中国の政治とずいぶん異なっているものであり、「此太無義理」と思って、訓令によってこれを改めさせた。

　当時の倭王は、推古天皇であった。推古八年（600）以来の外交政策の失敗と関係があるか定かでないが、推古十一年（603）より、推古天皇のもとで、聖徳太子と蘇我馬子が一連の政治改革を実施した。皇居を豊浦宮から小墾田宮へ遷させたのは推古十一年（603）の十月[74]、冠位十二階の発布は二ヶ月後の十二月である[75]。厩戸太子は、翌年の四月に「親肇作憲法十七条」[76]、その秋の九月に、「改朝礼」とある[77]。小墾田遷宮をはじめとする一連の政治改革の実施を境に、推古朝の朝政が小墾田遷宮以前のありかたと遷宮以降のありかたの二つの時期に区別される。

　『隋書』に見える豊浦宮での倭王の聴政は、一般的に日本の固有なまつりごとのありかただと考えられるが、問題なのはこの聴政がいつまで敷衍できるかということである。神意に基づいて政治を運営するこのような形態は、『魏志倭人伝』に記載された倭の女王である卑弥呼の統治下の邪馬台国にまで遡ることができる。卑弥呼が「鬼道」「惑衆」ということによって邪馬台国を統治するという記載があり、「灼骨以卜、用決吉凶」（『後漢書』東夷列伝の倭条）、「其俗挙事行来、有所云為、輒灼骨而卜、以占吉凶、先告所卜、其辞如令亀法、視火坼占兆」（『魏志倭人伝』）などのように、日本列島においては、神意に基づく政治を行うことは古来からの風俗であろう。

　発掘された三世紀までの考古学の資料から考えれば、古墳時代以前の日本列島人の祭祀の内容は、縄文の地母神や仮面などから弥生の穀霊や祖霊（のち首長霊）へと変化した[78]。しかし、個別的な祭祀のありかたの差異は別問題であり、弥生時代における銅鐸や青銅製武器を埋納することは、縄文時代における土偶や土器を壊して大地に埋めることと根底において通ずるところを持つ。むしろそうした弥生時代の大地への崇拝は、縄文時代の祭祀を引き継いで発展していたものだと言ってもよい。これは後の古墳時代において流行っていた天への崇拝と巨大な差異があるとされている。

　古墳時代には、大和朝廷の勢力が列島各地によりいっそう広がっていた。埼玉県稲荷山古墳出土の鉄剣銘や熊本県江田船山古墳出土の銀象嵌銘大刀などの金石文に、「治天下」や「獲加多支鹵大王」などの文字が判読できる。獲加多支鹵大王は『日本書紀』に記載される雄略天皇だとされている。それによる

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[71] 『春秋左氏伝』成公十三年に「国之大事、在祀與戎」とある。
[72] 代表的なものとして、冠位十二階（推古十一年十二月壬申条）と憲法十七条（推古十二年四月戊辰条）があげられる。
[73] 石母田注34前掲書、11-66頁。
[74] 『日本書紀』推古十一年十月条。
[75] 『日本書紀』推古十一年十二月条。
[76] 『日本書紀』推古十二年四月条。
[77] 『日本書紀』推古十二年九月条。
[78] 寺沢薫「青銅のカミとマツリ」（『日本の歴史02　王権誕生』講談社、2001年）97-124頁。

と、少なくとも五世紀中後期から、「治天下大王」が日本列島の君主号として創成され、日本的な天下意識が出現していた。さらに、六世紀に入ると、この日本的な天下意識は、太陽神信仰とともに、高天原神話の核心的な部分となった。

　また、前述した『隋書』倭国伝の記載において注意すべきなのは、「跏趺坐」とあるように聴政していた倭王の座る姿勢である。倭王は仏のごとく坐して聴政していたとされ、ここに仏教の影響がうかがえる[79]。日本における仏教の公伝時期については、552 年説と 538 年説が両立しているが、いずれにせよ大体六世紀中葉頃であろう。したがって、『隋書』に見られる倭王のまつりごとのありかたは、政治改革以降のありかたに比べると確かに日本の古来の特徴が見える。しかしこの慣習は、意外にそれほど古くなく、六世紀中葉以降のものであろう。それは、六世紀中後期の欽明朝頃から七世紀初頭の推古朝頃の時期において「朝庭」が成立していたこととも符合する。また、小墾田遷宮以降、朝庭機能が転換する際に、律令制度の整備とともに、朝政も日本固有のありかたから隋唐式のありかたへと変容していったと考えられる。

４．結論

　以上、日中の史料に見られる「朝政」の用例を分析しながら、比較的な観点で、日本古代の「朝政」の特色を検討してみた。以下にその結果をまとめよう。

　中国古代の「朝政」の場合、時間のアサが「朝」の本源的な意味であり、アサに君主にまみえることが朝政の原初的形態であった。しかし、朝見の定例化は朝政の場の限定をもたらした上で、政治内容の拡大と朝政の場の限定にしたがって、朝政の時間は必ずしも「朝夕」に限定されなくなった。その結果、朝政の朝の本源的な意味である「アサ」が捨象されて用いられなくなっていた代わりに、「朝政の場」という意味である「朝廷」が朝政の朝に定着していく。それゆえ、「朝政」という語は、基本的に朝廷の政事を意味する。また、古代の庭（廷）は祭祀の場として「斎庭」の性格を帯びていた一方で政事を行う場としての役割も担った。「朝廷」という語もそれに由来したのである。「朝」はほかに動詞として「王が廷で臣下と会して政事を処理する」という意味を持つので、朝廷の朝は動詞の朝見や朝政を意味すると指摘した。「朝廷」とは、基本的に朝政するための庭または朝見用の庭を意味する語である。

　次に、「朝、正也（朝は正なり）」とあるように、「朝」は「正（政）」に通じ、「朝政」は「朝」と同義である。筆者は中国古代の「朝政」を「君主が朝廷で臣下と会して政事を行うこと」（朝廷の政事）を定義した。『周礼』や『礼記』などの中国古代の経典に見える「朝」の用例は、動詞の「まみえる」と朝政の場として用いられるのが多いのに対し、時間の「あさ」をさして使われる用法がほとんど用いられなくなっていた。また、朝廷という語は、漢代とその以前の時代で朝政の場と中央政府として用いられる用例が多いのに対し、隋唐時代になると中央政府と皇帝の代称として用いられる用例が多く、朝政の場の用法がほとんど用いられなくなっていた。朝廷の語義の変容は、漢代から隋唐時代にかけての中国古代の朝政の場の変容に対応する。隋唐時代では朝政の場の用法がほとんど用いられなくなっていたのは、隋唐時代の朝堂の重要性が低くなっていたことを反映している。

　次に、七・八世紀の日本の官僚制度は未熟であったゆえに、隋唐の律令制度を導入したとはいえ、当時の日本にとってはそれを全面的に実施するのはまだ時期尚早であった。というより、日本古代の律令制度は、日本の政治的伝統と隋唐の律令制度とが織り交じって妥協して生まれたものであり、それゆえに、「朝政」はそもそも中国から伝来した言葉であるが、日本的な「朝政」の特色が見いだされる、ということを指摘した。日本古代の「朝政」という語は、「朝–政」の二つの形態素を「修飾語–被修飾語」の関係で配置して作られた合成語であり、語彙の構成から見ると、「朝の政」という修飾構造に属し、それは「朝、正也（朝は正なり）」という中国古代の「朝政」と異なる性質のものであることを検討した。それに基づいて筆者は、日本古代の「朝政」を「みかどで行われる君臣に通じるまつりごと」（略称「みかどのまつりごと」）と定義した。

　次に、中国古代の「朝政の場」である「朝廷」という語は、日本古代で「みかど」にあたる。「みかど」は、多様な語義を持っている語である。朝政の場として、「みかど」の形成は朝政の形成と不可分

な関係があるため、その変容から朝政形態の変化がうかがえる。和語としての「みかど」の語義には、「宮門」や「貴人の家」など具体的な場所を指す語義から、「天皇の治める国」もしくは「天皇本人」という抽象的な語義になるという変化が確かめられる。天皇の意で用いられるのは、武田氏のいう奈良時代後半以降ではない。個人的には、七世紀後期から八世紀初期のあたり以降、「みかど」が天皇や国家などを指す例が増えるようになったのではないかと推測している。ただし、「宮門」や「貴人の家」など具体的な場所を指す用法は、「みかど」の本義として、奈良時代においても続いて用いられていた。

　次に、文献史料によって、朝と朝庭（廷）の語義は推古朝を画期として変化していたことがあきらかにされている。中国古代で「朝廷（庭）」はＡ皇帝が朝見を受け政事を処理する場所、Ｂ中央政府の代称、Ｃ皇帝の代称として使用されているが、隋唐にはＢやＣの意がほとんどで、「朝庭」が宮城内の具体的な場所を指す語として使用されることはなかった。しかし、「朝庭」が宮城内の具体的な場所を指す用例が、推古紀以前にはわずか九例のみであったが、推古紀以降、二十七例にまで増加するという現象には注目すべきである。養老令と唐令との対照により、『日本書紀』『続日本紀』における「朝・朝庭（廷）」が具体的な場所を指す用法は、唐の影響ではなく、当時の日本の事情によるものと言ってよいだろう。そう考えると、同じ名称であるが、日本の王宮における「朝庭」と唐におけるそれとは異なる意義を持ち、機能にも独自性がうかがえる。また、同じ「朝庭」が「天皇・中央政府」を指す用例でも、推古紀以前は、中央政府を指すのが一般的であるが、推古紀以降、天皇を指す用例が多くなる。特に、「拝朝」に関する記事が急に増加する。ここからも推古朝がひとつの画期となったことが認められる。六世紀中後期の欽明朝頃から七世紀初頭の推古朝の時期には、「朝庭」が成立していたのだと言えよう。推古朝の小墾田遷宮を契機として、朝庭の外交儀礼や政務処理という政治的な性格が強化され、庁（＝朝堂）の出現をとともに、複数の朝堂を包含する広大な「ニハ」へと発展した。言い換えれば、七世紀前後に成立した朝庭は、後世の朝堂院の祖型と位置付けられるだろう。

　次に「まつりごと（政）」の意味を検討し、この用語には、「まつり（祭）」である宗教的な権威と儀礼とによって政治を安定的に行うという意味があることを指摘し、それが七世紀に入ると、隋唐との交渉のなかで、最初神的な色彩が濃かった朝政は、政事と祭祀とに分化するに伴って、次第に古典的な「祀與戎」の段階を抜け出て、隋唐時期の中国的な朝政に近いものに転化するようになる、ということを論じた。『隋書』に見られる倭王のまつりごとのありかたは、政治改革以降のありかたに比べると確かに日本の古来の特徴が見える。しかしこの慣習は、意外にそれほど古くなく、六世紀中葉以降のものであろう。それは、六世紀中後期の欽明朝頃から七世紀初頭の推古朝頃の時期において「朝庭」が成立していたこととも符合する。また、小墾田遷宮以降、朝庭機能が転換する際に、律令制度の整備とともに、朝政も日本固有のありかたから隋唐式のありかたへと変容していったと考えられる。

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Research Note

Japan's ODA Policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus
An Analysis of Japanese Assistance to Economic Development in Kyrgyzstan and Armenia

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Since the end of the Cold War, establishing partner relationships with other regions beyond Southeast Asia, such as Central Asia and the Caucasus, has served as a primary goal for Japan in asserting its foreign policy. Japan has been active in the wider Central Eurasian region, namely, in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, over the last two decades, mainly through provision of its official development assistance (ODA) and implementation of international cooperation projects. Japan`s foreign aid allocation to these countries was primarily aimed at the achievement of balanced and sustainable economic growth as part of its ODA policy in the region. This paper aims to provide an extensive overview of bilateral relationships between Japan and the countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus in the context of formulation and implementation of Japanese ODA programs. The paper starts by elaborating on the main features of Japan's foreign aid policy towards the target countries in the region and then outlines the main policy objectives behind Japan's ODA allocation towards Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. The discussion concerning Japanese engagement in the region will be focused on Japan`s economic development practices and their impact on ODA recipient countries.

Keywords: Japanese Foreign Policy, ODA, Economic Development, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan

Introduction

The official standpoint of Japan, as a donor country, is articulated in the ODA Charter provided by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, which declares a clear preference for Asian countries. As stated in the Charter, Japan's priority for the Asian region is justified by the notion that "Asia [is] a region with [a] close relationship to Japan and which can have a major impact on Japan's stability and prosperity."[1] The top ten recipients of Japan's ODA are thus located in Southeast Asia, and almost 60% of Japan's ODA is distributed to these countries (OECD 2017). The geographical preference of Japan for aid distribution has been the same for a quite long time but this tendency seem to be fluctuating since the end of the Cold War (Nishigaki and Shimomura 1998).

Japan has been active in the Central Eurasian[2] region, namely in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, over the last two decades, mainly through provision of its ODA and active participation of Japanese businesses in pursuit of Japan's economic interests (Dadabaev 2013). The priority area for Japanese aid allocation in respective countries is predominantly connected with the achievement of balanced and sustainable

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[1] Information from the website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2007/ODA2007/html/honpen/hp304000000.htm; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[2] The term "Central Eurasia" is used in this study as a reference to the geographical area comprised of Central Asia and the South Caucasus.

economic growth. The majority of projects implemented under the established country assistance plan deal with infrastructure development and provision of technical assistance, which lack prospects to generate economic opportunities and value for local development (Dadabaev 2016). Only few projects, such as educational grants and grants for agricultural producers, seem to have had an impact on local economic revitalization (Dadabaev 2016, Yuasa 2007, Len 2005). The existing literature on the impact of Japanese aid on economic growth and development in Central Eurasian countries suggests that, in most cases, the development projects implemented by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) lack direct impact on local communities and beneficiaries since the majority of projects are directed at the provision of humanitarian assistance or infrastructure development at the state level rather than the support of local economic development in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan (Marat 2008, Kawato 2008, Mangi 2011).

In recent years, the vast majority of academic works have stressed the importance of studying the relationship between aid allocation and its impact on the economic development of recipient countries. For instance, early studies commissioned by Papanek (1972) found a positive correlation between foreign aid and economic growth. Another scholar, such as Singh (1985), revealed that aid may have positive and strong effects on growth even without state intervention, while scholars such as Snyder (1993) pointed out the importance of country size in assessing the impact of aid on growth. On the other hand, Burnside and Dollar (1997) came to the conclusion that aid may be effective, that is, contribute to growth only in a good policy environment, which may maximize a donor's efforts to bring a positive change though collaboration with policy implementing agencies in developing countries. Later studies, however, question the real benefit coming through aid allocation and found that aid may also have a negative impact on growth (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999). One study conducted by Knack (2000) found out that with large amounts of aid inflow, the institutional quality in developing countries diminishes, while at the same time increasing rent-seeking and corruption attitudes, and therefore causing a negative impact on growth. Consequently, the investigation of the relationship between Japanese foreign aid and economic growth in developing countries possesses conditionality based on geographic context, aid flow and its type, and, from a methodological point of view, how it is being observed and the sources used (Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger, 1999).

One of the main objectives of this study and contribution to the existing literature on Japanese foreign aid topic is thus to review how the bilateral relationship between Japan and recipient countries, in the form of aid inflow to Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, has impacted the economic development of recipient countries. The correlation between foreign aid attainment and economic development discourse will focus on Japan's efforts to encourage economic development prospects in recipient countries and identify the deviations in Japan's approach to stimulate this process.

In order to assess this process, this study is designed in a way to reveal what motivates Japan to allocate foreign aid and what was the impact on recipient countries from explanatory and descriptive standpoints. Since the study strives to explore the process of relationship building between donor and recipient countries, the case study approach will be applied. The descriptive nature of the study sought to be important to form the contextual framework for the study and outline Japan's ODA policy towards Central Eurasian states. On the other hand, the explanatory standpoint enables discussion of the different ways used by Japan to promote economic development and to understand the factors motivating Japan to undertake certain development policies in recipient countries.

This paper consists of four main parts. The first part aims to provide a brief explanation of Japan's foreign policy objectives in Central Eurasia. The second and third parts discuss development projects implemented by Japan in recipient countries. The final part will provide a conclusion by summarizing the main findings of the study and will prescribe an assessment of whether the formulated Japanese ODA policy towards recipient countries contributed to economic advancement.

1. Japan's ODA Scheme for Central Eurasia

(1) Japan's Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus Region

Japanese engagement in the wider Central Eurasian region started shortly after the post-Soviet states gained their independence in 1991. This process was benchmarked by the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the newly independent republics of Central Asia and the South Caucasus in 1992. Initially, Kyrgyzstan was one of the first out of five Central Asian states to attract the attention of Japan, however, as collaboration between Japan and other Central Asian states has evolved, more attention has been paid to other countries of Central Eurasia. For instance, despite the fact that Japan established its first diplomatic contact with Kyrgyzstan, Japanese embassies were first opened in

Tashkent, Almaty, and Dushanbe, and finally in 2003 in Bishkek. The most recent Japanese embassy was opened in Yerevan in 2015.

In general, Japanese engagement in the Central Eurasian region can be analyzed within three main periods: Starting from 1930 up until 1945, the countries of Soviet Central Asia were studied by a number of Japanese scholars who examined specific characteristics related to economic and political conditions as well as nationality problems in respective countries. The main goal for accomplishing these studies was to reveal the shortcomings and weaknesses of Soviet governance and, by doing so, securing the stability of the Japanese empire (Takeuchi 2000).

The second period of Japan's interaction in the region is connected with the establishment of independent Central Asian states in 1991 up until 2004. This phase symbolizes the recognition of newly independent states by Japan and establishment of diplomatic relationships with them. Yet despite the fact that Japan maintained bilateral relationships with Central Eurasian states in the early 1990s, Japanese policy towards these countries remained unclear and fluctuating. According to Hook et al. (2001), during the second phase, Japanese policy-makers did not undertake any assertive steps towards maintaining closer interactions with Central Asian states and "were more eager for historical reasons to develop relationships with Central Asian Republics" (Hook et al. 2001).

The third and contemporary phase of Japan's engagement with the Central Eurasian region starts with the introduction of the "Central Asia Plus Japan" concept in 2004. This process is also remarkable because, starting from 2004, the Central Asia and the Caucasus Division at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign affairs started to operate. The total ODA channeled into the region in 2014 constituted 290 million USD. Since then, Japan started to maintain full-fledged interactions with Central Eurasian countries in three major areas, including: (1) diplomatic/political interaction; (2) trade, and investment; and (3) aid and assistance (Dadabaev 2016).

(2) Japan's Strategic Interests and Foreign Policy in Central Eurasia

Japan's interests in the region can be reviewed within three main objective lines. Japan built up its framework for cooperation with the Central Eurasian states based on the main principles of ODA, which were associated primarily with the revitalization of Japan's Silk Road narrative. For Japan, establishing partner relationships with other Asian countries beyond China served as a primary target in asserting its foreign policy objectives. The second main objective of Japan for engagement with Central Eurasian states was connected with the provision of assistance for these newly independent countries by facilitating their smooth transition from planned economies to market economies and, by doing so, supporting their sustainable development. The final objective for collaboration with the countries of Central Eurasia was based on strategic interests of Japan related to the extraction and use of oil and natural resources with the aim of diversification of its energy resources.

Given the fact that Japan's territorial dispute with Russia suppressed Japan from utilizing the energy potential of the Sakhalin and Kuril Islands, Japan needs to secure its energy consumption from the Middle East (Tuman, Strand and Emmert 2009). In addition to these three main interests of Japan in the region, the geographical location and proximity of these countries to China also plays a role in the construction of Japan's foreign policy towards Central Eurasia. China's aspiration to integrate the countries of the region to its overall regional initiatives, such as through East Turkestan policy or "One Belt, One Road" initiative, also motivates Japan to maintain its own influence through increased aid delivery to the region (Muldavin 2000, Dadabaev 2016).

(3) Japan's ODA Disbursements in Central Asia and the Caucasus

The interaction and implementation of Japan's policy towards these countries started with the provision of development assistance within human rights, democratic, and free-market economic principles. The first batch of ODA donations to Central Asian states accounted for 2.57 million USD in 1993 and reached 108.48 million USD by 2008. The provision of ODA to Central Eurasian states was governed by Japan's Four Guidelines of ODA, along with the main principles of the ODA Charter (Hook et al. 2001).

The ODA provided by Japan within the framework of these principles is presented in Table 1. Figure 1 displays the total ODA of Japan between 1992 and 2015.

Table 1 Japan's ODA in Central Asia and the Caucasus from 2006 to 2015 (in USD millions)

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Armenia	7.68	85.23	57.7	98.7	77.45	7.48	0.31	1.33	1.69	-5.31
Azerbaijan	4.06	11.36	-2.8	-2.03	-11.01	105.75	155.36	42.85	68.72	21.31
Georgia	11.63	7.01	2.42	12.31	6.48	4.97	30.66	45.07	57.39	39.72
Kazakhstan	24.87	43.31	37.9	37.13	-1.82	-20.73	-15.93	-6.32	-36.75	-33.23
Kyrgyzstan	17.22	15.68	12.35	17.75	23.16	30.62	19.57	17.48	21.24	42.12
Tajikistan	8.04	9.43	8.06	26.24	43.42	35.59	32.98	26.66	23.55	17.82
Turkmenistan	0.62	-0.54	-1.54	-1.19	-0.94	-1.47	-2.21	-1.68	-1.6	-1.29
Uzbekistan	18.61	56.32	48.63	20.41	7.04	-1.79	-6.01	30.11	34.18	126.66

Source: Compiled from data made available by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development aid (ODA) disbursements to countries and regions [DAC2a]), available at http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A&lang=en# (Accessed 13 December 2017).
Note: Negative figures indicate that outstanding loans remain after repayment by respective recipients.

Figure 1 Japanese Total ODA in Central Asia and the Caucasus between 1992 and 2015

Source: Compiled from data made available by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=TABLE2A&lang=en# (Accessed 13 December 2017).
Note: Negative figures indicate that outstanding loans remain after repayment by respective recipients.

(4) JICA as an ODA Policy Implementation Tool

Established in 1974, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) serves as a main mechanism for the coordination and realization of Japan's ODA policy in developing countries. The main principles of JICA include: addressing the global agenda, reducing poverty through equitable growth, improving governance, and achieving human security. [3] Based on these main principles, JICA accomplishes aid coordination mission through provision of its support for the sustainable development of Central Eurasian states (see Figure 2).

JICA's operations in ODA recipient countries are guided by preferences for certain sectors for aid distribution. Given the fact that Central Eurasian countries are considered to be landlocked and, thus, lack direct access to the sea for conducting their trade relationships, it is required from these countries to establish alternative routes of transportation and telecommunication to reach other regions of the world for attaining and sustaining their economic development. Acknowledging the importance of this

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[3] "JICA- Mission Statement" available at: < http://www.jica.go.jp/english/about/>, (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

conditionality for the achievement of Japan's policy objectives in the region, JICA concluded that "in the absence of adequate maintenance and management since independence, facilities have considerably deteriorated and are in urgent need of rehabilitation."[4] Therefore, one of the primary and biggest installments of Japanese ODA in 1995 was directed towards the implementation of projects related to infrastructure and transportation development in Kazakhstan. The total value of Japanese ODA grants accounted was 50.9 billion JPY and was used for the realization of the Railway Transport Capacity Development Project, the Irtysh River Bridge Construction Project, and the Astana Airport Reconstruction Project.[5]

Another ODA disbursement of 2.3 billion JPY was provided to Kyrgyzstan in May 1999 for the development of the transportation sector in the country. According to a JICA project administrator, the main objective for the provision of this development aid was:

> "Considering the particular importance of the extensive rehabilitation and modernization of the deteriorated transportation network for the country's development, JBIC has mainly provided support for the transportation sector. ODA loan commitments have been provided for the Bishkek-Manas Airport Modernization Project, which upgrades the Manas Airport in the capital of Bishkek to function as an international airport; and the Bishkek-Osh Road Rehabilitation Project to improve the condition of the main road linking the capital Bishkek with the second largest city, Osh. JBIC has provided ODA loans totaling ¥25.7 billion to Kyrgyz for six projects."[6]

Similarly, in 1997, Japan provided 4.5 billion JPY for the Railway Transportation Modernization Project in Turkmenistan and 15.6 billion JPY for the Telecommunication Network Expansion Project (II) and the Three Local Airports Modernization Project (II) in Uzbekistan.[7]

The second biggest sector that attracts the most of Japanese ODA is the power sector. Due to the inherent Soviet period power-supply systems, Central Asian states possess power supply inefficiency and, thus, is confronted with a need for infrastructure development to operationalize it.

Since establishing its relations with Central Eurasian states, Japan has signed many bilateral aid agreements. According to one of these agreements, in 2006, the following policy areas were defined as priority by Japan for cooperation with Uzbekistan: (1) Support for building human-resource development systems needed for developing a market-oriented economy and industrial development; (2) support for rebuilding social sectors; (3) support for upgrading and improving economic infrastructure; and (4) promotion of intra-regional cooperation.[8] Based on these priority areas JICA also established a framework for the implementation of activities in order to promote poverty reduction through economic growth and supporting regional cooperation through (1) developing a foundation including transport infrastructure; (2) support for social sectors and, (3) the Central Asia Plus Japan Dialogue implementation.[9] Likewise, the following four priority areas were set by Japan in 2009 for the bilateral relationship between Japan and Tajikistan: (1) rural and industrial development; (2) transport and traffic; (3) border control; and (4) the upgrade of basic social services.[10]

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[4] Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2000, (Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 2000), p. 38.

[5] Ibid, p. 40.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid, p. 49.

[8] Japan International Cooperation Agency and Development Aid (JICA), Japan Development Assistance Report-2009, (Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), 2009), p. 43.

[9] Ibid, p. 44.

[10] Ibid.

Figure 2. The Evolution of JICA Programs in Central Asia and the Caucasus

Unit: JPY millions

Year	Value
2008	28.54
2009	19.948
2010	19.777
2011	15.501
2012	24.324
2013	17.857
2014	28.366
2015	35.71

Source: Compiled from the data extracted from JICA Annual Reports (2007-2016), available at https://goo.gl/TNhxGY (accessed on 13 December 2017)

As stated earlier, starting from 1992, Japan has been using its development aid towards the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus in order to establish a closer relationship with the countries of the region (Takamine 2005). Despite the fact that the strengthening of the relationship between Japan and the countries of the region was followed by the delivery of enormous foreign aid to the region, Japanese foreign policy during this period can treated as passive and unclear. From 1997 to 2004, the region witnessed a new phase of Japanese foreign policy orchestrated by then-Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto known as "Hashimoto Doctrine" (Hook et al. 2001). The main attribute of this period and the objective of this doctrine was to further Japan's relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries and using this partnership for addressing global pressing issues. With the outbreak of the East Asian financial and economic crisis in 1997, Japan's aspiration for regional cooperation and a leadership role was once again manifested. According to a study by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan's policy aimed at practicing a more enhanced bilateral relationship with other countries of the Asian region from mid-1997 onwards implies that "although Japan was certainly not abandoning its attachment to the bilateral norm and bilateral relationship with the U.S., these were beginning to be challenged in the midst of Japanese policy-making agents by the resurgent norms of Asianism and internationalism" (Hook et al. 2001, p. 224).

If we analyze the trajectory of development assistance provided to Central Asian countries by Japan between 1997 and 2004, we may observe that the total value of Japanese foreign aid to the region was reduced in 1997 owing to the implementation of the Hashimoto Doctrine, as shown in Figure 1. Yet, as depicted in Figure 3, after the 9/11 attack in 2001, the development assistance disbursement was increased once again. The main reason for the increase in the total value of Japanese foreign aid disbursements to the Central Asian region was based on Japan's goal of maintaining peace and stability in the wider Asian region. It was important for Japan to secure its region (ASEAN) from the transmission and expansion of terrorism from the side of Afghanistan, and thus, Japan used foreign aid to prevent the development of such scenarios in Central Asia.

Figure 3. Total Value of JICA Programs in Central Asia and the Caucasus

Unit: JPY millions

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
■ Uzbekistan	4,587	2,551	2,047	1,946	3,717	2,708	8,184	18,931
■ Azerbaijan	377	121	7,731	6,163	11,075	5,289	7,261	6,015
■ Georgia	80	135	659	1,251	3,256	3,909	5,147	4,086
■ Kyrgyzstan	1,641	1,028	1,852	1,193	1,260	1,503	4,218	3,966
■ Tajikistan	6,517	1,229	688	3,307	2,501	847	3,112	1,893
■ Armenia	8,514	10,252	4,124	223	189	297	227	552
■ Kazakhstan	6,772	4,439	2,617	1,372	2,305	3,280	197	229
■ Turkmenistan	52	193	60	26	21	24	21	36

Source: Compiled from the data extracted from JICA Annual Reports (2007-2016) available at https://goo.gl/TNhxGY (Accessed on 13 December 2017)

Since 2004, Japan has shown an increased interest in the region and been practicing more comprehensive cooperation with the countries of Central Asia and South Caucasus. The introduction and implementation of the "Central Asia Plus Japan" Initiative marked the new phase of cooperation between Japan and the countries of the region. The nature of cooperation between Japan and Central Eurasian countries since 2004 can be reviewed from a multi-approach perspective which is not limited to the delivery of development aid but also represents an enhanced interaction in different areas of mutual interest.[11]

For Japan, which had been pursuing the goal of raising its role and position in international arena, practicing a more balanced mode of interaction with the countries of Central Eurasia, was important. In reviewing Japan's post-Cold war efforts, one may acknowledge that, after the U.S, Japan had been providing the largest portion of foreign aid to the region. Given the fact that maintaining regional security

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[11] "Central Asia and Caucasus', JICA Report, available at:

<http://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/reports/annual/2010/pdf/22.pdf>, (accessed on 13 December 2017), p. 43.

is vital for the realization of Japan's strategic interests in the region, including access to natural and energy resources, Japan considers the military presence of Russia and the U.S. as crucial condition for practicing and sustaining a fully-fledged interaction with the countries of the region. Even though, Japan has strategic interests in the region, its efforts to support the democratic development and economic transition to a market economy of the countries of the region cannot be downplayed.

2. Japan's Development Assistance Program for Armenia

(1) Japan's ODA Policy towards Armenia

Japan's engagement with Armenia started in the 1980s, when Armenia was part of the former Soviet Union. The initial assistance policy of Japan was formulated in the form of disaster relief after the Spitak earthquake in 1988. Japan sent disaster relief teams to Armenia three times in order to provide urgent rehabilitation and reconstruction support for the construction of equipment to remove the debris after the earthquake. Since 1991, after Armenia gained its independence, Japan has continued provision of its technical and humanitarian aid to refugees within the framework of its emergency disaster relief program. In addition, a number of Armenian officials were able to participate in technical training programs in Japan since then. Diplomatic relations between the governments of Japan and Armenia was established in 1992, and the first batch of Japanese ODA assistance was received by Armenia in 1994. A technical cooperation agreement between the two countries was signed in June 2005 with the aim of strengthening the economic cooperation between two countries. Based on the Country Assistance Policy formulated by Japan in 2012, two areas were outlined as priority areas, including: (1) the development of economic infrastructure and regional development, and (2) strengthening of disaster prevention measures. Along with these main policy objectives, achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth serves as a basic framework for policy implementation in Armenia[12].

The initial phase of cooperation between Japan and Armenia in the 1990s entailed the provision of technical support by nature and was based primarily on the implementation of ODA projects in the agricultural sector. One of the first ODA programs that was introduced in 1997 was related to the food production development program. According to Armenian Agriculture Minister Zaven Gevorkian, the Japanese government was very supportive in the refining process of the agricultural sector through provision of funding to address existing problems in the sector. For instance, in the 1997-2000 period, Japan allocated a 420 million JPY grant to the government of Armenia in order to support programs facilitating the development of the country's agrarian sector. Under this program, the received funding was used by Armenia to buy agricultural machinery, equipment, as well as agricultural fertilizers.

Since 1998, Japan has provided technical and expert support to reform the country's energy sector. Notably, a 40 million USD credit was received by Armenia and was used to build new capacities and modernize existing infrastructure in the energy sector. The Armenian government was obliged to repay the credit within 20 years with a 10-year grace period.

Along with the provision of technical support, under the established country assistance policy, the Armenian government also received two grants designed to advance the country's cultural and healthcare sectors. The Japanese government allocated 500,000 USD grant for the purpose of strengthening the operational productivity of the Armenian Philanthropic Orchestra by enabling them to purchase musical instruments and build new recording studio. Most recently, Japan's aid was delivered to the development of economic infrastructure, as shown in Figure 4. For the details of the different types of assistance provided by Japan to Armenia, refer to Table 2.

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[12] Information from the website of Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). http://www.ru.emb-japan.go.jp/ARMENIA/20130613.html; Accessed on 13 December 2017.

Table 2. Performance of Japan's Assistance to Armenia by Type of Assistance (in JPY hundred million)

Aid Schemes	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total Amount
ODA Loans	-	-	-	104.91	-	-	-	-	-	104.91
Grant Aid	1.36	0.09	2.12	9.71	2.23	0.36	0.09	0.26	0.33	16.55
Technical Cooperation	3.81	1.59	2.03	1.98	1.1	2.68	2.22	1.5	1.61	18.52
Acceptance of Technical Training Participants (persons)	62	47	44	37	41	46	40	36	35	388
Dispatch of Experts (persons)	9	13	3	1	1	6	10	11	10	64

(Unit: JPY hundred million for ODA loans, grant aid and technical cooperation, and the number of people accepted under Technical Training Participants and Dispatch of Experts program. "-" indicates "not applicable")
Source: ODA Data Book and the attachment (reference data) of the Annual Report of JICA (2014). The performance of technical cooperation between FY2005 and 2012 includes the technical cooperation of all Japanese organizations, while that in FY2013 includes only the technical cooperation provided by JICA. The figures in the table are total (gross) amounts of disbursement.

The cooperation in the economic sphere started only after the establishment of the Japanese-Armenian economic committee in August 2000. The first joint session of the Japanese-Armenian Economic Committee was held in Tokyo in June 2001. Among the major topics discussed during the session, collaboration in the areas of high technology, the processing industry, and tourism were given a higher importance. As a result of the joint meeting, the two parties agreed to enhance bilateral trade and economic relations under the established legal framework on Avoidance of Double Taxation on Income and Property, and on Mutual Protection and Stimulation of Investment. This meeting was also remarkable since it enabled both parties to acknowledge the passive level of bilateral cooperation due to the absence of country representation in the respective countries.

The official visit of the Armenian President Robert Kocharian to Japan in 2001 served as the foundation for the new level of bilateral relationship between the two countries. Although this visit can be treated as formal in nature, the agenda of the visit was pertinent to the discussion of economic interaction between two countries. During his visit to Japan, Robert Kocharian met with the Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Takeo Hiranuma and stated that Tokyo serves as one of the main aid providers to Armenia and expressed his motivation to make a transition from aid recipient to a fully-fledged partner of Japan in the region. Stressing the need for enhanced bilateral economic relationship between the states, the president admitted that the Armenian government is "extremely interested in Japanese private investment in Armenia" and expressed his willingness to further the development of small- and medium-sized businesses in the country.[13] At the end of the meeting, an interstate agreement, including a two-year program to develop Armenia's mining industry with the support of JICA, was achieved.

Another turning point of the joint meeting between Japan and Armenia was the discussion around the potential of Silk Route re-opening. The two parties agreed on mutual collaboration in the revitalization process of the Silk Route and, in the course of negotiations, the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation pledged to provide financial assistance for the modernization of the Zvartnots Airport in Erevan.

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[13] Irina Komissina, "Yaponiya i Kavkaz: Soedinit li ih Velikiy Shelkoviy put," *Central Asia & Central Caucasus Press AB*; http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2002/journal_rus/cac-03/03.komru.shtml (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

Figure 4. Bilateral ODA Disbursement to Armenia by Sector (2014-15)

Source: OECD, 2017. https://goo.gl/7r9dP2; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

As one may judge based on the above-mentioned timeline of events, the development of the relationship with Japan has become one of the priority directions of Armenian foreign policy in the course of bilateral cooperation. The press secretary for the Armenian president, V. Gabrielian, noted that maintaining mutually-beneficial cooperation in political and economic spheres with Japan is important for Armenia in order to support private sector development and advance the country's economic capacity by attracting the necessary financial resources from donor countries like Japan.[14]

(2) Japan's Development Assistance Projects in Armenia

The geographical landscape of Armenia makes it difficult for village populations residing in the mountainous areas to reach the city center, and thus significantly impacts the agricultural productivity. This also results in the accumulation of more than 60% of the Armenian GDP in the capital city of Yerevan. Taking into account this conditionality, the government of Japan has been assisting Armenia in narrowing down the proximity between urban and rural areas and boosting overall rural economic development processes through the provision of grants aimed at infrastructure building. The projects implemented in infrastructure and capacity building sectors, including construction of power distribution networks, formed the basis for sustainable economic development and contributed to raising people's living standards. According to the Rolling Plan designed in April 2015, the Japanese government assured to implement: (1) the "Supporting Energy Sector Program;" (2) "Promoting Private Sector Development and Strengthening Basic Economic Structure," and (3) the "Rural Development Program." Among the planned projects, two ODA loan projects including the "Power Transmission and Distribution Network Improvement Project" and the "Yerevan Combined Co-Generation Power Plant Project"[15] possess importance for the advancement of the country's energy capacity and raising the productivity of power distribution networks. In addition to the implementation of projects in the power sector, the Japanese government has been also supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and local industries' development through the implementation of technical cooperation projects such as the One Village, One

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[14] Supra n.11.

[15] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), ODA by Region: Central Asia and the Caucasus, Rolling Plan for the Republic of Armenia, 2014 ed., http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000010.html#armenia (Accessed 13 December 2017).

Product (OVOP) Project.

It is apparent that due to the geographical location of Armenia, predominantly in the mountainous area, the occurrence of natural disasters such as earthquakes and landslides are quite often in the country. In this connection, Japan has been assisting Armenia to improve its disaster risk reduction measures by transmitting and sharing Japanese technologies during the prevention, emergency and reconstruction stages. The "Strengthening Regional Measures for Disaster Prevention Program" was designed to scale up these efforts and was included in the Rolling Plan for Armenia. In order to formulate the human resources development and disaster risk reduction capacity of Armenia, a number of technical cooperation projects, including the "Study on Landslide Disaster Management," the "Project for Seismic Risk Assessment and Risk-Management Planning," "Development of Communities Affected by Landslides," and the "Landslide Disaster Management Project" have been implemented.[16]

In addition to the above-mentioned projects in the main policy areas, a number of projects directed at the improvement of services in the educational and healthcare sectors are being integrated into the current Rolling Plan for Armenia. According to this plan, technical cooperation projects dealing with the construction of health centers and provision of materials and equipment to rural schools have been also implemented.[17]

3. Japan's Development Assistance Program for Kyrgyzstan

(1) Japan's ODA Policy towards Kyrgyzstan

As mentioned earlier, in the first half of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan, out of the five Central Asian countries, drew the most attention of the Japanese government, which was manifested by the Japanese Foreign Minister's visit to the country in 1992 (Kawato 2008). Japanese interest in Kyrgyzstan was justified by its small-sized economy and lack of natural resources to uplift its development and, thus, it was assumed that Japan could play a significant role through provision of ODA to have a positive effect on the country's further economic development. However, over the course of bilateral interaction between the two states, Japanese interest in Kyrgyzstan has slowed down since the Kyrgyz side was not ready for the implementation of Japan's large-scale assistance projects and, therefore, Japan shifted its priority orientation towards Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (Kawato 2008).

Despite the fact that Kyrgyzstan is not in the top five Japanese ODA recipient countries, Japan serves as one of the influential donors to the country, providing its support for: "(1) enhancement of transport infrastructure; (2) agricultural development; (3) social development; (4) human resource development in an open market environment; and (5) greater access to basic human needs, including human security."[18]

Japanese efforts to provide assistance for the country's socioeconomic development was supplemented by the provision of foreign aid in the form of credits and grants. The total value of Japanese ODA to Kyrgyzstan from 1992 to 2005 was accounted at around 389 million USD.[19] The major portion of this funding was channeled for infrastructure development projects, including the realization of two big projects such as the Bishkek-Manas International Airport Modernization Project (5.454 billion JPY), Bishkek-Osh Road Rehabilitation Project (total 8.266 billion JPY).[20] Along with the realization of large-scale projects in the transportation field, Japanese ODA was also used for the overall improvement of the efficiency and maintenance of the country's transportation sector through procurement of equipment and modernization efforts, as illustrated in Figure 5.[21] The second most important direction of Japanese ODA is connected with the provision of funding for the reformation and advancement of Kyrgyzstan's financial sector. Japan has been actively supporting the process of improvement in the country's payment system

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[16] Information from the website of Japan International Cooperation Agency.
https://www.jica.go.jp/armenia/english/activities/index.html; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), ODA by Region: Central Asia and the Caucasus, Rolling Plan for the Republic of Armenia, 2014 ed., http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000010.html#armenia; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[18] Erica Marat, "Kyrgyzstan: Japan's Prime Partner in Central Asia?" in Christopher Len, Tomohiko Uyama and Tetsuya Hirose (eds.) Japan's Silk Road Diplomacy: Paving a Road Ahead, Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University, 2008), 87.

[19] Japanese embassy in Kyrgyz Republic, "Japanese-Kyrgyz relationships," Bishkek; <http://www.kg.emb-japan.go.jp/relation_r.htm>; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[20] Ibid.

[21] Central Asia and ODA Loans. Japan Bank for International Cooperation. 2008. p.5.

through setting a master plan and implementing a banking settlement reporting system (3.44 billion USD).[22]

During the period of 1993 and 1997, Kyrgyzstan received 200 million USD aid from Japan. Most of this funding was channeled for industrial development of the Kyrgyz Republic. The projects accomplished in this field were related to mining, including increasing the country's potential for oil and gold and uranium mining, in the first place.[23] By 2001, Japan had become the number-one donor of ODA disbursements for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, and organized several in-house consultation meetings of donors for Tajikistan in Tokyo (Kawato 2008).

Figure 5. Bilateral ODA to Kyrgyzstan by Sector, 2014-2015

Source: OECD, 2017. https://goo.gl/YWKZ8Z; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

Economic cooperation between the two countries is regulated by the Kyrgyz-Japanese Economic Committee. The committee was set up to promote joint trade and bilateral business partnership activities. According to the joint meeting of the committee held in September 1997, both parties agreed to regulate the foreign direct investment process through facilitating the interaction between Japanese and Kyrgyz state structures and private companies. As a result of bilateral business development, Kyrgyzstan was able to absorb Japanese technological advancement products such as, cars, equipment for different fields of industry, and electronics. In return, Japan imported precious metal and various types of chemicals from Kyrgyzstan.[24]

Japanese engagement with Kyrgyzstan went beyond established official channels of communication conducted by JICA, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Japan Bank for International Cooperation. Japan has been also actively using multilateral institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank for the delivery of its development assistance. The assistance

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[22] "Kyrgyz and Japanese FMs discuss prospects for bilateral cooperation," *Kabar*, 30 March 2017, available at http://kabar.kg/eng/news/kyrgyz-and-japanese-fms-discuss-prospects-for-bilateral-cooperation/; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[23] Esen Usubaliev, "Japanese Politics in Central Asia in View of Another Possible Center of Power," *Central Asia & Central Caucasus Press AB*, http://www.ca-c.org/journal/2001/journal_eng/cac-05/16.usuben.shtml; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[24] Information from the website of Japanese embassy in Bishkek. http://www.kg.emb-japan.go.jp/relation_r.htm; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

provided through these channels represents Japanese capacity-building efforts accomplished in the form of human resources development training, Japanese classes, seminars for Kyrgyz entrepreneurs in business development, and tourism promotion. These capacity-building and technical cooperation projects are being organized and coordinated by the Japanese Center for Human Resources Development established under the Kyrgyz National University.

The official visit of Kyrgyzstan's President, Almazbek Atambaev to Japan in 2013 has contributed to the advancement of the bilateral relationship between two states. Within the framework of his visit, Atambaev met with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to discuss and exchange views on bilateral relations between two countries as well as issues pertinent to regional and international stability. As a result of this visit, the two parties signed the "Memorandum of Cooperation between the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan: Memorandum on Cooperation in the Field of Education between the Ministry of Education and Science of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan."[25]

(2) Japan's Development Assistance Projects in Kyrgyzstan

Since establishment of bilateral relationship between Japan and Kyrgyzstan, Japan has been providing substantial assistance for the Kyrgyz government to achieve democratic governance and transition into a market economy while stressing the need for the preservation of human security throughout the transition process. For example, Japan has been supporting the Kyrgyzstan's transition into a market economy by allocating its loan aid for the improvement of transportation infrastructure and delivered grant aid for the improvement of the technical capacity of major medical facilities through provision of necessary medical equipment. The country assistance policy was formulated by Japan taking into account the country's economic weakness and, thus, increasing the country's economic potential was set as a top priority. Japan's development assistance policy was sought to serve as the "catalyst" for promoting self-help efforts toward achievement of economic development and was accomplished in line with the Country Development Strategy (CDS) of the Kyrgyz Republic.

(3) Japan`s Contribution to the Development of Transportation Infrastructure

The geographical location of the Kyrgyz Republic at the intersection between East and West had been playing an important role for Kyrgyzstan to accomplish its commercial transactions and product channeling over the time. However, given the fact that Kyrgyzstan is landlocked and predominantly consists of mountainous areas with no direct access to the sea and Europe, the development of transportation infrastructure serves as an important condition for accomplishing its economic activities. Besides, since the Soviet times, overall road conditions in the country have worsened, making it difficult for rural people to reach the country's remote areas at times when disasters occur or during the winter period. Proper transportation facilities as such are being considered by Japan to enable Kyrgyzstan to position itself as a regional distribution hub and gateway for the Central Asian region by connecting the east-west and north-south routes.

Japanese efforts to support the transportation infrastructure development were formulated taking into account Kyrgyzstan's potential to facilitate regional cooperation and economic interaction with neighboring countries. Besides, the development of infrastructure was deemed by Japan as not only facilitating intra-regional trade with neighboring counties, such as China, but would also "stimulate the development of other areas of the economy, including mining and manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, and could serve as a precondition for enhanced intra-regional cooperation in each of these sectors."[26]

Taking into account the importance of this conditionality, Japanese ODA policy for Kyrgyzstan was concentrated "on the implementation of projects and programs aimed at the construction of road and bridges, provision of construction equipment for road reconstruction, and strengthening of road maintenance systems." [27] More specifically, Japan has been providing yen loans to the Kyrgyz government for the construction of main automobile roads and railroads. Along with bilateral aid, Japan has been also collaborating with other donors and the Kyrgyz government to implement projects

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[25] "*Kyrgyzstan i Yaponiya podpisali ryad dokumentov o sotrudnichestve*," Vecherniy Bishkek, 27 February 2013. Available at http://www.vb.kg/218344; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[26] MOFA, Japan Country Assistance Policy for Kyrgyzstan 2009; http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/assistance/pdfs/e_Kyrgyz2009.pdf; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[27] Supra n. 25.

contributing to "the improvement of systems for promoting the efficiency of road administration, standardization of customs procedures, promotion of intra-regional distribution, and development of human resources for these areas."[28]

(4) Japan`s Contribution to the Development of Agricultural Sector

Although the agricultural sector of Kyrgyzstan is not internationally competitive and encompasses only 3% of the country's landscape, it employs about 60% of the country's labor force and more than 35% of country's GDP is generated from the sector[29]. In addition, some farm products are exported to the neighboring countries of Central Asia. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of large-scale collective farms, the availability of unharvested crops and farm equipment to cultivate them has also become one of the major problems in the sector.

The development of the agricultural sector is sought by Japan to contribute to the country's industrial development since it is closely connected with other supporting industries, such as light industry, the food processing industry, and the handicrafts industry[30]. For instance, the advancement of the food processing industry is believed to facilitate the marketing of value-added agricultural products and thus contribute to the development of agriculture overall.

The Japanese government's support for the development of the agricultural sector of Kyrgyzstan was thus focused on infrastructure development through the provision of farming equipment, the development of irrigation, and the construction of the necessary processing facilities[31]. These efforts were accomplished in order to stimulate Kyrgyzstan's niche market so that the country can enhance its capacity to produce specialty goods and raise its competitiveness in relation to neighboring markets specializing on grain production. Alternatively, Japan has been also implementing capacity building and human resource development programs facilitating the improvement of the agricultural technique and farmers' agricultural practices.

(5) Japan`s Contribution to Local Development

The dissolution of the Soviet Union left not only Kyrgyzstan's industry in a vulnerable situation but also resulted in the bankruptcy of a number of factories and collective farms which used to be the main source of income for the vast majority of country's population. This process has further led to the overall stagnation of country's rural economy while also creating severe poverty, possessing a significant threat for human security. In addition, poor and inherent infrastructure in the fields of transportation, communications, healthcare and education has also contributed to the slowing down of the regional economic processes by eliminating the revitalization prospect[32]. The southern region of Kyrgyzstan had become the hub for radical Islamic groups and joined Afghanistan's drug trafficking route. Occurrence of this situation created an alarming prospect for the country's national security with substantial threat beyond the regional boundaries of the country and threatening the overall stability of the region. Thus, the first priority for the Japanese government has become community empowerment through the introduction of local development projects.

In this regard, the introduction of the OVOP concept in certain regions of the country has served as an essential infrastructure development and capacity building method enabling the country to revitalize the regional economy and gain socioeconomic development. The local development program of Japan has also played an important role for the revitalization of the local community and the environment.

(6) Japan`s Contribution to Human Resources Development

Kyrgyzstan is well-known among Central Asian states for its introduction of fast-track transitioning into the market economy through its attainment of WTO membership, liberal approach towards privatization, land distribution reforms, and promotion of domestic trade and industry. Despite the favorable and utmost efforts of Kyrgyzstan to liberalize its economy, its efforts have not brought the desired results, because the majority of the country's entrepreneurs have been practicing old business administration techniques since Soviet times. Besides, in most cases public officials tend to be confronted with the challenge of effective governance, given the fact that they lack adequate and proper knowledge

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[28] Ibid.

[29] Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), The Kyrgyz Republic: Opportunities and challenges to agricultural growth, Annual Report, 2011 ed., http://www.fao.org/3/a-i2711e.pdf; (Accessed on 13 December 2017).

[30] Supra n.25.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

on how to pursue public administration and tackle the problems arising throughout the process of transitioning towards a liberal market economy.

Therefore, one of the priority directions of Japanese assistance to Kyrgyzstan has become the provision of support for human resources development aimed at fostering the country's transition to a market economy. In its efforts to facilitate the country's human resources capacity, the Japanese government has been providing technical cooperation grants in order to support the "development of the legal system for the market economy, governance improvement for enhancement of democracy that affects development of sound market economy, and legal system improvement for the establishment of the rule of law."[33] Another significant step undertaken by Japan in relation to human resources development can be observed in the example of Japan Centers for Human Resources Development that were established in three countries in Central Asia, including Kyrgyzstan. These centers tend to deliver the necessary capacity building training and share expert knowledge, and, therefore, serve as an effective tool for increasing country's potential for economic growth.

5. Conclusion

As described in this paper, over the last two decades, Japan has been providing a significant amount in foreign aid to support the economic development process in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In addition to serving as a main instrument for the maintenance of regional development, Japanese ODA has also served as a main tool for establishing bilateral relationships and supporting Japan's foreign policy objectives in recipient countries. Despite the fact that Japan has been pursuing a similar development policy objective — the achievement of sustainable economic development in both countries—Japan has been practicing different tactics to operationalize this goal in target countries.

The development policy areas for both regions were set taking into account the socioeconomic situation in respective countries and was focused mainly on stimulating economic development, human resources development, capacity development, and infrastructure development. These areas were set and deemed by Japan as important to gain a long-term impact on economic growth and regional development in Central Eurasia.

The study has shown that majority of Japanese development projects, in general, resulted positively on recipient countries. This was achieved owing to transmission of Japan's funding and expertise through the established country assistance program. As exemplified in the paper, the ODA policy set by Japan enabled Armenia to benefit from receiving technical assistance to support its agricultural and private sectors. This in turn has served as an important factor in revitalizing the local economic development of the country. In Kyrgyzstan, Japanese efforts to support the revitalization of the Kyrgyz economy was limited to the provision of technical assistance and implementation of infrastructure development projects. These projects had less impact on economic development in the country since projects implemented under the Japanese ODA scheme had less exposure and generated less economic opportunities to scale up the country-wide development process. Nevertheless, unlike the Armenian case, in Kyrgyzstan, Japan's efforts to spur the economic development of the country were accomplished by multi-vector operations in the areas of transport infrastructure, agricultural development, social development, and human resources development. These projects were deemed as crucial in supporting local communities and enabling them to benefit from Japanese expertise and technology.

Japanese interaction with countries beyond Southeast Asia also denotes its strong aspiration for maintaining extended and closer ties with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The ODA serves for Japan as a crucial postwar innovative mechanism for the transmission of its material and non-material resources that have been utilized by Central Asian and South Caucasian recipient countries for the achievement of their economic development gains. The further direction of Japanese development assistance to the target countries can make a greater contribution to the achievement of their economic development goals if it was focused on supporting not only infrastructure development projects but would also integrate local capacity building projects, which, in turn, may create a greater and significant economic value to spur the overall economic development of recipient countries. Provision of support to local community empowerment projects can also ensure that development projects implemented by Japan benefit not only the central government but may also increase grassroots development prospects.

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[33] Supra n.25.

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Research Note

Managing Diversity in a Contemporary Organization:

Pursuing "Authenticity" in the Process of Overseas Expansion

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This study examines the dynamics of diversity management in a contemporary workplace by focusing on how a company attempts to pursue "authenticity" in the process of overseas expansion and the challenges it may face during the process. Managing employees with different ethnicities and cultural backgrounds has been regarded as one of the most challenging issues for many Japanese companies overseas. This research explores this issue based on a case study of a Japanese ramen company, hereafter referred to as "Yama Ramen" in Boston, United States, and analyzes how the company attempts to create an "authentic" Japanese brand by representing its "Japaneseness" in management while struggling to adapt to the local context. The fieldwork, including participant observation at the shop and interviews with the employees, was conducted in March and May 2017 in Boston. Through the discussion, this study posits that at Yama Ramen, pursuing "authenticity" is a way to promote its brand but is also a process of negotiating the meaning of "Japaneseness." During this process, many Japanese managers have cultivated an ethnocentric ideology, which has become stronger alongside their interactions with the locals. This belief discouraged the Japanese managers from learning actively from the locals, but tried to convince them that the Japanese way was the best, which resulted in creating unharmonious human relations. This study highlights the negative aspects of implementing an ethnocentric ideology in a business context and the possible results of neglecting a respect for diversity. Its conclusion offers a few recommendations to the company for future management practices.

Keywords: Diversity, Authenticity, Culture, Adaptation, Japan

Introduction

On a sunny day in May 2017, I visited a Japanese ramen shop, hereafter "Yama Ramen" in Boston, Massachusetts, as part of my fieldwork. The store had a modern look and employed many non-Japanese workers. However, I could still identify many Japanese characteristics from its ramen, menu, and how the staff dressed and greeted customers with "welcome to the store" in Japanese *irasshaimase*. After the participant observation and interviews, I realized that I was misled by these external appearances. This store was, in fact, a contemporary organization and a mirror of the ongoing globalization process, as I felt that I was in a diverse space moving across different continents while interviewing employees from a single ramen shop.[1] This was a new experience for me because my past research shows that many Japanese companies would have made strong efforts to recreate what they thought to be an "authentic" or "original" Japanese brand and practices abroad even though some locals were

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[1] The author was granted permission to do field work (such as participant observation and interviews) at the shop from Yama Ramen headquarters and shop representatives.

reluctant to do so. I wondered, "What is different here?" It turns out that the company did want to reproduce "authentic" Japaneseness in Boston, much like other Japanese companies did; however, they faced some challenges strongly connected to the issue of cultural diversity. I asked myself again, "So, how does diversity influence the pursuit of authenticity and why?" This study aims to answer these questions based on an anthropological analysis of the discourse on diversity and "authenticity" in a contemporary organization. This study uses "authenticity" in the same sense as originality but focuses more on the unique cultural logic behind it. Unlike conventional business studies on authenticity that have focused largely on personal performance from a psychological perspective, this research examines "authenticity" in terms of a company's belief. A contemporary organization here indicates an environment that employs a diverse workforce.

With the increasing movement of business and people across borders and continents, companies have more opportunities or needs to employ people from different cultures. The level of diversity might differ in companies; however, there has always been a debate on how to balance the company's originality and authentic philosophy while adapting to local situations.[2] This type of strategy could be divided into two according to their targets: one is external (such as a branding strategy) and the other is internal (human resource management). Numerous studies have been conducted on how to create a unique brand overseas without disrespecting its legend, history, and fundamental values.[3] Some early literature showed how a company sometimes used its national culture as one of its brand-building strategies, especially if that country or region had been positively evaluated. Previous research showed that the image of Japanese products was high, particularly in three areas: price, quality, and technology.[4] How to balance standardization and localization in terms of managing talent is also a challenging issue for companies. To achieve higher efficiency, some companies create operation manuals so that the staff can perform in a standard way, which might also benefit the standardization of assessment criteria.[5] Changing some of the practices abroad is unavoidable because of differences in laws and regulations; however, the balance of these two practices can largely influence issues such as diversity management, gaining better employee engagement, and so on.[6]

Managing diversity includes managing personalities, races, societies, economics, and politics, but this study focuses mainly on the cultural diversity arising out of some of these aspects. In various research studies that have discussed the issues of diversity management, Japanese companies seem to have been either overlooked or widely criticized for practicing ethnocentric management.[7] It is debatable whether their practices are ethnocentric or not, but many would agree that Japanese companies tend to place more emphasis on philosophical or psychological aspects in their management. Some researchers claimed that Japanese companies were also eager to reproduce their "authentic" cultural practices, such as their customer service, or the *omotenashi* (Japanese hospitality) spirit in overseas branches.[8] Studying such organizations can contribute to better understanding of how cultural elements interact with management practices, and how a company can balance cultural and non-cultural issues.

Many scholars and business practitioners have conducted research on Japanese companies abroad; however, most of the cases have focused more on large companies such as trading companies and manufacturing firms, possibly because of their greater impact on the Japanese economy and business presence. These cases were often described as conventional, meaning that they practiced less diversity, but employed more Japanese executives and

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[2] Flood, R. L., & Romm, N. R. (1996). Diversity management: Triple loop learning; Gilbert, J. A., Stead, B. A., & Ivancevich, J. M. (1999). Diversity management: A new organizational paradigm. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 21(1), 61–76.

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[7] Zhu, Y. (2016). Reexamination of Japanese companies overseas: Anthropological critiques of ethnocentric management. *Journal of Management Philosophy*, 13, 60–73.

[8] Zhu, Y. (2016). Introducing Omotenashi to the world: Challenges of Japanese customer service in a cross-cultural setting. *Transcultural Management Review*, 13, 47–63.

managers. To better understand a holistic picture of the modern Japanese organization, this study chose a Japanese ramen company that operates more than 60 shops in nine countries and regions.

The number of Japanese restaurants has increased over the past years, which to some extent was facilitated by the recognition of *washoku* as the UNESCO Intangible World Heritage in 2014, and the Japanese government's "Cool Japan" campaign. According to statistics from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of Japan in 2015, there were 89,000 Japanese restaurants worldwide, a number increased 1.6 times from 2013.[9] According to Shinyokohama Ramen Museum's report in 2013, there were around 1,000 ramen shops abroad, of which approximately one third were in the United States.[10] According to the Japan External Trade Organization's (JETRO) market research in the United States published in 2012, the success factors of ramen included its rich taste and relative ease in achieving a sense of fullness at a lower cost; even though it needed to be adapted to local factors such as strict laws on importing food, it (along with the employees) showed an "authentic" Japaneseness.[11] What is unique about Yama Ramen, one of the successful Japanese ramen shops in the United States? How was diversity interpreted and managed in the process of pursuing "authenticity"?

This study is based on participant observation and interviews conducted in March and May 2017 in one of the Yama Ramen shops, hereafter the University shop, in Boston. The period of participant observation was relatively short compared to traditional anthropological research; however, the dynamics of globalization and diversity were observable from the very beginning. Table 1 shows the list of interviewees at the shop with their basic details. All the information related to the shop, such as the names of informants, shops, and companies are pseudonyms, and any second-hand materials that might reveal the identity of the company are not cited. Besides the two employees from Japan, other employees were from various countries including Nepal, the United States, and South America. They all had a U.S. Permanent Residence Card except for the two Japanese managers who had either a working visa or spousal visa. Jobs are divided into management and staff, and listed from top to bottom as follows: shop manager, business manager, manager for either kitchen or floor, and staff under their management. Some of the additional information about Yama Ramen is based on interviews conducted with three managers at one of the Yama Ramen shops in Canada in July 2017.[12]

Table 1 List of interviewees at the University shop, Yama Ramen, Boston (March and May 2017)

No.	Name	Gender	Age	Job Type
1	Aida	Male	30s	Shop manager
2	Suzuki	Female	40s	Business manager
3	Kevin	Male	30s	Manager (kitchen)
4	Doi	Female	40s	Staff (floor)
5	Elvis	Male	20s	Staff (kitchen)
6	Steven	Male	30s	Staff (kitchen)

This study will first discuss the general framework centered on authenticity, diversity, and management to illustrate the previous literature on these issues, and how this research differs. The case of Yama Ramen, including its historical development and overseas business achievements, is then introduced. One of the Yama Ramen branches, the University shop in Boston will be discussed in detail to better understand the discourse between

[9] Kaigai nihonshoku resutoran suu no chousa kekka no kouryou oyobi nihon shoku, shokubunka no hukyuu kentou iinnkai no secchi tou ni tsuite. 海外日本食レストラン数の調査結果の公表及び日本食・食文化の普及検討委員会の設置等について (August 28, 2015) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press/shokusan/service/150828.html. Accessed on July 21, 2017.
[10] Marke Zine editor. (March 6, 2013). Shinyokohama ra-men hakubutukan ga sekai no ra-men jijyouwo repo-to 新横浜ラーメン博物館が「世界のラーメン事情」をレポート [Report worldwide ramen by Shinyokohama Ramen Museum], Marke Zine, http://markezine.jp/article/detail/17345. Accessed on July 4, 2017.
[11] JETRO. (Feb 2012). Beikokushijyou wo mezasu nihon kigyou no torikumi jirei 米国市場を目指す日本企業の取り組み事例 [Cases of Japanese companies that aim for the United States]. JETRO, https://www.jetro.go.jp/ext_images/jfile/report/07000806/us_jp_act.pdf, Accessed on July 5, 2017.
[12] Information on the interviewees at Yama Ramen Canada will be provided in each instance along with a description of the interview contents.

"authenticity" and diversity. The conclusion summarizes the overall arguments with some suggestions offered to the company regarding its future management practices.

1. Diversity, Authenticity, and Management

Diversity is a challenging management issue for many companies because it has less tangible benefits; however, it is also a critical issue that managers have to deal with so as to better manage the team.[13] Some studies have pointed out its positive aspects[14] and others have suggested including diversity as a part of managers' training.[15] Regardless of its importance, early literature has also pointed out various difficulties.[16] One of the challenges is to find ways to value individual and collective differences, which requires "translators" who can better explain the culture in a simplified way so that people are able to understand each other.[17] These translators, known as "cultural mediators" or "cultural brokers," are expected to create bridges between different parties,[18] and this concept could apply to the case of management as well. Sometimes, a company's goals or policies do not make sense to the local employees because they are embodied within a specific cultural logic. If this organization has translators, locals could at least have some frame of reference to its logic, although whether they agree with this logic or not is another matter. These translators may not only contribute to facilitating the integration of a diverse workforce, but also to enhancing its organizational strength.

Balancing diversity and "authenticity" is another significant issue the management needs to consider. For instance, when a company enters an overseas market, one issue they need to manage is its brand image. Some companies may have different types of brands abroad; others expect to reproduce exactly the same type of brand to ensure its "authenticity."[19] This is similar to the dichotomies of standardization-localization and homogeneous-heterogeneous, while some have pointed out a third strategy—hybridization.[20] Studies have shown various companies' strategies and their outcomes, but few of them have pointed out how the culture has influenced their decision-making because most management scientists tend to focus more on the rational aspect of business practices rather than the cultural or emotional aspects that guide employees' behaviors most of the time.

Scholars in other fields suggest different perspectives. One type of study is to research the relationship between culture and authenticity. Iwabuchi examined the influence of Japanese popular culture in the Asian region and claimed that the process enhanced the cultural power of Japan along with its cultural superiority, which is the recreation of its "authentic" culture.[21] Zhu uses this concept in her study of a Japanese multinational company in Hong Kong and claimed that one of the reasons why the organization failed to reproduce Japanese culture was

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[13] Robinson, G., & Dechant, K. (1997). Building a business case for diversity. *The Academy of Management Executive*, *11*(3), 21–31.

[14] Magoshi, E., & Chang, E. (2009). Diversity management and the effects on employees' organizational commitment: Evidence from Japan and Korea. *Journal of World Business*, *44*(1), 31–40.

[15] Egan, M. L., & Bendick, M. (2008). Combining multicultural management and diversity into one course on cultural competence. *Academy of Management Learning & Education*, *7*(3), 387–393.

[16] Gröschl, S., & Doherty, L. (1999). Diversity management in practice. *International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management*, *11*(6), 262–268.

[17] See literature such as Katan, D. (2014). *Translating Cultures: An Introduction for Translators, Interpreters and Mediators*. London: Routledge; and Pym, A. (2012). *On Translator Ethics: Principles for Mediation Between Cultures* (Vol. 104). Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.

[18] See Kishi, Y. (2009). *Shain ryoku ha "bunka nōryoku" –Taiwan jin kanbu ga kataru nikkei kigyō no jinzai ikusei* 社員力は「文化能力」：台湾人幹部が語る日系企業の人材育成 [Ability of employee is 'cultural ability' – Narrative story of training told by Taiwanese managers] Tokyo: Fukyosha; Al-Krenawi, A., & Graham, J. R. (2001). The cultural mediator: Bridging the gap between a non-western community and professional social work practice. *British Journal of Social Work*, *31*(5), 665–685; Kawasaki, Y., Takita, K., Sonoda, S. (eds). (2004). *Guro-barize-shon to higashi ajia.* グローバリゼーションと東アジア[Globalization and East Asia]. Tokyo: Chuo University Press.

[19] Zhu, Y. (2016). Re-imagining corporate branding: National culture as a marketing competence. *The Journal of International Public Policy*, *37*, 53–66.

[20] Robertson, R. (1995). Glocalization: Time-space and homogeneity-heterogeneity. *Global Modernities*, *2*, 25–45.

[21] Iwabuchi, K. (2002). *Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

because the sentiment of cultural superiority among the Japanese expatriates lowered employee motivations.[22] Aoyama anthropologically examined how a Japanese sushi chef recreated authentic Japanese food in Hong Kong and claimed that the efforts made by Japanese chefs were market-driven, and aimed to convert so-called Japanese values into a commodity.[23] Some literature claims that the reproduction process is based on Japanese management's ethnocentric ideology and points out the strong influence of culture on management.[24] This literature has shown the strong impact made by culture on the process of pursuing "authenticity."

The above review shows that few studies combined three key words: diversity, authenticity, and management in the same context. In a diverse workplace, how does a company attempt to retain its originality or authenticity intact and what kind of cultural logic underlies this? Are there any conflicts during this process? How does diversity influence this process? This study examined the Japanese ramen shop, Yama Ramen, and its overseas operations to further discuss these issues. The paper will first describe the company's historical development and its current overseas business operations. It will then analyze the company's "authenticity" and how it aims to recreate this abroad.

2. Yama Ramen and its Overseas Operations

Yama Ramen was established in Sapporo, Northern Japan, in 1988 and is well known for *tonkotsu* (pork bone) ramen, one of the representative broths of Japan. In the city of Hokkaido, the first Yama Ramen shop housed nine seats and served only *shio* (salt) ramen initially. The company opened its stores across Japan with either a franchise or direct operation, and has developed from a small-size regional Japanese ramen shop to an organization with more than 80 shops worldwide by the end of July 2017. Among its 21 shops in Japan, nine were directed and managed by the parent company of Yama Ramen (TIP), while the other 12 were franchised. TIP also operated other ramen shops in Japan although the Yama Ramen business had a significant influence on their overall operations. Yama Ramen started its overseas expansion in the United States and by July 2017, there were more than 60 shops in nine countries and regions. The number of stores abroad not only exceeded the number in Japan, but their profits also dominated 60% of the overall revenue meaning that the overseas operations became significant strategic locations for the company. In total, 11 Yama Ramen shops were located in the United States, followed by 10 in the Philippines and 5 in Taiwan.

An important management structure at Yama Ramen is the number of different companies involved in the operations of shops in the United States. A Japanese consulting firm (P&M) manages one shop in Washington, and two shops in Massachusetts, and the branch of TIP (D company) manages 11 shops across three states and one city. When a company operates through franchise or directly manages their stores abroad, one of the important strategies they have to consider is how to balance standardization and localization in both brand building and management so as to balance the company's power.[25] Yama Ramen's parent company, TIP, interfered less in the actual local management, and gave a certain amount of autonomy to the local management companies. This required mutual trust between the top management at Yama Ramen and local management companies. While people at TIP felt that there was a huge market for ramen overseas, the local management company believed that the beauty of Japanese culture could be exported and disseminated through its ramen shops. In a media interview, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of P&M said that it was their mission to share both tasty Japanese food and the beauty of Japanese culture, such as Japanese hospitality or the *omotenashi* spirit. Managers at Yama Ramen Canada also said that they should share the positive aspects of Japanese culture with overseas customers. These missions reflect the strong expectations from the company to the overseas ramen shops in terms of realizing not only its "authentic" ramen but

[22] Zhu, Y. (2013). *Control and Manipulation: The Company Building Process of a Japanese Fashion Enterprise in Hong Kong*, (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from HKU Scholars Hub.

[23] Aoyama, R. (2016): Global journeymen: Re-inventing Japanese craftsman spirit in Hong Kong, *Asian Anthropology*, *14*(3), 265–282.

[24] Zhu, Y. (2016). Reexamination of Japanese companies overseas: Anthropological critiques of ethnocentric management, *Journal of Management Philosophy*, *13*, 60–73.

[25] Lu, Y., & Bjorkman, I. (1997). HRM practices in China-Western joint ventures: MNC standardization versus localization. *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, *8*(5), 614–628.

also Japanese culture.

The reasons why these beliefs seem to become stronger each year is because of the huge popularity and financial success of many Yama Ramen shops in the United States. A representative of the Canadian branch stated that even though the rent is much higher than in Japan, it did not appear that difficult to earn profits compared to Japan. Japan has a larger number of ramen shops with a variety of choices and fierce competition. The Canada representative said that it is hard to win a market share without creativity, and that constant improvement of taste is necessary as customers get bored easily. An interview in Boston also reiterated that even though the financial goal was set higher and the rent was several times higher than a shop in Japan, the shop manager was so far able to achieve his goals without greatly reforming his business strategies.

It is important for the top management to share the same goals and beliefs, but how can an overseas shop realize these in the actual workplace? This study will discuss the managerial strategies of Yama Ramen for achieving two goals: unifying its "authentic" food and atmosphere, and unifying the philosophical aspect—"authentic" Japaneseness. An examination of the two types of "authenticity" aims to provide a basic understanding of the environments that resulted in the conflicts and struggles between the management and the workers.

(1) "Authentic" food and atmosphere

One of the most important practices Yama Ramen insisted on sharing was the taste of its broth, which involves three main steps. The first was to train the shop managers in Japan before their departure. All shop managers were Japanese and needed to attend a two-month (or longer) training in an "authentic" shop located in Northern Japan.[26] This was slightly different from most of the "traditional" Japanese restaurants where several chefs had relatively long years of experience as some shop managers used to be office workers before "becoming" ramen chefs. In other words, they were "trained" professionals who were expected to represent and recreate the "authenticity" of the Yama Ramen taste. The second step was to clarify the amount of ingredients and simplify the cooking process so that anyone could learn it in a short period of time, which is a fairly common practice in many types of food chains.[27] Every store needs to make fresh broth every night and, in general, only full-time employees with more experience were allowed to access the recipe and actual process.[28] In order to control the taste of the broth, the company had a third step: monitoring. Yama Ramen requires every top manager to eat three bowls of ramen containing different tastes each day before opening the shop. One of the representatives in Canada claimed that he was afraid of gaining weight because eating three whole bowls of ramen every morning was too heavy for him. The head office did not respond positively to his request for smaller bowls because only tasting from the whole bowl would reveal differences. This insistence by the company once again shows how much Yama Ramen values the unified tastes of "authentic" broth.

Besides its broth, the company exports most of the eating utensils, which were designed for multiple purposes from Japan. For instance, the ramen bowl was designed to keep the food warm for a relatively longer time. Almost every food item is supplied locally, including the noodles, pork bone for the broth, eggs, ramen, and *chashu* (marinated braised pork) owing to the strict legal regulations in the United States; however, the local management companies were trying to create food as "authentic" as possible by contracting with local factories to make these recipe ingredients exclusively for them. For instance, noodles were produced in a Japanese company's factory in the United States and were delivered across the country and Canada. In addition, the menu was not allowed to be altered without consent from Yama Ramen. For instance, a shop manager in Canada said that it was impossible for them to offer curry ramen because it would destroy the brand image of the company, which represents "authentic" ramen. The manager added that every small alteration to the menu, such as creating a new type of dessert or drink, needed approval from its U.S. management company.

Yama Ramen aims to create an "authentic" store atmosphere by unifying some store decorations and practicing its unique location strategies. Before opening any new store, Mr. Tanaka, the person in charge of store

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[26] Only one of the Japanese store managers who had not received any "formal" training in Japan was promoted locally although in his case, the manager at D company visited the store quite often to ensure the taste was "authentic."

[27] Kaufmann, P. J., & Eroglu, S. (1999). Standardization and adaptation in business format franchising. *Journal of Business Venturing*, *14*(1), 69–85.

[28] The author was allowed to take pictures in most places in the shop except for the area where the broth was made.

design will be sent to discuss the details with the local representatives. While some issues were negotiable, others were not. For instance, the company's logo, from its form and color to every inch between the characters, needs to be exactly the same everywhere. Mr. Tanaka would check the logos regularly to make sure they were identical. This is one of the most basic requirements and every overseas store and local management company respects this. The basic color for the store is black although the color of flooring and other details could be negotiated. For instance, one of the shops I visited in Canada featured modernity and tradition by combining a modern style of store decoration with the Japanese Ainu culture, and the details were determined by negotiations between Mr. Tanaka and the local representative rather than predetermined earlier. The local representative told me that he was given the power to choose not only one of the local antique shops as a supplier for the shop's chairs and tables, but also to design some of the decorations to enhance the concept's message. The power given to Mr. Tanaka was extensive as he would be the person with ultimate decision-making power in any Yama Ramen shop. This is one of the ways of unifying the store's concepts across cultures.

Location strategy also contributes to creating the unique store atmosphere. The recent opening of shops abroad, and especially the independent ones, shows the head office's aim of transforming its brand from "a" Japanese ramen shop to "the" ramen shop. Most of the Yama Ramen shops in Japan are independently located along the road (so-called "road-side shop"), or housed on the first floor, or sometimes the basement. Compared to Japan, food courts in the low–mid end shopping malls are more common for Yama Ramen in the United States. These shops are all housed in the same shopping malls that were locally founded by the Japanese. According to an informant in Yama Ramen, Canada, opening shops in a shopping mall has unlimited capacity to attract customers; however, it did not help in creating a sophisticated brand image, and a repetitive and tedious environment also discouraged employees from working harder. Out of 14 independently housed Yama Ramen shops in the United States, 3 often required market research, higher rents, and further preparations, but this format was considered to be an efficient way to create a unique brand and better educate employees. For instance, one independent shop in Boston with antique lights and classical music was aimed at creating a sophisticated yet Japanese ramen shop. This type of shop also allowed shop managers to spend more time on educating employees and retaining good talent. The company's strategic shift from the shopping mall to independent stores was also aimed at building an "authentic" brand image with a group of educated and loyal staff.

The section above described how Yama Ramen aimed to unify its "authentic" brand image by standardizing the broth making and food preparation, and by sharing the concepts for creating a unique store atmosphere and store format. Local management companies were given a certain amount of autonomy for monitoring the broth, negotiating and making decisions on matters such as actual food preparation, and store decorations. In comparison, persuading local staff to practice "authentic" Japaneseness seemed to be more challenging. The next section will describe the meaning of "authentic" Japaneseness and how employees are expected to practice this at the local shops.

(2) "Authentic" Japaneseness

One of the missions for both the Yama Ramen head office and franchise owners is to fully harness the potential of Japanese food and the culture attached to it. This study will illustrate one aspect of Japanese culture, namely, its management philosophy, which is based on three key concepts: *omotenashi*, *seishin-ron* (theory of mental toughness), and *zen'in keiei* (involving everyone in management). These were not written out formally, but many managers at Yama Ramen shops used exactly these terms or similar words when they explained "Japaneseness."

The Japanese style of hospitality or *omotenashi* has been one of the buzzwords not only for Japanese companies but also the Japanese government as part of the "Cool Japan" campaign started in the early 2010s. While many Japanese companies claimed this to be part of the traditional cultural practices and strongly suggested its dissemination, a study conducted by Zhu claimed that this concept results in superficial performance and a one-way practice based on the analysis of two aspects of Japanese customer service: the importance of *kata* (form), and a one-way guest-host relationship.[29] These two concepts show how people *should* behave rather than *would* behave

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[29] Zhu, Y. (2016). Introducing *Omotenashi* to the World: Challenges of Japanese Customer Service in a Cross-cultural Setting, *Transcultural Management Review*, *13*, 47–63.

in specific situations, and how they *should* serve customers by predicting what they want even though they might not need these services.

Emphasizing how employees present themselves through *kata* was considered to be important during the interaction with consumers, which includes some practices such as smiling in a specific way, handing over products or change in both hands, and using particular words with consumers. In other words, it is important to practice *kata* in the "right" way. Unlike the seminal research by Hochschild, who showed how employees in many workplaces such as airlines, restaurants, and hotels need to control their behaviors,[30] Japanese employees need to not only conduct themselves in the way the company or the society desires but also need to behave "accurately." Japanese companies often utilize manuals to educate employees to practice behaving in this manner; however, many local employees found these manuals ambiguous because their underlying cultural logic was different from the local culture.[31] Yama Ramen did not have a specific written manual, but the concept of *omotenashi* was shared among Japanese top managers. One of the representatives in Canada said that it was *atarimae* (common) for Japanese to know the meaning of *omotenashi*, and picked up a small piece of trash nearby to make a point that this type of "care" (in Japanese, *kidukai*) for the customers shows the Japanese *omotenashi* spirit. This behavior, in fact, shows the one-way host-guest relationship, meaning that even some local customers did not care or even notice the small piece of trash, but how they think does not influence how servers behave. This representative added that he understood sometimes that Japanese service might be excessive, but this is the beauty of Japanese culture. This does applies not only to the case of customer service. I once saw the shop manager in Boston clean out the garbage because it was too full. He said that even though this might not be his job, anyone who saw this situation should clean it up as part of *kidukai* because it is for the sake of all employees. These behaviors and thoughts represent very well how the managers value the spirit of *omotenashi* abroad and wish to disseminate its practices.

The second key term to better understand the Japaneseness at Yama Ramen is *seishin-ron*, which literally means the theory of mentality, and in this study indicates specifically the theory of "mental toughness." This term has positive and negative meanings. On the positive side, it implies one's energetic personality and dedication to teamwork, but on the negative side, it expresses one's strong tendency to comply with authority and willingness to work overtime. This type of ideology is interrelated with the concept of *taiikukai-kei*, literally meaning the groups of people who belong to or used to play at either professional or amateur sports clubs. These groups of people were considered to be suitable for certain types of work in Japan, such as sales personnel who have strong team spirit and mental toughness.[32] A representative in an overseas Yama Ramen shop used to work in the sales department and said that he had very limited time with his family in Japan because he was working extremely long hours. He considered himself as *taiikukai-kei*, and believed working long hours to be cool.

Focusing on one's work attitudes and process rather than results is another feature of Japanese management. According to Thomas Rohlen, who conducted participant observation in a Japanese bank, spiritual training for new employees is for cultivating their mental strength and molding their adaptability.[33] This type of ideology has some similarities with military training. According to Ronald Dore's comparative study on British and Japanese factories, one of the distinctive features in a Japanese organization is its strict hierarchy and obedience to the hierarchical order, which is similar to military practices.[34] If an organization has top management with such an ideology, it may face challenges with insufficient support because the management believes that it is necessary for people to suffer and fight until they drop. This situation applies to some of the cases in the Yama Ramen operations, which will be further discussed below.

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[30] Hochschild, A. R. (1979). *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling*. CA: University of California Press.

[31] Zhu, Y. (2016). Introducing *Omotenashi* to the world: Challenges of Japanese customer service in a cross-cultural setting. *Transcultural Management Review*, *13*, 47–63.

[32] Osano, K. (2015). Taiikukai no gakusei ha hontou ni shuushokuni yuuri nanoka. 体育会の学生は本当に「就職に有利」なのか [Does taiikukai-kei have advantage for job hunting?]. Toyokeizai online, http://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/97608?page=2. Accessed on July 1, 2017.

[33] Rohlen, T. P. (1974). *For Harmony and Strength: Japanese White-Collar Organization in Anthropological Perspective*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

[34] Dore, R. P. (1990). *British factory, Japanese factory: The origins of national diversity in industrial relations*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

The third key term relating to the concept of "authentic" Japaneseness at Yama Ramen is *zen'in keiei*, which indicates a situation where employees at every level are involved in management. This concept was developed by Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of the Japanese electronics company, Panasonic, and was aimed at increasing the awareness and involvement of employees in management, actively listening to their voices so as to improve their products and services.[35] For instance, some Japanese companies require part-timers to check or even memorize sales targets, and analyze customer purchase tendencies so that they could brainstorm how to improve sales.[36] Other companies may ask employees to share their responsibilities with each other rather than clearly distinguishing between their jobs so that everyone can have their eyes on others' work. This requires an ambiguous job description, which is a representative characteristic of Japanese management, and also the underlying requirement for realizing *zen'in keiei*.[37]

Many Yama Ramen managers believed that it was necessary for all staff to be aware of what was going on at the store. That is why employees needed to attend briefing sessions together to learn the previous day's or the monthly sales, and customers' purchasing tendencies. Some local employees cared less because learning these facts would not change their position or salary at the store nor was it written in their job description; however, the company believed that these sharing sessions could help in gaining more loyal employees able to point out a problem, analyze the situation, and generate better solutions. They stressed the importance of sharing responsibilities together because the workplace was not simply a place for work but also a small community where people could find their sense of belonging and purpose. The next section of the case study will address how this type of ideology has been interpreted at Yama Ramen shops and how the tipping system influences its practices.

The previous section described the meaning of "authenticity" for Yama Ramen according to three aspects: *omotenashi* (Japanese hospitality), *seishin-ron* (theory of mentality), and *zen'in keiei* (involving everyone in management). After defining the concept of "authenticity," the next step is to "translate" it to the local staff. At Yama Ramen, line managers, such as shop managers and other managers, were expected to play the role of "missionaries" who translate and pass on messages from the top to the bottom. Corporate goals, such as pursuing "authenticity," are usually abstract and broad, and need translation into detailed explanations or sometimes instructions.[38] This work is challenging and unpredictable because every manager may translate "authenticity" differently even though they share a similar ideology of what "authentic" Japaneseness is. This is different than making broth, and unifying ramen bowls and store decorations because these are more clearly defined and leave space for negotiations. Therefore, it is important for the line managers to discuss the practice and ensure that they are on the right path (and the same path).

How were the concepts of "authenticity" actually interpreted and presented in an overseas Yama Ramen shop? How does the local management company influence its practices? How do managers and staff respond to each other? This study selected one Yama Ramen branch, the University shop in Boston, to further discuss these issues so as to better understand the challenges of diversity management and the conflicts and struggles that arose in the process of pursuing "authenticity."

3. Yama Ramen in Boston

Independently built, the University shop was located near an Ivy League university in Boston, and was managed by P&M, the Japanese consulting firm (along with another store in downtown Boston and one in Washington). It is located near one of the main roads connecting the campus and residential housing, and is only a few minutes from the nearest metro station. The road in front of the shop offers various restaurants to customers including Chinese, American, Indian, Vietnamese, Korean, Malaysian, and fusion. Its proximity to the Ivy League

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[35] Nonaka, I. Katsumi, A. (2015). *Zen'in keiei: Jiritsu bunsan inobe-shon kigyou seikouno honshitsu*. 全員経営：自律分散イノベーション企業成功の本質 [Zen'in keiei: Success recipe of autonomous decentralized innovation companies]. Tokyo: Nikkei Book.

[36] Zhu, Y. (2015). Corporate ideology and store managers: Implication from a Japanese retailer. *The Journal of International Public Policy*, *36*, 1–24.

[37] ibid.

[38] Dessler, G. (2016). *Fundamentals of human resource management*. Florida: Florida International University.

university attracted not only students but also tourists, and it was busy even on weekdays. As a flagship store, the University shop represents the most advanced and latest brand image of the company. It has 59 seats decorated with carefully selected furniture, and music to create a comfortable and modern atmosphere. The price of ramen is slightly more expensive than in Japan. For instance, one combo, a bowl of ramen with sides such as *gyoza* (fried dumpling) or *karaage* (fried chicken) costs around US$20. This is not only to fit the price range to the market situation, but also to balance the profits and the expensive rent. High rent and fierce competition does not stop Yama Ramen. Its financial status was stable and increased every year, which gave the shop manager greater expectations as well as increased pressure.

Data are based on the fieldwork conducted in March and May of 2017 at the Boston shop, including interviews with six employees, and additional information retrieved from second-hand sources.[39] Employees at the University shop were either managers or staff who were assigned to one of two locations: kitchen or floor. Job titles from the top to the bottom were: shop manager, business manager, managers of kitchen or floor, and staff under their management. The staff working on the floor had two different roles: one was the server who took the customer's order, and the other was the busser who brought the food and cleaned the tables. The roles of the kitchen staff were mainly divided according to their specific jobs, such as cutting vegetables, boiling eggs, and so on. The ratio of managers to part-timers was 2:8, and most staff were aged between 20 and 30.

The shop manager, a Japanese man in his early 20s, had been sent to America five years previously. He helped open shops in several cities in the United States, and was then assigned to work as a shop manager at the University shop. The business manager, a Japanese woman with fluent English, was expected to be in charge of "everything but broth making." Four other employees I interviewed had different countries of origin, including South America, Nepal, Japan, and the United States. Except for one person from Nepal, all other employees were able to speak fluent Japanese by virtue of having either grown up in Japan or through self-study. It was a coincidence that most of them were able to speak Japanese because interviewees were randomly selected according to their break time. All the interviews were conducted informally, as I chatted with them while they were taking a break or working in the back room. Direct quotes are not used frequently here because it is more important to illustrate the space created by the people rather than simply quoting what they said.

The next section will discuss how the management philosophy of P&M, the Japanese consulting firm that operates the store, is interrelated with "authentic" Japaneseness. This case study will not discuss the standardization of "authentic" taste and store atmosphere because most of the practices were well standardized, and it is the interpersonal aspect of the "authenticity" that created more challenges. This study then examines how shop employees interpreted these ideas, and how this interaction resulted in conflicts between the shop manager and others, and between Japanese ideology and local practices. A discussion of this case study is included at the end of this section.

(1) "Authentic" Japanese management philosophy

P&M, a Japanese consulting firm, was established in Japan in 1999 and started its overseas expansion in 2013. Besides its Yama Ramen operations, the company is also involved in various fields such as farming and machinery, mostly based in Japan. The Yama Ramen shop in Washington was their overseas debut. Along with the president of Yama Ramen, who is one of the executives at P&M, the U.S. branch has three members including the CEO and two staff. The CEO of the company, Mr. Takada, began his career in a retail industry, and changed his job to a venture company where he discovered the potential of the Internet. During his days at the second company, he and others founded the company's professional sports club where he served as club director. After taking early retirement, he founded P&M and started franchising a machinery business. He befriended the president of Yama Ramen and believed that opening ramen shops could fulfill his dream to provide opportunities to young Japanese and fully harness the potential of Japanese food and culture. In a media report, he compared a sports team to the ramen shop saying that the store manager (coach) needs to motivate and encourage employees (players) to perform well and acquire more customers (fans). In this context, he was the executive/general director. According to another media interview, he showed his desire to disseminate Japanese food and its *omotenashi* culture. This echoes what

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[39] This paper refrains from citing these sources because they might reveal the identity of the company.

the representative at Yama Ramen Canada told me, "We want to share the beauty of 'Japaneseness' (*nihon-rashisa*) by serving traditional dishes with the *omotenashi* spirit. The ramen has just started getting recognized abroad, and I believe it will become as well-known as sushi someday."

The above section described the management philosophy of the local management company, P&M, which largely emphasizes the importance of disseminating "authentic" Japaneseness in Boston. How do employees interpret and respond to this? How does it influence human relations at the shop? The next section will analyze how and what caused the struggles of the shop manager in the process of interacting with local employees, and the conflicts between Japanese ideology and local practices.

(2) Human relations and the struggles of the shop manager

Conflicts between the shop manager and others can be examined according to four main aspects: diverse workforce, lack of management training, little support from others, and poor communication skills with an ethnocentric ideology. Employees at the University shop were racially diverse. For instance, three kitchen managers at the shop were from different ethnic backgrounds, namely, Japanese-American, Korean, and American. There were more than four different ethnic groups at the store working as either managers or staff. The two main ethnic groups were Hispanic and Indian, which dominated the overall employees at 20% and 40%, respectively. Other major ethnic groups included people from Vietnam and Thailand. The shop manager commented that not all shops in Boston were the same, but because of the store's large size, the ethnic groups were more diverse. Some tended to invite their friends or relatives from the same country or region to work at the University shop, so the relative size of the ethnic groups grew as well. It was also not uncommon for these employees to have lived abroad. One of the informants from Nepal told me that he had worked in different cities before he worked in Boston. Most of his family members were out of Nepal for either work or study, and his younger sister was studying in Tokyo as a scholarship recipient of the Japanese government.

A diverse workforce is one of the possible obstacles to facilitating the dissemination of "authenticity" at the store, in particular, "authentic" Japaneseness. One means of looking into this issue is by examining the role of line managers, including the shop manager, business manager, and the kitchen and floor managers. They were expected to pass the message from the top management to the local employees effectively; however, in this process, the shop manager described how he was struggling with a feeling of hopelessness because other managers did not share the same goals owing to differences in their cultural backgrounds. Moreover, this difference was not only from one culture to another, but to multiple cultures, which made it even harder for the shop manager to pass on the message. Based on these observations, the author believes that if the Boston shop had recruited a less diverse workforce or more Japanese employees, there might have might have avoided this problem; with employees sharing similar values and beliefs, the results might have been better in terms of disseminating "authentic" Japaneseness. In the case of Canada, where employees were mostly Japanese with working holiday visas, less diversity at Yama Ramen shops contributed positively to cultivating a better environment for achieving the goal of realizing "Japaneseness." Other than diversity, another possible reason is lack of training on how to manage a diverse workforce.

Lack of management training is due to two conventional Japanese managerial practices in P&M. First, every employee is educated in the organization based on his or her potential and no prior experience is needed.[40] Every employee is expected to learn through on-the-job training rather than intensive training; this also applied to the case of the shop manager, who had no training or education of being a manager before or after he was sent to the company, because the top people believed that he would learn from experience. This also reflects the ideology of *seishin-ron* (theory of mentality) as people with this mindset believed that as long as you could communicate with the employees "from the heart," they would cooperate with you even though you did not have any management skills. The business manager at the University shop commented that this type of ideology does not distinguish "boss" from "leader," and from her point of view, the top people at P&M were the former (i.e., those who do not have leadership ability, but only want their subordinates to follow orders).

Another possible reason for the lack of management training is because Japanese organizations value

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[40] Yamashita, Y. (2016). Jinteki shigenkanri to nihon no soshiki. 人的資源管理と日本の組織 [Human resource management in Japanese organizations] Tokyo: Dobunkan.

"professional" managers less and "generalists" more, which contributes to the realization of democratic decision-making. In Japanese companies, many managers do not have their own offices because they are expected to observe the progress of their subordinates and create the image of a "people person" by sharing the office with them. Many Japanese organizations require management trainees to go onto the front line for the first several years, including cleaning the washrooms before they are promoted as managers.[41] This type of management needs to have an ambiguous job description where people's jobs overlap so that sometimes the manager does the work of their subordinates and vice-versa. These elements prevent P&M from providing any professional training.

The third possible reason for conflicts is the negligible support the shop manager received from P&M and other managers at the store. The first and most influential manager was the Japanese business manager, who had a strong opposition toward P&M's management philosophy, which reflected "traditional" Japanese management. This related to her working experience back in Japan. When she was job hunting before graduating from university in Japan, she experienced several instances of gender inequity and felt that finding a decent career in Japan was hopeless. Luckily, she was able to find a job in a foreign company after working for several years at a traditional Japanese firm, as she had dreamed of working in a place where she could be free from gender inequality, which she believed represented "traditional" Japanese management. Ms. Doi, who worked at Yama Ramen as a server, agreed with this opinion and said that the working environment was not ideal for women who wanted to climb the career ladder in the 1990s. Ms. Doi had lived in the United States for quite a long time, which had allowed her to gain a certain degree of cultural competency. As "cultural mediators," such employees could have helped the company disseminate "authentic" Japaneseness more effectively; however, their disagreements made them reluctant to do so.

The shop manager was also not getting sufficient support from P&M mainly because the company did not want to pay extra for an expensive and unnecessary expatriate. He commented that since he had worked at the University shop, he felt more pressure because of the higher sales goals and diverse workforce. He had had to work six days a week and more than 12 hours a day for the past several years because he found no reason to rest or go home early. This situation improved slightly after he married and had a child; however, P&M was not positive about sending any helpers although the shop was finally going to get a Japanese manager in the middle of 2017. P&M's behavior could be thought of as rational in a sense, as it looked at the sales and found no reason to send any additional staff, but they also had the mindset of *seishin-ron* (theory of mentality), and *taiikukai-kei* (playing in a sports team), which led them to believe that people should work until they drop otherwise they were not trying hard enough.

The last reason why the shop manager struggled with the company's mission was due to his poor communication skills, which somehow reflected his ethnocentric ideology as well. The shop manager seldom interacted with the local employees unless he felt it to be necessary or urgent. He felt his limited management experience and language ability made it hard for him to communicate well with different people. Interviews and observations suggested an alternative interpretation. Fluent language skills and rich management experience might positively influence one's communication; however, the case of the shop manager showed his strong belief in Japanese culture. He felt challenged to educate local employees to understand Japanese culture and practices, which he believed to be the best way to attract and serve customers. His insistence on following Japanese practices or, alternatively, his feeling that Japanese culture was superior to others had strongly influenced his behavior. Given this ideology, he was reluctant to adapt his ideas to the local situation or actively learn what local people thought. The business manager agreed that sometimes problems were caused not simply because of insufficient language skills but with how they thought. She believed that it was important to communicate with the staff and give them an opportunity to understand what the management wanted from them. A local kitchen staff, Steven, who had himself learned Japanese and had strong language skills said:

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[41] Clark, R. (1979). *The Japanese Company*. Cambridge, MA: Yale University Press.

The shop manager barely communicates with us. He hasn't explained anything about Japanese culture here. As one of Japan's fans, I feel the Japanese way of customer service is great and locals should learn from that. The way people offer their services is different here. Americans need to show they are professional if they have the ability (i.e., stick their chest out), but the Japanese are modest with a different style of service. I think locals could learn how to bow, but they need to understand the Japanese culture first. It is possible for them to behave exactly like Japanese, but without understanding the culture, it is very hard to practice it.

(Informal interview at the University shop, May 9, 2017)

This situation is very similar to the case where a Japanese apparel retailer reinforced the practice of a customer service manual without explaining its content because many Japanese expatriates did not realize it would be a problem for local employees to follow the manual.[42] Many people's behaviors were culturally determined and some would not explain why they were behaving in a certain way until people from the other culture asked them. The case of the shop manager cannot represent all situations, as there were many managers who were willing to listen to and accept local cultures into management, but the point here is that an ethnocentric ideology can be constructed unintentionally and become stronger when working in a diverse workplace. In other words, for some groups of people, the more they interact with different cultures, the more they value only their culture and not others. History has already proven that if certain groups of people utilize this ideology only to favor themselves, they learn this lesson the hard way.[43]

The above section explained how the relationship between the shop manager and other employees slowed down the dissemination of "authentic" Japaneseness. Observations and interviews show that not only the shop manager's personality but also the way of thinking that he had cultivated in Japan strongly influenced his behavior. Another factor influencing the pursuit of "authenticity" is the gap between local practices, such as the tipping system, and Japanese management philosophies, such as *omotenashi* and *zen'in keiei*.

(3) Conflict between Japanese ideology and local practices

The tipping system for service providers is a common practice in many countries and its main purpose is to encourage employees to serve customers better.[44] For instance, employees at some clothing stores can receive tips indirectly from the customers by putting their names on the customers' purchases, which is not uncommon in many apparel shops in Hong Kong. In the United States, tipping the servers at a restaurant is important to their overall income. In Canada, it is not uncommon to tip the taxi driver, but it is not mandatory in some cities. These customs might be slightly different from one another, but in general, if the servers fail to satisfy customers' expectations, customers can choose to give less, or nothing at all for that matter. The tipping system was introduced at the University shop in Boston as well as many other Yama Ramen shops in the United States to adapt to the local situation. A difference between Boston and other shops in the United States was the division of labor on the floor: one type of work was the server's and another was the busser's. While the server was responsible for taking orders, the busser would bring the food to the table and clean it afterward. This practice was considered to be fairly common in Boston and was introduced by a former local manager. Not only servers but bussers were also entitled to receive tips.

The shop manager agreed that the tipping system for the floor staff did motivate them, but as it did not help motivate the kitchen staff he believed that the system was imperfect. He wanted to motivate both in the same way so that he could attract not only skilled employees but also loyal ones. This is based on the ideology of *zen'in keiei*, where all staff help each other to improve the management. It is also influenced by the practice in Japan, where the

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[42] Zhu, Y. (2015). Implementation of management philosophy overseas: Case study of a Japanese retailer in Hong Kong. *Journal of Management Philosophy*, *12*(1), 114–122.

[43] Boas, F. (1940). *Race, Language, and Culture*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

[44] Seiter, J. S. (2007). Ingratiation and gratuity: The effect of complimenting customers on tipping behavior in restaurants. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *37*(3), 478–485.

scarcity of tipping led companies to practice different strategies.[45] One strategy was to transfer employees to work in different departments so that they could find their best match. Takahashi claimed that Japanese organizations paid attention to what the jobs could give employees, namely, a sense of purpose rather than simply monetary rewards.[46]

Unfortunately, abolishing the tipping system or rotating employees' jobs has some challenges mainly because of different language abilities. One of the criteria for choosing servers was their language proficiency. Servers could determine a customer's image of the shop and they needed to be carefully selected. Participant observation made it clear that most of the servers were native English speakers from the local area while others, such as the busser and kitchen staff, had lower language abilities. Some kitchen staff did not speak English at all, which limited their workplace to a location where no interaction with the customers was required. Another problematic issue was the conflict among some groups of employees. Some ethnic groups tended to gather together and speak their own language, which sometimes created a wall between them and the others. This was apparent during my observation where I heard more than two languages in the kitchen. The last thing management wanted was a conflict at the store, and the shop manager believed that abolishing the tipping system could encourage employees to cultivate a group spirit that would reduce conflicts as much as possible; however, he realized this was very difficult because of existing tipping practices, and he was caught between these two ideas. What if the employees were mostly Japanese? How would they handle tipping? Shops in Canada may provide some clues. The tipping system existed in Canada as well, but Japanese employees there were reluctant to fight over tips; this did not seriously influence their work because many of them had limited expectations of the monetary rewards they could get from working at Yama Ramen Canada. This shows that employees with similar cultural backgrounds to Japan may better facilitate the dissemination of "authentic" Japaneseness although it does not mean it is impossible in Boston, only harder.

Another "authentic" Japanese management philosophy, the *omotenashi* spirit, also appeared to encounter some difficulties during its dissemination. Many Yama Ramen shop managers I interviewed used "self-centered" as the opposite to *omotenashi* or, in this context, "selfless" to describe some local employees' behaviors that dissatisfied them, especially those they termed "individualism." The shop manager at the University shop told me of an incident when a server misbehaved during an interaction with customers. The server took the wrong order from the customer, and after the customer had eaten the food, the server asked him to pay. From the shop manager's perspective, the server should not have asked for money because it was the shop's fault in serving the wrong food. He felt that this type of behavior showed that the server did not consider the customers' feelings. Another example was how the employees were reluctant to work if it was outside of their job description. From the shop manager's perspective, if employees had nothing to do, they should help colleagues, which would ultimately contribute to improving overall work efficiency. The shop manager understood that the local employees behaved according to the job description written on the contract; however, he still believed that every employee should voluntarily help others. In this context, the *omotenashi* spirit not only applied to the customer-server relationship but also to relationships with colleagues. A Japanese representative at Yama Ramen Canada gave me an example of a local staff member who did not show up for work because he had a date with his girlfriend, and explained there was nothing he could do because he had to please her. The representative said it was "unbelievable" because he could not imagine the same situation in Japan, and that such situations made it difficult for him to trust local employees.

The above section shows how much the shop manager valued the Japanese cultural ideology; at the same time, it shows how he interpreted the local's behavior according to his values. The examples the shop manager and the representative mentioned might not apply to all locals, but they tended to connect them to stress and therefore found it difficult to build relationships of trust with staff. As the kitchen staff member, Steven, claimed, education was necessary for the local employees. For instance, if the shop manager clearly guided the employees when they

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[45] In a few high-end restaurants, some customers might tip by wrapping it in an envelope or might give the change to the taxi drivers.

[46] Takahashi, Nobuo. 2010. *Kyomou no seikashugi: nihongata nenkousei hukkatsu no susume* 虚妄の成果主義：日本型年功制復活の進め [Unrealistic merit system: Revival of Japanese seniority-based system]. Tokyo: Tsukuma Shobou.

made mistakes or informed them of the consequences when they did not show up for work, the result might be different. Education is critical and necessary before Japanese managers judge the locals; otherwise, ack of awareness not only leads to stereotyping but also prevents local staff from learning.

(4) Discussion

This section first reviewed the external environment and financial achievements of the Yama Ramen University shop in Boston, United States, and then discussed the conflicts and struggles at the store through considering three aspects: the management philosophy of P&M, human relations between the shop manager and staff, and the gap between Japanese ideology and local practices. Financial achievements seem to suggest the management's success; however, the strong insistence on disseminating "authentic" Japaneseness may become an obstacle to motivating employees, which would have a negative impact on its operations in the long term. In addition to a diverse workforce, lack of management training, insufficient support, and communication based on an ethnocentric ideology caused conflicts and struggles for the shop manager during the process. A unique feature of Boston's case was that even within the dynamic movement of people across cultures, the pursuit of "authentic" Japanese management philosophy did not fade away, but only became stronger. This shows how a unified culture was encouraged at Yama Ramen, and echoes some claims that our society is becoming more culturally homogeneous.[47] Many examples suggest the company's attempts to cultivate a single and unified cultural practice at the store; however, the locals' reactions showed that diversity was important and valuable.

The reluctance to listen to local opinions and little interaction with them did not help the shop manager introduce the concept of "authentic" Japaneseness, but created a wall between the two and reinforced an ethnocentric ideology. This may cause considerable harm for corporate management in terms of building mutual trust and cultivating a cooperative spirit. It often takes time and effort to introduce a new type of system or beliefs into a diverse workplace, but it also requires long-term and intimate communication with the local parties to achieve this goal.

4. Conclusion

This study examines the dynamics of diversity management in a contemporary workplace by focusing on the challenges a company faces in the process of pursuing "authenticity" overseas. There have been numerous studies about diversity management, but only a few of them have described how the idea of "authentic" culture plays a significant role in the process of achieving corporate missions and what their management practices imply. Based on a detailed analysis of the University shop in Boston, this study has two unique findings. The first is that during the company's pursuit of "authenticity," Japanese managers' overt confidence or belief in the concept had ironically become a main obstacle in facilitating the process. Examples in this study showed that the more Japanese managers believed in the necessity of disseminating "authentic" Japaneseness, which most of them did, the more they felt that Japanese culture was superior, which resulted in poor communication with the locals and less interest in their side of the story. Poor communication and limited mutual understanding eventually resulted in slowing down the process of achieving "authenticity."

Another unique finding is that the more diverse the workplace is, the more unified "authentic" culture is considered to be ideal. At the University shop, different languages, customs, and behaviors could be observed. You would not even realize which country you were in as the staff was so diverse. As such, the University shop experienced a dynamic flow of globalization in a small and compact space. In such an environment, the Yama Ramen management had another aim—to create singular and unified cultural practices and values. This seems to have provided an example of how our society has become culturally homogeneous; however, the reactions of local employees showed that cultural diversity still has a huge impact and cannot be overlooked.

This case provides new insights into the understanding of the company's strategy on balancing standardization and localization. Much of the conventional literature has claimed that companies operating overseas are required to balance these two; however, the case of Yama Ramen shows its clear pursuit of unifying Japanese

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[47] Ritzer, G. (eds). (2009). *McDonaldization: The Reader*. CA: Pine Forge Press.

standards and minimizing localization. Observation in the field showed close ties between business and culture where the corporate branding (to recreate an "authentic" shop) was interrelated with or even created the Japanese managers' ethnocentric ideology. This belief was cultivated naturally and unintentionally, but resulted in discouraging these managers from thinking from the locals' perspectives. The diversified workforce in Boston has shown the clear conflict between an ethnocentric ideology on the Japanese side and the pursuit of diversity by the locals. It also shows that the more Japanese managers want to realize the "authentic" shop, the less close they are to attaining this goal. This limitation in a business context means less efficiency in managing diverse people through a less efficiency of managing diversified people with a unified management ideology.

Based on these findings, this study offers a few suggestions for future management to companies in similar situations. First, when a company enters the overseas market, it is necessary to keep in mind that ethnocentric ideology can have a negative influence on their operations, and especially on their relationships with local people. Examples from Yama Ramen, Boston show that a strong ethnocentric ideology causes less communication with the locals, and results in poor relationships with them. To avoid this situation, the company could educate their employees to understand the importance of valuing different managerial practices. This sounds fairly easy, but the reality suggests that many expatriates have failed to do so. It would benefit the management to utilize the good aspects of local management practices rather than judging them according to their own cultural values. Second, the company may need to revise its mission to better create an organic environment that values individual differences. It is apparent that a corporate mission such as pursuing "authenticity" or, in other words, a "unified" ideology has underestimated the value of local culture, and this type of behavior will reduce the opportunities to identify the advantages of local practices. Third, balancing institutional control and individual freedoms is the key to determining outcomes. To manage efficiently overseas, the company needs to create a system to control and monitor employees so that they can avoid errors and increase best practices; meanwhile, it is also crucial for the employees to feel a sense of belonging, freedom, and commitment to the company. Organizational culture is a process of negotiating meaning and it is necessary for the company to not only listen to the locals and learn from them, but at the same time, to enhance control when necessary. The underlying principle of achieving this is to understand the negative influence of ethnocentric ideology and its dissemination through management practices.

This study provides a detailed case study to offer a holistic analysis on diversity management, but it would be more valuable if this research could be expanded to shops in other regions to further explore how diversity interrelates with globalization and culture.

研究ノート

日本の戦時ペニシリン開発研究にみる「技術と文化」の相互性

―複合的な「出来事」としてのペニシリンものづくり―

Technology and Culture in the Case of the Development of Penicillin in Japan during World War II

Penicillin Development as a Plural Phenomenon

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　日本でも第二次世界大戦中に抗生物質ペニシリンの開発研究が行われた。戦況不利になる中で研究資材が不足し、開発が先行している英米が交戦国であるために学術先端情報の入手も困難な状況にあったが研究開始の約9カ月後にはペニシリンの精製を得た。工場における大量生産試験開始以後は本土空襲が激化し、初期段階で終戦を迎える。

　本稿の研究目的は、天然物であるアオカビが産生する抗生物質を医薬品として安定供給する開発研究が未知の分野であったにも拘わらず、短期間で開発研究初期段階に到達し得た要因を「技術と文化」の相互性に関連付けて探ることである。

　研究ノートでは研究方法の特徴を報告する。戦火を免れて保存されていた一次史料と開発研究に従事した新田和男氏のオーラルヒストリーを用いて開発研究の過程を再現し、科学研究行政の視点による分析につなげる。非公開の一次史料は、科学動員主担当である陸軍軍医学校研究部編集の『年鑑』や科学研究行政の主務者である稲垣克彦陸軍軍医少佐による『研究部　業務日誌』を含む。新田和男氏は研究の中核となった伝染病研究所第7研究室で有効菌株の探索・培養・精製・抽出に従事し戦後は抗生物質および抗癌抗生物質の研究者となっている。

　官僚制の中の技術将校（陸軍軍医学校　稲垣少佐）と基礎医学（微生物学）・臨床医学・コロイド化学・統計学および推計学の学者である4人のブレーン（梅沢浜夫・鳥居敏雄・佐藤弘一・増山元三郎）が発揮した学際的研究支援のリーダーシップを「技術と文化」の相互性として読み解けると考えている。

　Japan carried out research and development (R & D) of penicillin, the antibacterial agent, during World War II. Yet research materials for penicillin's R & D gradually became insufficient due to adverse tactical situations. Advanced academic research information was difficult to obtain because Britain and the U.S., who were at the forefront in penicillin R & D, became belligerent. However, about nine months after starting the initial R & D, pure penicillin was obtained. Although mass production of penicillin commenced, the aerial attacks on Japan's mainland intensified, and the war came to an end for Japan.

　The purpose of this research note is to discuss the relationship between technology and culture in the case of the development of penicillin. In particular, Japanese researchers strove to achieve a supply of penicillin, the natural blue-molded antibacterial agent, as a pharmaceutical agent.

　For the purpose of re-staging the process of R & D leading to the analysis of the R & D of penicillin from the viewpoint of collaboration among science-research-government in Japan at that time, this research note examines this unique research approach using primary documents concerning the R & D of penicillin. These

valuable documents have escaped the war and are mainly heretofore unavailable primary historical sources, including an oral history provided by Kazuo Nitta.

　　These primary historical sources include an *Annual* which was compiled by the research department of the Academy of Medicine Army that was involved in science mobilization, as well as the business diary of the research department which has been described by Katsuhiko Inagaki, who, at the time, was a major in the Academy of Medicine Army and a leader in the science-research-government collaboration. Analysis of the leadership of the interdisciplinary research support by Katsuhiko Inagaki described above and also the existence of four mentors−Hamao Umezawa, Toshio Torii, Kōichi Sato and Genzaburo Masuyama−contribute to clarifying the relationships between technology culture.

はじめに

　　1928 年（学会誌発表は 1929 年）[1]にフレミングが青カビから発見した抗菌物質ペニシリンは、病原菌の増殖を顕著に抑制したが極めて不安定であった。臨床応用研究に取組んだ英国フローリーらが 0.1mg のペニシリンを生成・抽出するまでに 3 年を要した。戦傷者の治療薬として安定供給できる製剤の大量生産開発の場は 1941 年アメリカに移され、1942 年には戦時特別研究として米英の国家機密指定となり、1943 年アメリカで大量生産方式が確立した。戦前まで死亡率第一位を占めていた感染症の治療薬・抗生物質ペニシリン製剤の誕生である。

　　日本のペニシリン開発研究は陸軍軍医学校研究部を主担当として 1944 年 1 月 27 日に戦時科学動員テーマの認可を受け、研究班始動の 9 カ月後には「碧素（ペニシリン）1 号」の精製を得た。

　　本稿では、研究資材の確保も先端科学情報の入手も日を追って困難になる中で、開発研究の初期目標に到達し得た要因を探る視点をペニシリン開発研究の主務者である陸軍軍医学校の稲垣克彦陸軍軍医少佐と 4 人のブレーンがとった研究企画と支援の手法に定める。有機的な研究者組織の構築と研究成果と課題を議論する委員会(ペニシリン委員会)の運営や実験および工場での開発試行を進捗させる為に必要なヒトやモノを新たに配分する手法に注目する。複雑な問題となっている「出来事」の事象ではその中から解決の糸口を見出し、一方、多様に存在している「出来事」を目的達成のために活かして使うペニシリン開発における科学研究行政のあり方に分析の視座をおく。

　　その理由は開発研究の主務者である陸軍軍医学校の稲垣克彦軍医少佐が寄託した全一次史料の閲覧を許可されたからである。一次史料を通して、史料を寄託した稲垣克彦陸軍軍医少佐の考えと行動の再構築が可能だからである。開発研究の中核研究室となった伝染病研究所第七研究室で実験に従事し、後に抗生物質の研究者となった新田和男氏のインタビューを許可されたことも本稿での分析の助けとなる。

　　これらの分析を通して、日本が近代国民国家として歩みを始めて 70 年余り後である 1943 年末から 1945 年におけるペニシリン開発研究という「出来事」の中から、「技術と文化」が相互に影響しあい、ひいては後の社会のあり方への提言となるところまで見いだせれば幸いである。

　　なお、一次史料を基にして著者が作成した戦時ペニシリン開発研究の過程を年表【付録 1】として、また、新田和男氏へのインタビュー（オーラルヒストリー）を【付録 2】として、研究ノートの最後に添付した。

1 ．「科学研究行政の理念」の堅持と実行　　（文化に資する学問と技術の進捗をめざす）

　　ペニシリン開発研究の全期間を通じて、科学動員を主務する陸軍軍医学校研究部の稲垣克彦陸軍軍医少佐の行動記録からは、ゆるぎない信念をもって生起する問題に立ち向かい克服して往く様子を読み取ることができる。本人は「後日ニ備エント」して編纂した「年鑑」[2]に「科学行政の理念」や「新興国理念五カ条」として明示している。稲垣は日本において学術の進歩が進まぬ理由を「平安朝以来連綿ト

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[1] Fleming, A. (1929). On the antibacterial action of culture of a *Penicillium*, with special reference to their use in the isolation of *B. Influenzae*, *Brit. Jour. Expt.* Path. 10: 226-236.

[2] 陸軍軍医学校研究部編集『陸軍軍医学校研究部　年鑑』(自昭和 18 年 12 月　至昭和 19 年 12 月) 1945 年 2 月。

シテ来タ」日本人の心情にあるとみている。

　　　「従来日本ニ於ケル学術ノ進歩ガ遅々トシテ常ニ欧米諸国ノ驥尾ニシテ甘ンジテイナケレバ
　　　　ナラナカッタ所以ハ、実ニ平安朝時代以来連綿トシテ続イテ来タ所ノ、学問ヲ衆目カラ覆ヒ、
　　　　極ク少部分ノ者ノミガソレヲ享受スルコトニヨッテソノ神聖ト尊厳ヲタモトウトシタ心情ガ、
　　　　全ク抜ケ切ラズ、誤ツテハ学問ヲ自己ノ所有物ト看做シ、ソノ公表ヲ以テ己ノ損失ト考ヘル
　　　　ガ如キ、眞理ノ何タルカヲ解セザル学者ノ氾濫ニヨルモノデアルト考ヘル」[3]

　　このように観ている当時の日本において科学研究の目標を達成するために、稲垣は確固たる理念
「新興国理念　五か条」を掲げて柱とした。

　　　「當研究所ハ開設以来常ニ国家興隆ノ原動力ノ毅然タル基礎ヲ確立スベク努力シ来ツテ居ル
　　　　ノデアリ、総力戦ノ實ヲ挙ゲテ国難ヲ打開セントスル意図ノ下ニ常ニ眼ヲ汎ク国内及ビ国外
　　　　ノ情勢ニムケテソレラノ情報ヲ蒐集シ、学会ノ新鋭ナル学者ヲ動員シテ来タ。然モ要ハ国
　　　　ヲ興スノ一語ニ蓋キルノデアッテ　コノ偉大ナル理想ヲ実現セントスル意図コソコノ研究
　　　　部ノ生命ニ外ナラナイノデアル」[3]

　　また、理念を掲げて目的を完遂するためのモットーとして、研究・企画・金融・世界政策・教学の
五項目をあげている。
　　本稿では彼らの「企画」手法に注目しているが、開発研究の初期目標を達成した時点で編纂した「年
鑑」結語の「企画」の項で稲垣は次の様に述べている。

　　　「當研究所ノ業績ノウチ最モ顕著ナルモノハ、従来日本国内に割拠シテヰタ研究機関ヲ
　　　　汎ク渉猟シテ、ソレラ相互ノ有機的連絡ヲ緊密ニシテ、ソノ上ニ立ツテコレラヲ統御シ、
　　　　以ツテ研究内容ノ最大能力ヲ発揮セシメタコトデアル。国家的見地カラミタ場合、ソノ
　　　　喜バシイコトハ勿論デアルケレドモ、各個人的ナ見地カラ、又学問ソレ自体ノ見地カラ
　　　　見テモ　ソノ発達推進ニ寄与シタ功績ハ蓋シ絶大ト言ワナケレバナルマイ」[4]

ブレーンとして軍医学校研究部の嘱託とした４名の研究者も新鋭の学者である。稲垣自体も当時３３歳
の軍医少佐であり陸軍官僚制の中では中堅の技術官僚である。ペニシリン委員会を組織し、招く委員は
新鋭なる中堅の学者[2]を入れることに留意している。勿論、学界の重鎮にも委嘱している。戦時には多
くの科学動員による研究班が立ち上げられている。そのすべてが期待された目標に達しえたとはいえず、
各研究班で組織された委員会もすべてが実のある開催を続けたとはいえない様である。[5]
　　国民の生命生活の向上に資するために、学問を神聖なる帳に閉じ込めず実用できる技術を産み出す
まで発展させようとする姿勢は、まず、抽象的な次元で考える「技術と文化」の相互性に着目して彼ら
が開発研究を主導したとみることができる。
　　村田純一は「知覚と生活世界」[6]の技術の項で次の様に述べている。

　　　「近代科学の成立が、技術的・実験的知との結合によって生じたものであることは、F・ベーコンや
　　　　デカルトがいちはやく指摘している通りである」
　　　「技術には新たな「行為の形」を生み出し、新たな経験の仕方を創造する力、あるいはハイデガー
　　　　の言葉を使えば「世界を開示する」という現象学的な力が備わっているからである」
　　　「科学と生活世界、思惟と直観という二元的枠組みのなかで登場した科学の「技術化」の問題は、
　　　　科学と技術と生活世界といういわば「三元的」枠組のなかでとらえ返されねばならなくなる」

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[3] 前掲『陸軍軍医学校研究部　年鑑』200 頁。
[4] 前掲『陸軍軍医学校研究部　年鑑』201 頁。
[5] 沢井実『近代日本の研究開発体制』名古屋大学出版会、2012 年。
[6] 村田純一『知覚と生活世界－知の現象学的理論』東京大学出版会、1995 年、232～234 頁。

村田の上記の初出は 1988 年であったが、稲垣が 1944 年の時点で、科学（学問）と技術の進捗が国民家の生活世界にまで至らなければならないと考えていたであろうということを「年鑑」の記述から、また【付録 1】年表や【付録 2】からみるペニシリン開発研究主導の行動から再現することができると著者は考えている。

2．「技術と文化」の相互性実現の「場」としてのペニシリン委員会

（1）ペニシリン委員会

　　稲垣少佐は「年鑑」にも記しているが、当時の日本の学界では学者が割拠しており連携して開発する風土がないことが学術の進歩を遅らせているとして、現状を打破する為の具体的な形を採択した。

　　新鋭ナル学者[3]もメンバーに入れたペニシリン委員会という組織である。ペニシリン委員会という協同の「場」を創り、その「場」によって異なる分野の学者たちが有機的につながり、成果をオープンに報告して共有する。オーラルヒストリーを聴取した新田和男氏の言葉をかりると「先駆けなし」である。課題が発生すれば皆で議論して智慧を出し合い克服の糸口を見つける。およそ 1 ヵ月～1 ヵ月半毎に開催されたペニシリン委員会での成果報告と課題克服のための検討討議の繰り返しによって、短期間でのペニシリン精製や工場生産試行移行への進展をみている。

　　開発の各プロセスにおいて主となる研究分野は異なる。異なる分野の研究者・研究組織が連携し協同していくためには、各々の成果や直面した課題を討議する「場」の設営と持続が必要であったと考えている。

（2）ペニシリン委員会（多分野研究者組織）での報告・検討を可能にする―用語と数字―

　　ペニシリン委員会という「場」において、各プロセスで修得した「技術」を共に理解し課題を協同して考察するために、用語の説明と数字化（例えば、力価検定の際の標準菌株の選択や、検定方法判読の為の数字設定）が必須である。個々の「技術」を、科学的な表象として共通に論じあう表現へと置き換えるための用語の説明と数字化が実施された。

　　ペニシリン委員会をほぼ 1 カ月余りの間隔で開催し続け、次なる目標に向かったことによって、9か月という短期間で「碧素（ペニシリン）1 号」精製というゴールに到達したといえる。

　　前節 1 では抽象的な次元で「技術と文化」の相互性に注目したが、本項では「技術と文化」の相互性を生み出すための具体的なモノとして、ペニシリン委員会という組織とその委員会で各委員の理解をつなぐ用語と数字を採りあげた。ペニシリンの開発研究は医薬品生産と臨床応用が目標であり、とりわけ、世界標準に則った用語と数字による説明が必要である。

3．1944 年時点における日本の学術蓄積と組織運営手法

　　稲垣少佐は当時の学問と学者のあり方や学術の進展の遅れを指摘しているが、ペニシリン委員会には医学・理学・植物学・微生物学・生物化学・農学・合成化学・統計学・推計学など多分野の学者、すなわち多分野の学問成果を招集することができている。ペニシリンを産生する有効菌株の探索には苦労しているが、委員会開催時には 2000 種の菌株が保存されていたことを確認している。明治維新後に初めて近代学問にふれたといえるが、その 70 年後には、ペニシリン開発研究を成功させ得るだけの学問および技術の蓄積と学者があったということである。大々的な感染症対策の実施は日清戦争と日露戦争終結後に海外から帰還する将兵の検疫であった。日露戦争後の検疫では、ヨーロッパから帰国した北里柴三郎を迎え、感染症の検疫を実践している。[7]

　　一方、近代国家建設をめざした日本国家の行政組織も形を整えている。稲垣少佐自身が陸軍官僚制の中の医務局零下にある陸軍軍医学校の軍医少佐である。軍陣医学分野の研究を指導し監督する立場の中堅技術官僚（総力戦研究所に 3 期生として出向）である。科学動員となったペニシリン開発研究の主導者である稲垣軍医少佐に求められているのは科学研究行政の実行と成果である。稲垣少佐はこの開発研究遂行のために他の組織―文部省・厚生省・外務省・海軍などにも働きかけて開発研究の目標達成を

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[7] 陸軍省『臨時陸軍検疫部報告摘要』『明治三十七八年戦役検疫誌』1907 年。

企図してい[8]る。【付録１】の年表を参照されたい。大日本帝国の官僚制度を活用して開発研究の遂行を果たしたともいえる。

　「キーゼ綜則」[8]を入手する経緯は劇的であるが、これは 1943 年から文部省が実施している科学論文題目速報事業および翻訳事業[9]の成果である。文部省と外務省が連携して当時ドイツに出先機関を設けて実施していた事業である。

　1944 年から 1945 年の時点で、かなりの近代的学術の蓄積と近代国家を運営する官僚制度が機能していたといえよう。あとは、その蓄積をどのように有効に使ったかということであり、稲垣少佐は既にある学術の蓄積を有機的に再構築することで、日本の学問と技術の開発研究レベルをひきあげるモデルをつくったといえよう。この成果が戦後早期のペニシリン工業生産ひいては製薬工業・化学工業のレベルアップの起点となるのであり、世界を変えたくすりのひとつとされる抗生物質ペニシリンを治療薬として提供することで国民の健康・生活への貢献につながるのである。

おわりに

　一次史料の分類途上であり、史料を読み解いていく糸口に立ったに過ぎない。今後も一次史料が寄託されている内藤記念くすり博物館での史資料調査を続けて分析を継続する。

　報告したペニシリン開発研究は戦時下の科学動員であったから「先駆けなし」による学者の協同研究が可能であり、現在ではありえないと多くの人が言っている[10]。果たして、実際はどうなのであろうか。産官学や地域まで含めた研究プロジェクトも存在する。海外と連携する研究も多いと聞く。今後は戦時の科学動員研究体制の現在への連続はあるのかについても考察していきたい。

【付録１】

年表「日本の戦時ペニシリン開発研究の経過」（1943 年 12 月 15 日から 1945 年 8 月 15 日）

以下の史資料等から　著者作成
・「陸軍軍医学校研究部　年鑑」（1943 年 12 月から 1944 年 12 月）、1945 年
・「陸軍軍医学校研究部　業務日誌　稲垣克彦少佐」（1943 年 12 月 15 日から 1945 年 2 月 8 日）
・ペニシリン開発研究関連史料（稲垣克彦氏が内藤記念くすり博物館に寄託：非公開）

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[8] Kiese, Manfred (1943). Chemotherapie mit Antibacteriellen Stoffen aus Niederen Pilzen und Bakterien. *Kliniche Wochenscrift*, 22 (August 7, 1943): 505-511.

[9] 水沢　光「第二次世界大戦期における文部省の科学論文題目速報事業および翻訳事業―犬丸秀雄関係文書を基に」『The Japanese Ministry of Education's Science and Technology Information Service in World War II』2013 年　Journal of History of Science, Japan, Series II 52(266), 70-80, 2013.

[10] 久保秀雄「碧素委員会のことども」『岩波講座　現代生物科学　月報 12』岩波書店、1977 年、4-6 頁。

年・月・日	事項	備考
1943 年 12 月 15 日	● 稲垣克彦陸軍軍医少佐 　総力戦研究所(3 期生)から陸軍軍医学校へ帰任 ● 研究部創設の命を受け研究テーマの探索開始 ● 4 名をブレーンとして嘱託に任命。 　鳥居敏雄（臨床医学：東大物療内科） 　増山元三郎（推計学：中央気象台） 　梅沢浜夫（基礎医学・微生物学：伝研） 　佐藤弘一（生物化学：根津研究所） ● 「稲垣少佐および 4 名」は「総務部」 　企画・研究動員・査察等を担当、 　開発研究推進の中核をなす	● この開発研究支援体制は稲垣の科学研究行政理念（「研究部年鑑」参照に基づく ● 梅沢はペニシリン委員会委員でもある ● 梅沢の伝研 7 研は 9 月から開発の中核研究室となる
1943 年 12 月 21 日	● 稲垣少佐 　文部省　長井緯理科学官に挨拶 　ドイツ臨床週報（1943 年 7 月号） 　「キーゼ綜則」[8]の貸与を受ける	● 「キーゼ綜則」は科学論文題目速報事業 [9] により文部省に到着 　シンガポール迄は伊号第 8 潜水艦　文献類は日独の高級軍人・技術者と共に空路日本へ ● 送付文献目録は犬丸秀雄関係文書にあり
1943 年 12 月 21 日	● 同日　4 人のブレーンに諮り 　研究テーマを「ペニシリン」に決定	
1944 年 1 月 5 日	● 梅沢浜夫「キーゼ綜則」[8]の翻訳を完了 ● 雑誌「科学」1944 年 7 月号に文部省調査課の訳として掲載	● 掲載は全国の研究者への周知目的と考えられる ● 翻訳は第二次世界大戦期の文部省の科学論文題目速報および翻訳事業に基づく ● 名古屋帝大医学部には既に論文ありと久保秀雄 [10](ペニシリン委員)
1944 年 1 月 18 日	● 稲垣少佐 　陸軍省医務局長に研究テーマ*具申するが許可得られず 　＊「ペニシリン等菌類代謝産物による化学療法研究の必要性」	● 陸軍省医務局はサルファ剤合成に主眼をおいており、ペニシリンの重要性を理解していなかったようである
1944 年 1 月 27 日	● 今井　ブエノスアイレス特派員記事 　朝日新聞に掲載される 　「敵英米最近の医学界 　　チャーチル命拾ひ 　　　スルホン酸補ふ　ペニシリン」	● 世界を駆け巡った外からの情報により　即日許可となる

1944 年 1 月 27 日　　● 即日、陸軍大臣より下命
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（陸軍軍医学校長宛）
　　　　　　　　　「ペニシリン類化学療法剤の研究に直ちに
　　　　　　　　　　着手」（8 月迄に製品提出）
　　　　　　　　　● 臨時軍事費より総額 15 万円（当時）の
　　　　　　　　　　研究費計上
　　　　　　　　　（内訳）器材費・薬品費・動物代＝5 万円
　　　　　　　　　　　　　委託費・諸手当費＝9 万円
　　　　　　　　　　　　　内国旅費＝1 万円
　　　　　　　　　（研究費比較　1944 年度　日本）[11]
　　　　　　　　　　ペニシリン　15 万円（当時）
　　　　　　　　　　マラリヤ予防及び治療＝15.5 万円
　　　　　　　　　　マラリヤ治療剤ノ作成＝12.5 万円
　　　　　　　　　（アメリカの研究費）
　　　　　　　　　　ペニシリン戦時研究費総額
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＝2400 万ドル（当時）
　　　　　　　　　　マンハッタン計画　総額
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＝18 億 4500 万ドル

● 稲垣少佐の情報収集と申
　請あってこその研究体制
　開始である

● 1944 年の 15 万円を
　企業物価指数（2016 年）
　で貨幣換算すると
　1 億 1355 万円となる

　稲垣は 1955 年に
　2 億円にあたると回想

　15 万円は 1944 年当時の
　零戦 1 機の製作費用

1944 年 1 月 27 日　　● 稲垣少佐ら総務部
　　　　　　　　　「学際的研究体制」による推進のため
　　　　　　　　　【ペニシリン委員会】組織を立案
　　　　　　　　　● 関連分野から研究者を選定し委員に委嘱
　　　　　　　　　（農学・理学・医学・薬学・植物学・合成化学）

● 科学研究運営理念と方法
　『陸軍軍医学校研究部年
　鑑』として公刊すること
　により次代への提言とし
　た
● 我国の「技術と文化」の
　捉え方にも踏み込む

1944 年 2 月 1 日　　● 「第一回ペニシリン委員会」
　　　　　　　　　ペニシリン生産に有望な菌株の探索
　　　　　　　　　（農学系委員）菌種の純培養
　　　　　　　　　（理学系委員）菌代謝産物の研究
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　菌培養条件の検討
　　　　　　　　　（医学系委員）試験管内検定と
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　生体内検定、臨床試験

1944 年 3 月 8 日　　● 「第二回ペニシリン委員会」
　　　　　　　　　全研究室機関で保存されていた菌株
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　約 2000
　　　　　　　　　● 稲垣少佐ら総務部は学際的研究体制の
　　　　　　　　　　支援を実行
　　　　　　　　　　　外国文献情報の蒐集・翻訳・配布
　　　　　　　　　　　研究費・資材の配分
　　　　　　　　　　　研究者の確保
　　　　　　　　　　　（徴兵者は軍医学校の嘱託に採用）

1944 年 4 月　　　● 「学徒報国隊協力に関する件依頼」
　　　　　　　　　陸軍軍医学校長・三木良英軍医中将より

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[11] 沢井実『近代日本の研究開発体制』名古屋大学出版会、2012 年、199 頁。

<div style="text-align:center">厚生大臣・文部大臣・警視総監宛</div>

1944 年 4 月	•	「第一高等学校　勤労報国隊 　　　　　　　陸軍軍医学校班」結成 文科理科(計 20 名)　9 月に 10 名追加 　　　　　　　　　　総計　30 名	•	オーラルヒストリー聴取 の新田和男氏は理乙 2 年 から選抜
	•	業務：文献カード作成・翻訳・複写・ 　　　統計作成、 　　　ペニシリン委員会議事録・ 　　　報道原稿草案作成 　　　実験助手		
1944 年 5 月 18 日	•	「第三回ペニシリン委員会」		
	•	在外公館へ　ペニシリン文献・菌株の入手 依頼 　駐ドイツ大使館、東亜研究所(ソ連情報) 　コッホ研究所 　バルセロナレテー研究所 　　(論文と菌株の送付依頼) 　　(6 月末に陸軍省から駐在武官宛てに 　　4500 円送金)	•	「戦況」 サイパンの戦い 　(6 月 15 日 　　　～7 月 9 日陥落) マリアナ沖海戦 　　(6 月 19～20 日) 敗北により、西太平洋の 制海権と制空権を失う
1944 年 7 月 4 日	•	「第四回ペニシリン委員会」 培養不適の梅雨時期の為、開発研究は停滞		
1944 年 9 月 1 日	•	「第五回ペニシリン委員会」 　8 月にペニシリン研究は一斉に進展		
	•	有効菌株を決定 　「岩田 50 番」「伝研 N1 番」 　「薮田 176 番」「薮田 233 番」		
	•	培養基(栄養源組成)が抗菌力を左右 　材料模索　蚕の蛹も使用		
	•	委員から「実験の 1 ヵ所集中方式」提案 中核研究室を 伝染病研究所第 7 研究室(梅沢浜夫)に 決定	•	伝研 7 研は 新田和男氏の派遣先
1944 年 9 月 15 日	•	第 132 回東北医学会例会で 東北帝大医学部　近藤師家治*が ペニシリン第一号精製を発表 　「グラム陽性菌に対して阻止作用する 　　ペニシリンについて」 ＊黒屋政彦医学部教授(細菌学)門下生	•	新田和男氏聴取録 「伝研でもペニシリン精製 ができていたが未発表だ った為、 学会報告した東北帝大が 一号となる」、
1944 年 10 月 7 日	•	黒屋教授 ペニシリン注射液を持参し軍医学校来校		

<div style="text-align:center">210</div>

1944 年 10 月 9 日　● 　「ペニシリン小委員会」議題
　　　　　　　　　　　　黒屋政彦　東北帝大の成果発表
　　　　　　　　　　　　　臨床 4 例：蜂窩織炎.敗血症　全例全快
　　　　　　　　　　　　梅沢浜夫
　　　　　　　　　　　　　岩田 50 番生産菌による動物実験
　　　　　　　　　　　　　1000 倍希釈でも効果あり
　　　　　　　　　　　　今後の方針　有効菌種量産を申合せ

1944 年 10 月 16 日　● 　ペニシリン特許申請の準備
　　　　　　　　　　　　田中弁理士と協議
　　　　　　　　　　　　技術院にペニシリンに関する欧州特許
　　　　　　　　　　　　調査を依頼

1944 年 10 月 24 日　● 　細谷省吾　薮田 176 番株の生産菌から
　　　　　　　　　　　　副作用のないペニシリン精製を報告
　　　　　　　　　　● 　稲垣少佐
　　　　　　　　　　　　大量生産に向け　工場視察を開始

1944 年 10 月 26 日　● 　ペニシリン・コロリフィルム到着
　　　　　　　　　　　　（2 月に駐独大使館へ依頼）
　　　　　　　　　　● 　培養試験結果
　　　　　　　　　　　　国産ペニシリンより効果劣る

1944 年 10 月 26 日　● 　**「第六回ペニシリン委員会」**
　　　　　　　　　　　　海軍軍医学校.河合大佐出席（海軍と連携）　　　●　一次史料の中には、
　　　　　　　　　　　　　小林細菌学研究所精製ペニシリンによる　　　　　臨床試験担当者へ配布さ
　　　　　　　　　　　　　臨床例報告　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　れた「菌分担票」原本も
　　　　　　　　　　　　細谷省吾　動物実験と臨床試験結果報告　　　　　ある
　　　　　　　　　　　　　ペニシリンの生産力が安定してくる
　　　　　　　　　　　　　継代培養によっても生産力低下なし　　　　　●　黒屋教授から提出された
　　　　　　　　　　　　梅沢浜夫　化学式確認　　　　　　　　　　　　　菌分担票の欄外には、
　　　　　　　　　　　　　英国精製ペニシリン結晶と合致　　　　　　　　「この菌は近藤師家治が
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　発見した有効菌種であ
　　　　　　　　　　● 　田宮　伝研研究所所長の発言　　　　　　　　　　る」旨のメモあり
　　　　　　　　　　　　「既に研究段階のゴールは達成
　　　　　　　　　　　　大量生産への道を切り開かねばならぬ」

1944 年 11 月 12 日　● 　重城良造薬剤少佐（医務局課員）医校来訪
　　　　　　　　　　　　ペニシリン運用の件
　　　　　　　　　　　　医薬品生産資源調査の件
　　　　　　　　　　　　薬学者と工場協同作業の件

1944 年 11 月 15 日　● 　特許申請の検討　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　●　稲垣少佐
　　　　　　　　　　　　「委員会ガ公表スル前ニ何者カガ patent ヲト　　　「陸軍軍医学校研究部
　　　　　　　　　　　　リ権利ヲ主張サレルタメノ不利トナル事ヲ避　　　業務日誌」に記載
　　　　　　　　　　　　ケルタメニ patent ヲトル事ニシタノデアル」

「細谷氏ノ　梅沢氏ノ patent は発表セシム」*

1944 年 11 月 16 日　●　陸軍省医務局衛生課長. 出月大佐報道発表
　　　　　　　　　　　　「ペニシリンに至る道
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　―陸軍軍医学校研究部―」

1944 年 11 月 17 日　●　朝日新聞
　　　　　　　　　　　　「短期間に見事完成　世界一ペニシリン
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　わが軍陣医学に凱歌」

　　　　　　　　　　●　細谷省吾の談話
　　　　　　　　　　　　「陸軍軍医学校の非常なる熱意と官民学者
　　　　　　　　　　　　　が一致協力してやった仕事である。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　我国の科学行政がもっと確立され、軍、文部
　　　　　　　　　　　　　省、技術院、民間で大きな組織体が出来上が
　　　　　　　　　　　　　れば、あらゆる困難も克服され、大きい科学
　　　　　　　　　　　　　業績を挙げうると信ずる」

1944 年 11 月 18 日　●　森永乳業三島工場に　大量生産依頼
　　　　　　　　　　●　稲垣少佐
　　　　　　　　　　　　　ブレーン 4 名を三島工場に派遣して指導

1944 年 11 月 20 日　●　高級副官から通知
　　　　　　　　　　　　　昭和 20 年度の軍医学校研究部予算
　　　　　　　　　　　　「国民栄養並びに保健に関する研究」名目
　　　　　　　　　　　　　で 20 万円　要求中

1944 年 11 月 27 日　●　ペニシリン　雑誌投稿
　　　　　　　　　　　　　科学朝日、日本医事新報、日本写真公社
　　　　　　　　　　●　「科学朝日」には
　　　　　　　　　　　　　昭和 19 年 11 月号・12 月号に掲載

1944 年 11 月 29 日　●　業務日誌の欄外へ　稲垣少佐のメモ　　　　　●　［戦況］
　　　　　　　　　　　　「「ペ」ガ闇取引ニモチイラレル事ニ厳戒ヲ　　　11 月 29 日
　　　　　　　　　　　　　要ス」　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　東京工業地域目標とする
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　最初の夜間爆撃

1944 年 11 月　　末　●　梅澤の研究室に　萬有製薬社長. 岩垂亨氏　●　梅沢と岩垂幸一は
　　　　　　　　　　　　と長男. 岩垂幸一氏　来訪　　　　　　　　　　高校・大学の同窓
　　　　　　　　　　　　　梅沢からペニシリン開発依頼　　　　　　●　「176 番」「233 番」は
　　　　　　　　　　　　「176 番」「233 番」と「U33」(梅沢発見)　　　森永使用と同じ
　　　　　　　　　　　　を使用[12]　　　　　　　　　　　　　　●　統制により森永社名変更
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　●　開発会社の選定理由
　　　　　　　　　　●　森永食糧工業と萬有製薬の二社が　　　　　　森永：培養材料の脱脂乳
　　　　　　　　　　　　　ペニシリン製剤開発を開始　　　　　　　　　　　と豊富な壜在庫
　　　　　　　　　　　　　培養材料：森永は牛乳廃液（脱脂乳）　　　萬有：合成薬品開発経験

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[12] 日本経営史研究所編集『萬有製薬　八十五年史』2002 年、76-77 頁。

萬有はツアベック・ドックス　　　　　　　　　　と薬品の精製技術

1944 年 12 月 22 日　● 　森永三島工場、萬有目黒工場
　　　　　　　　　　　　 液体抽出に成功

1944 年 12 月 23 日　● 　「第七回ペニシリン委員会」　　　　　　 ● 　1945 年 2 月に
　　　　　　　　　　　　　 森永と萬有から　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 萬有は精製粉末品を完成
　　　　　　　　　　　　　 各 5 L のペニシリン精製液が届く
　　　　　　　　　　① 　大量生産方式確立まで委員会は継続
　　　　　　　　　　　 （陸海協同）
　　　　　　　　　　② 　とりあえず、民需より軍需優先
　　　　　　　　　　③ 　新委員　東北帝大：　黒屋教授
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　北海道帝大：坂村教授
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　京都帝大：　片桐教授
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　小林研究所（海軍）
　　　　　　　　　　④ 　臨床効果報告
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　東京帝大外科：都築教授

1944 年 12 月 26 日　● 　医務局へ上申　特許は陸海共著

1944 年 12 月 27 日　● 　森永三島工場へ出張
　　　　　　　　　　　　 小出中佐、重城薬剤少佐＊
　　　　　　　　　　　　 稲垣少佐、梅沢浜夫、梅沢純夫
　　　　　　　　　　　　＊陸軍省医務局課員.衛生材料本廠廠員兼務

　　　　　　　　　　● 　量産プラン
　　　　　　　　　　　　 衛生材料廠（工場監督）
　　　　　　　　　　　　 製造命令、原価計算、資材は衛生材料廠より
　　　　　　　　　　　　 労務者(女 50 名、男 5 名)
　　　　　　　　　　　　 大量生産工場施設へ
　　　　　　　　　　　　 エーテル回収装置、遠心機、電気炉、
　　　　　　　　　　　　 電気冷蔵庫、真空凍結乾燥機　手配
　　　　　　　　　　● 　目標　1 kg/ 1 ヵ月 （1 万人分）

1945 年　1 月 6 日　● 　『陸軍軍医学校研究部　年鑑』　　　　　 ● 　1945 年 2 月　公刊
　　　　　　　　　　　　 編集委員打合せ

1945 年 1 月 17 日　● 　碧素（ペニシリン）のラジオ放送原稿草案
　　　　　　　　　　　　 一高生（今道、田中、渡辺、横山）
　　　　　　　　　　　　 鳥居敏雄

1945 年 2 月 28 日　● 　「第八回ペニシリン委員会」　　　　　　 ● 　萬有から厚生省へ
　　　　　　　　　　　　 萬有製薬　岡崎工場から　製品提出　　　　　 製造許可申請
　　　　　　　　　　　　 ペニシリン単位　　　　　　　　　　　　 ● 　内服用碧素末
　　　　　　　　　　　　　 Oxford 単位に準じる検定方法を決定　　　　 内服用碧素液
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 碧素注射液（静脈用）
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 の許可

1945 年 3 月 6 日	• ペニシリン特許申請書 　　出願人　陸軍大臣　杉山　元＊ 　　　　　　海軍大臣　米内　光政 • 田中弁理士に作成費用　20 円支払い	• 終戦までの混乱により 　特許は出願できず ＊4 月 7 日から　阿南惟幾
1945 年 4 月 25 日	• 第一回　碧素講習会（1 週間） 　軍医・薬剤官　北支・中支からも参加 　碧素（ペニシリン）菌株を配布	• 帰隊後　部隊で碧素製造 　開始
1945 年 5 月 18 日	• 「第九回ペニシリン委員会」 　梅沢浜夫　ペニシリンカリウム塩は 　　　　　　低温下で粉末状にし 　　　　　　真空中に封入で安定を報告	
1945 年 5 月 23 日	• 第二回　碧素講習会 　満州・南支・中支からも参加	• 空襲を想定し 　講習初日に菌株配布
1945 年 5 月 24 日	• 東京空襲で陸軍軍医学校　焼失	• 東京大空襲
1945 年 5 月 25 日 　　　　26 日	• 東京空襲により萬有目黒工場ほぼ全焼 • 政府は最重要産業施設として陸軍作業部隊 を派遣 ペニシリン製造に必要な資材・機械類・電 線・水道管等解体整理し 軍用トラックで大崎駅に運搬 貨車積みで岡崎工場に輸送し活用[13]	
1945 年 8 月 15 日	• 第三回　碧素講習会　実施中に終戦の詔 　萬有岡崎工場も操業中	• 岡崎工場の作業日誌 「本日より新しき戦い 　始まる。 充填出来上り　372 本」 　　　　（矢野常彦）

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[13] 前掲『萬有製薬　八十五年史』83 頁。

【付録２】
　　新田和男氏のオーラルヒストリー　　（抜粋）
　　　（新田和男氏から　氏名公表の許可を得ています）
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聞き取り調査　　（2016 年 4 月 25 日）
質問者：小松　明子

１．ペニシリン開発研究が　科学動員テーマとして認められるまでの苦労

質問者：日本における戦時中のペニシリン開発研究の過程と運営の特徴について調べております。
　1943 年 12 月 15 日に総力戦研究所の 3 期生から陸軍軍医学校に帰任された稲垣克彦軍医少佐は、戦時に必要なテーマによる科学動員研究の企画実行を命じられます。
　戦後、稲垣氏は「12 月 21 日は運命の日であった」と回想しています。陸軍軍医学校への帰任挨拶と採択テーマへの助言を求めた文部省科学局の長井緯理科学官からいわゆる「キーゼの綜則」を含む科学論文題目の束を受取るところから「ペニシリンに至る道」[14]　が始まります。
　　このペニシリン開発研究の企画と運営手法には特徴があったと考えています。その手法によって不安定な物質であるペニシリンの精製と工場生産の初期段階に達し得たと推測しています。
有効な組織運営のひとつに第一高等学校生徒の軍医学校への勤労動員[15]　があります。理乙 2 年生で動員され、9 月からは梅沢先生の伝研 7 研で実験を担われ、後年、抗生物質・抗癌抗生物質の研究者となられた新田先生に当時の状況をお伺いできることを有難く存じます。
　では、ペニシリン開発研究のテーマ採択にまつわるお話からお聴かせ下さい。

新田：キーゼの論文ということですけど、稲垣少佐は梅沢先生が訳したのをご覧になってこれは是非やろうじゃないかというので、小出策郎中佐に相談したうえで、昭和 19 年 1 月 18 日に「ペニシリン等菌類代謝産物による化学療法の研究の必要」という意見を陸軍医務局の事務局に具申した。その結果 2 月 1 日に、だいたい 10 日ちょっとですね、陸軍軍医学校長の三木良英中将の名で、ペニシリン生産に関する研究のためにこういう研究者が招集されることになったと堀田国元さんの論文「日本のペニシリン開発の源流」[16]では簡単に書いてあるのですね。
　実際は、このわずか 2 週間足らずの間に、稲垣先生が―施設長さんですね。この間ものすごく苦労しているのです。可能なところだと陸軍省はもちろんのこと海軍省、大蔵省、文部省、厚生省、全部あたっている。その都度、ずいぶん反対される。そんなバカな、治るはずがないとか、敵の謀略だと追い返されているのです。それでも（稲垣）先生は何度も何度もしつこく説得して、やっとやってみるかということになった。いわゆる生体解剖で有名な 731 部隊の石井四郎少将、石井閣下が、そんなものは俺の方でやるからテーマをよこせというようなことがあったり。ずいぶん邪魔というか反対意見が多かった。その為になかなか通してもらえなかった。それをやっと陸軍の方で、じゃあ、やってみるかといって、やってみることになった。試しだけどもね。
　わずか 2 週間足らずでそこまで持っていくのは本当に並大抵の苦労じゃなかったのです。そういうことは（これに）[16]全然書いてない。

２．軍嫌いの一高生と陸軍軍医学校への勤労動員

質問者：当時一高生の方は概して軍嫌いの人が多かったと拝察しておりますけれど、積極的にペニシリン開発研究を担う思いが生まれたとしたら、どのようなきっかけがあったのでしょうか。

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[14] 稲垣晴彦編著『碧素　―国産ペニシリン開発の旗振り稲垣軍医少佐と一高生学徒動員』日経事業出版センター、2005 年、246-250 頁。
[15] 前掲『碧素―国産ペニシリン開発の旗振り稲垣軍医少佐と一高生学徒動員』
[16] 堀田国元「日本における抗生物質の源流―ペニシリン開発」(A Historical Story of the Japanese Antibiotics World: Development of Penicillin)。The Japanese Journal of Antibiotics 63(2), 179-204, 2010.

新田：一高生は概して軍嫌いの人が多かったというより、ほとんど全部　軍が嫌いでした。それを表に
　　に出したら引っ張られちゃう。当時は憲兵というのがいた。憲兵の他に特高警察というものが。とに
　　かく戦争に相当深入りしているわけですね、それに反対すれば片っ端から引っ張られて帰ってこない
　　のです。それくらい強制が進んでいた。ですから　みんなそう思っているけど、口には出せない。う
　　っかりそんなことを口にしようものなら引っ張られちゃうという状況だったですね。人間扱いされな
　　い、極端なことを言えば、国民全体が奴隷化されちゃったのですよ。ですから（勤労動員は）否応な
　　しなのですね。その時に、国はもう本当に酷い状況で、人手も足りないというので、学生であろうと
　　何であろうと勤労動員に引っ張られた。それに対してはもう文句がいえないのですね。それに従って
　　いくしかない。一高で始まった学徒動員もほとんどが飛行機作りとか戦車という武器の工場への勤労
　　動員。ところが、一高教授の中に生徒主事で柳田友輔（綽名・タヌキ）という人がいた。生物の教授
　　ですけど、生徒に対する面倒は一切その先生がみてくれた。柳田先生と稲垣先生との間で、どういう
　　風に話し合ったかは知らないけど、せっかく優秀な　―自分のことを優秀といってはまずいですけ
　　ど向学心に燃えているのがいるのに、それ全部を肉体労働に連れ出すのはもったいない。同じ奉仕
　　でも頭脳労働がよいのじゃないかという話が柳田先生と稲垣少佐との間にあったのではないか。稲垣
　　先生自身が一高出身ですから、そういう話し合いができたらしくて、生徒主事もそれは結構だ、いい
　　ことだというのですね。それで最初は 20 人だけ、文科、理科のトップを連れて行く。

３．語学・科学の受講と文献翻訳作業

新田：連れて行って何をするかというと、最初は翻訳だったのです。それも翻訳だけやるのではなくて、
　　今みたいにゼロックスなんかないから、写真撮影したものをさらに複写して本に綴じて関係したとこ
　　ろに配るとか、そういうものまでも僕らにやらせたらどうかということになった。一応名目は外国か
　　ら潜水艦なり何なりを通して運ばれてこられた―医学に限りません、政治的なものも含めて、外国の
　　これはと思われるものはどんどん訳させていく。文科系なんかは、英語だけではなくてドイツ語、
　　フランス語、ロシア語。それらを訳すためには、まだ高等学校で基礎的な知識や専門的知識がないだ
　　ろうと、もうすでに陸軍医学校の稲垣グループになっていた人たち―佐藤先生とか鳥居先生とか増沢
　　先生とか、梅沢先生とかの講義があった。梅沢先生は免疫の話、鳥居先生はアレルギー、増山先生は
　　統計の推計学。佐藤先生はもともとコロイド化学の専門だから物理化学的な、そういう講義があった。
　　その頃、他の連中は日立とか座間へ行っちゃって、飛行機の部品作りなんかをやっていた。そういう
　　講義があったから、実際に軍医学校に行くようになったのは 5 月末くらいから。
　　　そういった状況で行ってみたら、環境は悪くなかった。我々一高生はみんな軍隊は嫌いだけど仕方
　　がない、それに従わなければどうにもならない、強制的だから。いいことには一高は全寮制なのです。
　　今道友信君というのが、後に東大の教授になりますけど、隊長になって 20 人を束ねて、みんな一緒
　　に行く。軍医学校の門を入る時は隊列を整えて足並み揃えて守衛の前は敬礼をして。中に入ってから、
　　稲垣先生は一方では厳しかったけど、わりに柔らかいといったらなんだけど、僕らに同情する気持ち
　　があった。

４．ペニシリン委員会

新田：一方では、僕らとは関係なくペニシリン委員会というのが開かれていた。有能な研究者たちが
　　入っていて、その中に梅沢先生は勿論、伝研の細谷先生とか東大農学部の藪田先生、鈴木先生とい
　　った連中とか、有馬先生とかが入っていた。そういう委員会をやっていて、僕らはペニシリンづく
　　りをやらされることになった。東大の伝研は 1 研から 12 研まであって、1 研が細谷先生。細谷先生
　　のところはジフテリアの研究が一番すごかったのですが、それからトキソイドなんかですね。梅沢先
　　生は東大の細菌学教室にいたのだけど、2 月に伝研に移ってきたばかりだった。移ってきたところが
　　第 7 研究室で、長谷川秀治先生が教授だった。もともと結核の研究室です。クリスチャンの長谷川先
　　生は非常におおらかな方で強制しないのです。梅沢先生がペニシリン委員になったのだからこの研究
　　をやろうということになった。

５．伝染病研究所第７研での実験従事（菌株探索・培養・生成・抽出・精製）

新田：ところが戦争も本当に形勢不利の状況だったから、男の若手の研究者というのはみんな兵隊に引っ張られていなかったのです。中でも長谷川先生の第７研究室は男が２人ぐらいしかいなかった。１人が竹内富雄先生で、ペニシリンの研究のために梅沢先生につくことになった。梅沢先生の部屋に派遣されたのは、新田と星野英一、広川太刀雄の３人。１研の細谷先生の方には後に厚生省の医務局長になった田中明夫と三ツ森英寿と横山英輔の３人。後から梅沢先生の方に渡辺宏が来てそれでずっとやったわけですね。ですからペニシリン開発研究をやろうというのは、こっちの意思ではないのですね。これのために派遣されたわけですから、それをやらざるを得ない。

　高校生だからまだ何も知らない。竹内富雄先生が僕と一緒にやることになり、この先生から実験のノウハウの細かいことを全部教わった。この先生は非常に器用なのですね。動物実験の注射の仕方や動物の押さえ方、いろいろな菌の培養の仕方、有効物質の抽出方法。一から十まで先生に教わった。実験に必要なガラス細工作りも竹内先生から教わった。やってみたら面白いですから一生懸命やりましたけど、苦労が多かった。とにかくわかっているのは、キーゼの論文だけなのですね。あれしかないのです。本当にあれしかない。６ページくらいですね。あまり詳しい事は書いてないのです。ペニシリウム・ノタートゥムという青カビから作ったのだとか、培地はツアペック・ドックスとか、エーテルで抽出したとか、そんなところ。だからまず生産菌から探さなければいけない。菌株をもっている長尾研究所、徳川研究所、根津研究所、東大農学部の籔田先生の所に分けてもらいに行って、それを培養するのだけど、ツアペック・ドックスだけではなかなかうまく生えてくれないのですね、培地にいろんなものを加えてみたり。よく生える培地を作り出すことができても、うまくペニシリンらしい抗菌物質を出してくれないのですね。分けてもらった菌株はどれも役に立たない。では自分で探すしかない。といっても、今だったら青カビなんかどこにでもあるけれども、当時は食べ物がなかったのから、道端に生えている雑草だって食べちゃったのだから、綺麗に何にもないのですよ食べ残しなんてものは。古い鞄とか靴なんかを放っておいたらカビが生えたというようなところから取ってきた。集めること自体が大変だったですね。それはずいぶん苦労しました。

　いい思いもしたのですよ。いい思いというのはね、当時、東京あたりでは本当に食べ物がなくなっちゃって配給もろくなものが来なくなり、団栗の粉なんかがきたりね。終りには藁の粉が来るようになったりして、藁の粉を引いて団子にすると少しお腹はいっぱいになるけど、おいしくもなんともないし、朝作ってきて昼になる団子なんか納豆みたいに糸を引くのですよ。しまいにはそれすらなくなってきた。稲垣先生がどこからどう手に入れたのか軍の権威だろうけど、資材をモノとしてくれたわけ。ブドウ糖なんかは培地に絶対に必要なのだけども、今ではブドウ糖なんて白い粉だと誰だってわかっているのだけど、当時は白い粉のブドウ糖なんてありゃしなかったのね。こんな（手をひろげて）岩みたいな黄色い塊をばさっとハトロン紙みたいなものに包んで持ってきてくれるわけ。それを培地を作りながら、一生懸命掻いちゃ、ちょっとしゃぶっていた。細谷先生のところには水飴が行っていた。僕らのところにはブドウ糖の塊が来ていた。それで僕らお昼になると屋上に集まって物々交換をした。僕らは掻いたブドウ糖を持って、向こうは水飴をビーカーに入れて。本当はそれはよくないことなのだけども、そんないいこともなかった訳ではないけど、全体においては嫌な辛いことばっかりだったですね。

６．ペニシリン開発への使命感

質問者：やらざるを得ないということなのでしょうけれども、例えば細菌戦のためではなくて、ペニシリン研究のためだということですと頑張ろうというお気持ちになり得ますか。

新田：それは当然ですよね。とにかくこれで大勢の人の命が、兵隊の命が救われたのだと。戦争で弾に当たって死ぬよりも、そういった病気で死ぬ兵隊の方が多いし。それを救うことができたというような報道は耳に入ってきていた。兵隊さんがそういう症状で苦しんでいる。ペニシリンは化膿菌だけではなく、ガス壊疽とか敗血症とかにもみんな効きますので、早く作らなければいけないなという気持ちはもちろん強かったですね。

７．ペニシリン委員会の意義　「先駆けなし　みんなで情報共有　みんなで考える」

質問者：1930 年代から軍や技術院でテーマを与える科学動員に大学教授たちが名前を連ねて研究していますが、ペニシリン開発研究では組織面に特徴があったと考えています。

新田：稲垣少佐が組み込んだペニシリン委員会というのが、これが初めて、今までの学者同士の研究のシステムを変えた。ペニシリン委員会の一番の特徴は「先駆けなし、みんな協同」なのです。よそで発表しないで、必ずその「場所」で発表しようと。そこでお互いの知識の交換をやる。俺の所はこうなっているのだが、こうしたいのだが、何かいい手はないか―　といったら、相談に乗る。ペニシリンを開発するという点でみんなの焦点が合っていて、みんなそれに向かって「先駆けなしで協同でやる」。それまでは、研究者が何かやっても、それを取られてはいけないというので、内緒・内緒で自分たちだけでやっていた。そういうのが、このペニシリン委員会ではないということ。

質問者：この戦時ペニシリン開発研究の特徴は、約 1 ヶ月に 1 回間隔で開催されたペニシリン委員会と「先駆けなし」。ペニシリン委員会の「場」で他分野から出た意見も聴き、自分の分野でも役立てる。このやり方によって、9 ヶ月という短時間にペニシリンを生成できたのだろうと思っています。

８．復興を担う世代：一高生への期待と教育

質問者：当時の研究者だけではなく、「その次の世代の一高生」を組織に組み入れておられたところにも特徴があったと考えています。当時はやらなければならないことも多く復興を担うという想いはなかったでしょうね。

新田：実験をやっている最中はあまり余計な事は考えないで集中してやっていますからね。だけど、普段から、僕らが行った頃から稲垣少佐は、戦いは敗戦だ―　そういうことを僕らにチラっといっていました。勝てない、でもやらなきゃいけないと、はっきりとはいわないけれど、そういう感じでしたね。日本が負けた後はおそらく混乱するだろう、その日本の国を立て直すのは君達だと、そうおっしゃっていました。だけど、外にそんなことが漏れたら大変ですから。

質問者：稲垣少佐が　そのようにおっしゃっていたのではないかと推測していました。

新田：(稲垣先生が) おっしゃっていたというけど、ひとりでにわかるような説明で。負けた後、日本は混乱するからそれを立て直すのは君たちだぞというような。そういういい方で僕たちを教育していた。それはありありと体で感じましたね。さっき申し上げたように、一高生はみんな軍隊は嫌いですから、稲垣先生の事を馬鹿にしているのではなくて、先輩だし。(でも) イナゾルといっていたのです。イナゾルのゾルはゾルダーテンというドイツ語で軍人。稲垣さんという軍人という意味。イナゾル自体が、日本の国全体をもちろん考えていたわけね。この戦争は負けるということを考えているくらいだから、そのあとどうしたらいいかということを考えているわけ。それは君たちだぞ、そこまで考えていたのだから、相当、先見の明があったですね。さっきから何回も申し上げたように、特高警察が目を光らせていたから、日本が負けるなどとは口に出せない。稲垣先生はこの戦さは勝てない、そういう意味のことをはっきりじゃないけどおっしゃっていた。僕らは、それでも日本に勝ってほしいという気持ちはありました。やっぱり勝つのだという気持ちはあったですね。だから 100％敗戦だとは思っていなかった。だいたい大本営の発表が全部　嘘なのだけど、100％嘘だとは思いたくない気持ちがあった。やっぱり勝つのだという気持ちは少しあった。だから、敗戦が明確になったという言い方は適切ではない。3 月の東京大空襲の頃になるともうこれは危ないな、勝てそうもないなという気持ちになったけどもね。

９．不安定さによる抽出の苦労と立体構造不明でも臨床効果あれば可

質問者：ペニシリンは非常に不安定だとういうことで、抽出には苦労されたと思います。そのあたりのことをお聴かせ下さい。

新田：実際に動いたのは竹内先生と僕とそれから一緒に行った広川と星野と渡辺。ペニシリンは不安定だから、抽出というのは氷室でやるわけです。氷室というのはこの部屋の半分くらいの大きさで、全体が 10℃以下になっている。氷室は本来低温で保存しなければいけないものを置くところです。周りには棚がいっぱいあってそこに置く。当時、低温実験室というのはないから、ペニシリンは不安定だというので、全部、氷室の中で抽出をやった。他の連中はそんな寒い中に一日中入って作業するのは嫌だといったので、結局抽出をやったのは竹内先生と僕と 2 人きりだった。

質問者：今は、不安定な理由は、ペニシリンの薬効を発揮する部位であるβラクタム環の立体的構造の為だとわかっていますが、当時はわかっていなかった。

新田：まったく構造もわからないしね。とにかく不安定だった。

質問者：低温で処理すればなんとかできるというのは、経験的にわかるのですか。

新田：確かキーゼの論文に書いてあった。カビを精製するのが大変だったということ以外に、軍医学校から融通してくれる培地もだんだん先細りになってきたの。自分たちで探さなきゃいけないということになって、いろんな塩類なんか海水を採りに行ったり。魚のハラワタなんかも魚屋さんに頭を下げてもらったり。そういう状況でやったわけです。蛹も培地の蛋白源として使った。蛹も蚕の蛹ね。食べてみたけどパサパサしていて美味しくなかった。

質問者：ペニシリンは　非常に不安定でご苦労が多かったわけですけれど、ペニシリンの培養、精製、抽出に関する海外からの情報は途絶した状態だったと考えていいのでしょうか。

新田：梅沢先生やイナゾルのところには入っていたと思うのです。僕らに必要なもの（情報）だけは教えてくれた。

質問者：ペニシリンの立体構造はX線構造解析が利用できるまでは分からなかったわけですが、新田先生も、抽出精製した「碧素」が臨牀でよく効いたと書いておられます。使ってみて効くなら立体構造まで明確にわからなくても [17]　「ペニシリンが生成できた」と考えてよいのでしょうか。

新田：正直にいいまして、それはそう。生成物質がブドウ球菌の発育を抑える、しかもそれは動物実験でよく効く。それは多分ペニシリンだろうというだけで、ペニシリンだという確証はありませんが、ペニシリンだろうということだったですね。

【質問者の付記】
　　フレミングが発見した菌株はペニシリン・ノターツムと命名されたが、薬効を有するペニシリンは全合成製剤とは異なり、様々な有望菌株（天然物）から培養・生成が可能である。
　　戦後 1946 年時点でさえ、医薬品ペニシリンの有効含有量は流動的であった（無定形ペニシリン）。JAMA[17]　には「市販ペニシリンの性質は変化している」が掲載されている。戦時開発研究時には、英米も含めて立体構造は解明されていなかった。
　　戦後、X線構造解析法の発達により立体構造が解明され、「ペニシリン」が不安定である理由は、

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[17] Committee on Medical Research, The United States Health Service and the Food and Drug Administration (Joint Statement) (1946). The Changing Character of Commercial Penicillin: With Suggestions as to the Use of Penicillin in Syphilis. JAMA. 1946: 131(4): 271-275. Doi: 0.1001/jama.1946.02870210007002.

薬効発現部位である四員環βラクタム環の立体構造のねじれにあったことが判明する。
βラクタム環を残し安定な「ペニシリン」を精製・抽出するために化学構造の側鎖を修飾した。
異なる側鎖により、ペニシリンには G、X、F、K の４種類があった。
1946 年時点でさえ、同一の製造所のペニシリン製剤でも含有する側鎖が異なることが知られている。JAMA によると、含有量の変化は、培養に用いるペニシリン・ノターツムやペニシリン・シクロゲヌムなど異なる菌株を用いることや、培養技術や終末産物の純化（精製）過程の差異に起因するという。

１０．軍の権力の善用

質問者：稲垣少佐が、研究者の先生方を「先駆けなしの協同」で研究に向かわせることがきたのは、「軍の権力を善用できたからかな」と回想しておられます。戦時という時局の背景がありますけれどこういうこともいえるのでしょうか。

新田：それは、当然あると思う。軍の援助というか。それ以上に、委員たちが、大学の先生たちだけどその人たちがみんな一致してやらなければいけないという気持ちが強かったことだと思いますね。中には不満な人がいたらしいけど、それは表に出さなかった、稲垣少佐が出させなかった。

質問者：「問題がなかった訳ではない」と戦後、稲垣少佐が記しておられます。人間なのだから、そうだろうなと思いました。

新田：しかし、何らかの芽があったとしても、出させない。広く問題化するところまで行かせないというのがよかったのではないか。それはやっぱり軍の力ですよ。

質問者：軍があったとしても、やはり稲垣少佐という方がおられなかったら—。

新田：それはもう　そのままでしょうね。やっぱり稲垣先生は、人が何といおうとも、これはやらなければいけないのだという信念を持っていたから。だから自分のことなんか一切考えていない。おれはどうなってもいいけど、とにかくこれを遂行させるという。

質問者：新田先生、本日は　貴重なお話をお伺いすることができました。戦後の生まれの私にも、動員時の研究の様子、一高の伝統ある特徴などを想い描くことができました。有難うございました。お礼を申し上げます。